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Statement of the Supreme Court in 1895:
“Whenever a distinction is made in the burdens a law
imposes or in the benefits it confers on any citizens by
reason of their birth, or wealth, or religion, it is class
legislation, and leads inevitably to oppression and abuses,
and to general unrest and disturbance in society. It was
hoped and believed that the great amendments to the
Constitution which followed the late civil war had rendered
such legislation impossible for all future time.”
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust
Co.1
INTRODUCTION
Ask anyone whether the Constitution permits discrimination on the
basis of religion, and the response will undoubtedly be no. Yet the
modern Supreme Court has not recognized that the antidiscrimination
command of the Fourteenth Amendment protects religion in the same
way that the Amendment protects against discrimination on the basis of
race or gender. In fact, the Supreme Court has permitted the legislature
to facially discriminate against religion in funding programs.2 To make
matters worse, thirty-seven state constitutions and the District of
Columbia’s Code openly discriminate on the basis of religion in socalled Blaine Amendments.3
The exclusion of religion from the Fourteenth Amendment’s
antidiscrimination command is all the more remarkable because the
Supreme Court has used the Amendment’s antidiscrimination command
to protect a wide variety of groups—most of whom are never mentioned
elsewhere in the text of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has relied
on the Amendment’s antidiscrimination command to strike down
classifications based on gender,4 illegitimacy,5 physical disability,6
1. 157 U.S. 429, 596 (1895), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, as recognized in
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 524 (1988).
2. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (permitting a state to withhold
scholarship money from individuals seeking a religious education, even though it provided
scholarships to individuals seeking a secular education).
3. Kyle Duncan, Comment, Secularism’s Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious
Persecution, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 493 (2003) (counting so-called “Blaine Amendments”);
D.C. CODE § 44–715 (2012).
4. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996) (The VMI Case); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 205 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690–91 (1973).
5. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538
(1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972).
6. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985) (holding that
denial of zoning permit to home for mentally retarded individuals failed rational basis test under
the Equal Protection Clause). But see id. (Marshall, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the
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alienage,7 citizenship,8 and sexual orientation.9 And in Skinner v. State
of Oklahoma, the Supreme Court used the Fourteenth Amendment’s
antidiscrimination command to strike down a statute compelling
sterilization for larceny but not embezzlement.10 Although the Supreme
Court once restricted its equal protection doctrine to “discrete and
insular minorities,”11 it has recently extended equal protection rights to
whites, limiting affirmative action programs and other efforts to aid
racial minorities.12 Most recently, the Ninth Circuit used the Fourteenth
Amendment’s antidiscrimination command to strike down California’s
Proposition 8, banning same-sex marriages.13 Curiously, the Supreme
Court has not granted the same antidiscrimination protection to religion
despite explicit suggestions in the text of the Constitution itself that
religion ought to always be treated as a suspect class.
We think this outcome is clearly wrong. The Supreme Court’s
current view is that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment granted
equal protection to groups that lacked civil or political rights in 1787
(racial minorities), as well as to groups that lacked civil and political
rights in 1787 and 1868 but who would gain those rights in the future
(e.g., women, immigrants, gays and lesbians), yet the Fourteenth
Amendment denied equal protection to groups that did have both civil
and political rights in both 1787 and 1868 (religious groups). Such an
outcome is quite frankly wrong. A more likely construction of the
Fourteenth Amendment is that it did guarantee equal protection for
groups that already had civil and political rights prior to 1868, as well as
to other groups newly recognized for protection starting in 1868. Thus,
Michael A. Paulsen has quite rightly argued for an equal protection
approach to the Establishment Clause,14 and Bernadette Meyler has
argued quite rightly for an equal protection approach to the Free
judgment) (arguing that mentally retarded individuals should be considered a suspect class due
to history of discrimination and strict scrutiny analysis should apply).
7. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that a school district could not
charge children of illegal immigrants tuition to compensate for lost state funding).
8. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718 (1973) (holding that a state could not condition
admission to the bar on citizenship).
9. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
10. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (striking down a poll tax under the equal protection clause).
11. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
12. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009); Parents Involved in Cmty.
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747 (2007); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275
(2003).
13. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. dismissed
sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 2432 (2010).
14. Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection
Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 326–31 (1986).
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Exercise Clause.15 Other scholars as well have sought to interpret the
two Religion Clauses of the First Amendment with reference to the
Equal Protection Clause.16 But no one to date has made an argument
from the original public meaning of the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment that the antidiscrimination command of that Amendment
bans all forms of discrimination on the basis of religion, including
Blaine Amendments and public school monopolies, and that it would do
so even if the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause had never
been adopted!
In this Article, we argue that, as a matter of original meaning, the
Fourteenth Amendment, standing alone, forbids all discrimination on
the basis of religion just as it forbids all discrimination on the basis of
race and gender. Our understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is
based on the research of Professor Melissa Saunders17 and Professor
John Harrison,18 who have both argued that the Amendment outlawed
class legislation, and on the research of Professor Steven Calabresi and
Julia Rickert, who have argued that the Amendment also banned
systems of caste.19 The historical evidence is overwhelming and
persuasive. We argue that a ban on class legislation and systems of caste
is broad in scope and that it includes a ban on all forms of
discrimination on the basis of religion. Religion is a suspect
classification such that discrimination on the basis of religion ought
always to be subjected to strict scrutiny, which is strict in theory and
fatal in fact.20 We reach this conclusion without regard to the original
meaning of either the Establishment Clause or of the Free Exercise
15. Bernadette Meyler, The Equal Protection of Free Exercise: Two Approaches and their
History, 47 B.C. L. REV. 274, 275 (2006).
16. Other scholars have also argued that the religion clauses involve a concept of equality.
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 70 (2007) (explaining that “the religion clauses express equality norms
that . . . are much like the more general norms in the Equal Protection Clause”); PHILLIP
HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 14 (2002); Susan Gellman & Susan LooperFriedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal Protection Clause for Religion Cases (Not Just the
Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 666 (2008); Philip B. Kurland, Of Church
and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1961) (stating that the Religion
Clauses should be “read together as creating a doctrine more akin to the reading of the equal
protection clause than to the due process clause”).
17. See generally Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and
Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1997).
18. See generally John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101
Yale L.J. 1385 (1992).
19. Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 4 (2011); see also Mark C. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex
Discrimination: One Small Cheer for Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV.
1366, 1376 (1990) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause banned systems of class and caste).
20. See Paulsen, supra note 14, at 329.
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Clause either in 1791 or in 1868.
The antidiscrimination command of the Fourteenth Amendment
would ban discrimination on the basis of religion even if the Fourteenth
Amendment did not incorporate the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses. Discrimination on the basis of religion is a forbidden form of
class legislation even when it is sanctioned in state constitutions, and it
is always unconstitutional.21 And just as the constitutional and statutory
bans on race discrimination and on sex discrimination ban state laws
and workplace and educational environments that are hostile to African
Americans or to women, the ban on discrimination on the basis of
religion, which is specifically mentioned in the Civil Rights Act of
1964, should also ban workplace or educational environments that are
hostile to religion. A learning environment in which student religious
groups face official hostility on account of their religious beliefs is quite
simply illegal. Moreover, Supreme Court decisions that seek to scrub
the public square clean of all references to religion are themselves
unconstitutional attempts to create a public environment that is hostile
to religion.22 A Supreme Court rule banning public displays on
government buildings of, for example, the Ten Commandments23
creates an environment that is hostile to religion in the same way that a
Supreme Court rule banning displays of pictures of Martin Luther King
or of Susan B. Anthony would create an environment that is hostile to
African Americans or to women.
Our antidiscrimination argument with respect to religion is in line
with the Supreme Court’s most important and most recent decision
protecting religious liberty from government action. In its 2012 decision
in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, a unanimous
Supreme Court recognized that the Constitution mandates a “ministerial
exception” to generally applicable employment laws.24 In the HosannaTabor decision, a minister of a church claimed that she had suffered
employment discrimination.25 The Supreme Court unanimously held
that the plaintiff was a minister,26 and the Court explicitly rejected the
Obama Administration’s argument that the government can subject
ministers in churches to generally applicable employment
discrimination laws.27 Hosanna-Tabor thus requires the government to
consider the impact of its neutral, generally applicable employment
21. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 252.
22. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (outlawing a
display of the Ten Commandments); Lee v. Wesiman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (striking down
school prayers at graduation ceremonies).
23. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 850.
24. 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012).
25. Id. at 699–701.
26. Id. at 708.
27. Id. at 706–07.
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discrimination laws on religion. Since those employment discrimination
laws make it just as illegal to discriminate on the basis of religion, as it
is to discriminate on the basis of race or sex, it is hard to see how a
religious employer could ever be stopped from firing any employee for
religious reasons whether that employee is or is not a minister.
Obviously, religious employers can hire exclusively members of their
own religions just as it is obvious that Native American tribes can
decide whether a person is or is not, for example, a Cherokee, and just
as men can be excluded from all women’s colleges that have federal tax
exempt status. The Hosanna-Tabor decision decisively rejects the claim
that forbidding discrimination on the basis of race or sex discrimination
under the Constitution is somehow more important under the
Constitution and laws than is forbidding discrimination on the basis of
religion. All three forms of discrimination are equally proscribed by the
Constitution and by our civil rights laws.
Our analysis begins with the premise that the proper way to interpret
the Constitution is to evaluate the original public meaning of the
Constitution’s text.28 We thus follow the methodology of Supreme
Court justices Antonin Scalia29 and Clarence Thomas throughout this
Article. In looking for the objective original public meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s antidiscrimination command, we have looked
at dictionaries, speeches, newspaper articles, documents, legislative
histories, and historical events to determine the original public meaning
of the constitutional text.30 We emphatically do not think that the
framers’ subjective meaning or intent is a controlling analytical factor,
just as a party’s subjective intent in signing a contract does not
determine the meaning of the contract.31 Instead, we think that what
matters is the objective public meaning of the text as defined during the
historical time period in which it was written and ratified.32 It is
therefore necessary to examine the historical record to discern how the
28. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
(1997).
29. Id.
30. See William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism,
Original Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 497–98
(2007).
31. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 144 (1990) (“The search is not for a subjective intention. . . . [W]hat counts is what the
public understood.”); John Harrison, State Sovereign Immunity and Congress’s Enforcement
Powers, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 353, 388 (2006) (discussing how the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment were concerned that the Amendment could have broader implications than they
expected or intended); Steven Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v.
Virginia, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1393, 1408–09 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment banned
antimiscegenation laws, even though the framers subjectively intended otherwise).
32. See SCALIA, supra note 288, at 37–38.
THE LAW
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framers understood the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning insofar as it
bans discrimination.
Adhering to the original public meaning of the text is especially
important when evaluating a Fourteenth Amendment question. If a court
takes the view that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
civil rights can change and evolve over time, then no one is safe. Living
constitutionalists must concede that not only could groups be added into
the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection, but also that groups could be
removed from the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection as well.33 This
consequence was implicitly endorsed by the Warren Court in Harper v.
Virginia State Board of Elections, in which the majority stated that “the
Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a
particular era . . . we have never been confined to historic notions of
equality.”34 But perhaps some kinds of shackling are in fact good. If the
Supreme Court would always agree to adhere to the original public
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, civil rights could never in the
future be conditioned on the basis of race, and segregation would
always be unconstitutional. But if the Supreme Court follows the
Warren Court’s view in Harper, there are no constitutionally secured
protections against segregation. Under originalism, segregation was
unconstitutional in 1868, and Plessy v. Ferguson35 was wrong on the
day it was decided.36 But under Harper, Plessy was correct in 1896, and
segregation was permissible until the 1950s when the Supreme Court
said otherwise.37
We believe that the Fourteenth Amendment’s broad ban on all class
legislation and systems of caste prohibits the government from singling
out any groups or individuals for unique burdens or privileges or
33. Eliminating groups protected under the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment is precisely what the Supreme Court did in Carolene Products “Footnote Four.”
There, the Court restricted the Amendment’s protection to “discrete and insular minorities,”
even though the Amendment originally protected everyone, even members of the majority. 304
U.S. at 153 n.4; see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3088–3120 (2010)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Second Amendment does not give individuals a
substantive right to bear arms, even though the original meaning indicated otherwise).
34. 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
35. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (endorsing the concept of “separate but
equal”).
36. See Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 31, at 1431–32 (setting out the originalist case
against Plessy).
37. Similarly, Harper allows future courts to reinterpret the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law” as including fetuses, not just people. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added); see
Abortion Case I, Federal Constitutional Court (Germany), 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975) (“‘Everyone’
within the meaning of [the Constitution] is ‘every living human being,’ or, put differently, every
human individual possessing life; ‘everyone’ thus also includes the still unborn human being.”).
After all, why should it matter that in 1868 a “person” did not include a fetus?
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immunities. Class legislation, which benefits or injures a limited class
of individuals, can in essence be viewed as the opposite of legislation
enacted to promote the general welfare, which benefits all citizens.38
We find it hard to believe that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment created a broad ban on class legislation, yet excluded
religious individuals from protection against all forms of class
legislation enacted on the basis of religion. The religion clauses of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights served as early, though limited, bans
on some forms of class legislation directed against religion. Religion
also enjoyed substantial protection in state constitutions in 1868, most
of which had Free Exercise and Establishment Clause analogues.39
Constitutional protection against discrimination on the basis of
religion has deep roots in American history going back to the founding
generation. The founders were well aware of the evils of discrimination
on the basis of religion which had been widespread both in Europe and
in Colonial America, and they sought to guard against it. The three
religion clauses in the Constitution of 1787 and in the Bill of Rights
served as an initial, though limited, protection against certain specific
forms of discrimination on the basis of religion. State constitutions also
protected against certain forms of discrimination on the basis of religion
in varying ways. But unfortunately, discrimination on the basis of
religion was quite prevalent during the antebellum period. Slaves in
particular were subjected to harsh discrimination on the basis of
religion, in addition to the general cruelty that they experienced.
Abolition was partly sought to give slaves religious liberty. And the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment generally recognized that
discrimination on the basis of religion was entirely unacceptable. When
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment condemned the systematic
mistreatment of African Americans during Reconstruction, those
framers frequently cited the Indian caste system as a comparable
reprehensible social order. The Indian caste system was itself defined by
and was in practice a class system based on religious distinctions.40 A
typical nineteenth century dictionary definition of caste read, “In
Hindostan, a tribe or class of the same profession, as the caste of
Bramins; a distinct rank or order of society.”41 Bramins were the
38. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 252–53 n.29.
39. See Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State
Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights are Deeply
Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 31–41 (2009).
40. See generally Charles Sumner, Lecture, The Question of Caste (Wright & Porter
Printers, 1869), available at http://ia600306.us.archive.org/5/items/questionofcaste00sumn/
questionofcaste00sumn.pdf.
41. See, e.g., CHAUNCEY A. GOODRICH, A PRONOUNCING AND DEFINING DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 64, 75 (1856); JOSEPH E. WORCESTER, A UNIVERSAL AND CRITICAL
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 107–08, 128 (1849) (“Caste, n. A distinct, hereditary
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priestly class at the top of India’s religious caste system.42 So, in 1868,
the literal dictionary definition of an undesirable system of “caste” was
one that made reference to a religious caste system! The unavoidable
conclusion is therefore that when the framers banned systems of caste
and class legislation in general, they surely meant to ban class systems
that were maintained by discrimination on the basis of religion.
Banning discrimination on the basis of religion is also consistent
with global human rights law, which bans discrimination on the basis of
religion just as emphatically as it bans discrimination on the basis of
race or gender.43 At least forty-five countries protect against
discrimination on the basis of religion alongside protections against
discrimination on the basis of race and gender.44 Some of those
countries include such major world powers as Canada, Germany,
France, India, and South Africa. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights and Freedoms
also outlaw discrimination on the basis of religion. And in the United
States, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protected against discrimination on
the basis of religion alongside its protections against discrimination on
the basis of race and gender.45 Simply put, when people come together
to ban discrimination and to guarantee equality, they include religion
along with race and gender on the list of suspect classes.
We recognize that our reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment’s
antidiscrimination command in religion-related cases might appear
novel, since courts generally rely on the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to decide religion-related
cases. We think the Supreme Court has probably felt obligated to take
this path because the First Amendment’s text speaks so directly about
religion. In contrast, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
mention religion explicitly, although it is the Fourteenth Amendment
and not the First that makes the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause applicable at all to the fifty states. Notwithstanding the
constitutional text, there is no reason to think that all religion questions
must be answered by the First Amendment, and that no religion
questions can be answered by the Fourteenth Amendment’s
antidiscrimination command standing alone. Indeed, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s antidiscrimination command does not specifically use the
words “race” or “gender” any more than it uses the word “religion.” In
order or class of people among the Hindoos, the members of which are of the same rank,
profession, or occupation; an order or class”); see also Sumner, supra note 400, at 6–10
(discussing the Indian caste system at length).
42. Sumner, supra note 40, at 8.
43. See discussion infra Part II.E.
44. See Appendix.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006).
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fact, the Supreme Court as long ago as in 1938 in Carolene Products
“Footnote Four” said that the Fourteenth Amendment protects religion
from discrimination, just as much as it protects against race or national
origin discrimination!46 And the Court made that observation even
though it also recognized that laws abridging First Amendment rights
get strict scrutiny.47 The clear implication of Footnote Four is that
religion gets Fourteenth Amendment protection in addition to and above
and beyond any First Amendment protections that religion gets under
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.48 And that truism has
been cemented by subsequent courts’ almost ritualistic recitation that
“[t]he Equal Protection Clause prohibits selective enforcement based
upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification.”49 The Supreme Court has also never said that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s antidiscrimination command does not forbid
discrimination on the basis of religion. The issue of whether the
Fourteenth Amendment bars discrimination on the basis of religion has
never truly been argued before the Court because the parties and the
Court generally have focused exclusively on the First Amendment
religion clauses to date.50 So, the Supreme Court could start using the
Fourteenth Amendment to adjudicate discrimination on the basis of
religion cases without contradicting its existing incorporated First
Amendment case law. Even lower courts could start using the
Fourteenth Amendment’s antidiscrimination guarantee in religion cases
without getting into trouble for stare decisis reasons because the
Supreme Court has never said that only the incorporated First
Amendment can be used in religion cases.
In Part I of this Article, we discuss the original public meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment and its antidiscrimination command. In Part II,
we explain how the Fourteenth Amendment applies to ban
discrimination on the basis of religion. In Part III, we discuss how the
46. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
47. Id.
48. See further discussion infra Part III.C.
49. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 n.9 (1979) (citing Oyler v. Boles,
368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
456, 464 (1996); Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931, 938 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Engquist v.
Oregon Dep’t of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 596 (2008); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17
(1981)) (stating that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment most
typically reaches state action that treats a person poorly because of the person’s race or other
suspect classification, such as sex, national origin, religion, political affiliation, among others, or
because the person has exercised a ‘fundamental right,’ or because the person is a member of a
group that is the target of irrational government discrimination”).
50. Parties often mention the Equal Protection Clause as an afterthought, but they never
treat equal protection as the principal argument. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 44–45, Locke
v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315).
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original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment compares to modern
case law. In Part IV, we describe the connection between the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses and the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Part V, we explain why Blaine Amendments violate the Fourteenth
Amendment and respond to a critical counterargument against our
thesis. In Part VI, we apply the Fourteenth Amendment to the public
school system. We think that public schools in their current form
discriminate on the basis of religion. We then close with some
concluding thoughts.
I. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
For nearly 150 years, the Supreme Court has mangled the words and
basic structure of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court’s misreading
of the Fourteenth Amendment began in 1873 in the Slaughter-House
Cases, a case in which the Court, somewhat ironically, butchered the
language of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court’s opinion in the
Slaughter-House Cases rendered the Privileges or Immunities Clause—
the most important clause in the Fourteenth Amendment—essentially
meaningless.51 In subsequent years, the Court continued to ignore the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, and eight Justices adhered to that
stance as recently as 2010, in McDonald v. City of Chicago,52 although
Justice Clarence Thomas did call for reconsidering the Slaughter-House
Cases.53 Since 1873, the Supreme Court has relied solely on the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the textual source of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s antidiscrimination command.54 And in
cases involving claims of individual fundamental rights, the Supreme
Court has also ignored the Privileges or Immunities Clause and has
instead analyzed those cases under its substantive due process
doctrine.55
This approach has been largely unsettling to observers, since it
leaves unanswered some fairly obvious questions. First, what happened
to the Privileges or Immunities Clause? Second, how does a
constitutional guarantee of due process of law translate into a
substantive due process doctrine under which certain rights are
absolutely protected? And third, how does a clause that guarantees the
equal protection of existing laws also guarantee equality in the making
of new laws? Ironically, the Supreme Court has reached mostly the right
results in its case law while proceeding in every case under the wrong
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the current approach is
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 78–79 (1873).
130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010).
Id. at 3058–62.
See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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so unsatisfying as an original matter, we begin with an originalist
account of the whole text of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. The Text and Structure of the Fourteenth Amendment
To understand the original meaning of Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment, one must begin with the original meaning of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause.56 That Clause, which the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment thought was the most important Clause in the
Amendment, says that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States.”57 The Privileges or Immunities Clause thus restricts the kind of
laws a state can “make” or “enforce.” The Privileges or Immunities
Clause is the only clause in the Fourteenth Amendment which directly
addresses the question of what laws a state legislature can
constitutionally “make.” Noah Webster’s 1828 Dictionary defines the
verb “to make” as “to form,” “to fashion,” “to mold,” or “to create.”58
The Privileges or Immunities Clause thus applies to the formation of
56. Modern scholarship on the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
began with John Harrison’s article Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, in which
Harrison argued that the Clause was on an anti-discrimination guarantee and not a font of
substantive due process individual rights. Harrison, supra note 18, at 1387–88. Phillip
Hamburger reaches the same conclusion in Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 61, 73
(2011). See also DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS 342–51 (1985). Akhil Reed Amar and Randy Barnett read the Clause as
protecting both against discrimination and as conferring un-enumerated individual rights. AKHIL
REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE
BY 157 (2012); RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 62–65 (2004). Kurt Lash argues in a series of three law review articles which he is
turning into a book that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects both against discrimination
and that it also protects enumerated but not un-enumerated individual rights. Kurt Lash, The
Constitutional Referendum of 1866: Andrew Johnson and the Original Meaning of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2013); Kurt Lash, The Origins of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of
Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241 (2010); Kurt Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329
(2011). Robert Natelson argues in The Original Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, 43 GA. L. REV. 1117, 1183–88 (2009) for the John Harrison and Phillip Hamburger
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Our own view of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is that it protects: 1) against
laws that discriminate on the basis of class or caste and that are not just laws enacted for the
good of the whole people; and that 2) it protects both enumerated individual rights and unenumerated individual rights that are deeply rooted in history and tradition subject always to the
caveat that the states can override such rights if they pass a just law that is enacted for the
general good of the whole people. Our reading grows out of the foundational case of Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (1823).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
58. “Make” definition, NOAH WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY (1828), available at
http://www.1828-dictionary.com/d/search/word,make.
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laws. Laws can, of course, be made by the legislature as statutes, by the
executive branch as regulations, or by the judiciary as judge-made
common law. The Clause therefore forbids lawmakers from “making”
any laws that “abridge,” i.e. that “shorten” or “lessen,” those rights
which are the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.59
This reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause has been advanced
most vigorously in the modern era by Professor John Harrison and by
Professor David Currie.60
In addition to banning the making of discriminatory laws, the
Privileges or Immunities Clause also bans the enforcement of
discriminatory state laws.61 Noah Webster’s 1828 Dictionary defines the
verb “to enforce” as “to strengthen,” “to instigate,” “to animate,” “to
give force to,” or “to put in execution.”62 This indicates that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause forbids the executive and judicial
branches from executing any laws that “abridge” citizens’ privileges or
immunities. This no-enforcement language effectively prevents state
executive branches from being able to claim that they had no choice but
to execute a state legislature’s unconstitutional laws. Taken together, the
Privileges or Immunities Clause stops state governments from making
or implementing any laws that unconstitutionally “abridge” citizens’
privileges or immunities.63
The meaning attached to the Privileges or Immunities Clause was of
course squarely before the Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House
Cases. Since the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment makes
everyone born or naturalized in the United States a citizen both of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside, the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States necessarily include both (1)
59. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1422.
60. See Harrison, supra note 18; CURRIE, supra note 56, respectively.
61. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1402.
62. “Enforce” definition, NOAH WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY (1828), available at
http://www.1828-dictionary.com/d/search/word,enforce.
Enforce:
1. To give strength to; to strengthen; to invigorate.
2. To make or gain by force; to force; as, to enforce a passage.
3. To put in act by violence; to drive.
Stones enforced from the old Assyrian slings.
4. To instigate; to urge on; to animate.
5. To urge with energy; to give force to; to impress on the mind; as, to enforce
remarks or arguments.
6. To compel; to constrain; to force.
7. To put in execution; to cause to take effect; as, to enforce the laws.
8. To press with a charge.
Id.
63. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1420–24, 1447–51.
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their privileges or immunities of national citizenship and (2) their
privileges or immunities of state citizenship.64 But the Slaughter-House
majority denied this understanding. It seems quite obvious that the
majority’s reading ignored the Fourteenth Amendment’s plain language.
It was also general knowledge in 1866 to 1868 that a primary goal of
the Fourteenth Amendment was to outlaw the Black Codes which
abridged the state common law rights of contract, torts, and property of
African Americans.65 To accomplish that objective, the Fourteenth
Amendment simply has to be read as protecting the privileges or
immunities of state citizenship as well as the privileges or immunities of
national citizenship.66 But the Slaughter-House majority literally
rendered the Fourteenth Amendment unintelligible. For that reason, the
Supreme Court had to read back into the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses all the content that it had wrongly drained from the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.
But the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause grants all
persons the “equal protection of the laws.”67 In contrast to the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause says nothing about
equality in the making or implementing of equal laws.68 The noun in the
Equal Protection Clause is “protection,” and “equal” appears only as an
adjective. The Clause is thus quite literally all about the “protection” of
the laws.69 Therefore the text of the Equal Protection Clause declares
that “no state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”70 If the Clause had been meant to ban the
making or formation of discriminatory laws, it should have read, “no
state shall deny to any person equal laws” or just “no state shall deny to
any person equality.” The word “protection”—which again is the noun
in the Equal Protection Clause—would have been unnecessary if the
Clause was about equality in the making of laws.71 Instead, the word
“protection” adds meaning to the Equal Protection Clause because it
makes it clear that the Clause is fundamentally about providing equality
in the protection of those state constitutions and state statutes and state
common law rules that were already made and that were in the statute
books or that were in the recorded state case law.72
64. Harrison, supra note 18, at 1415.
65. Harrison, supra note 18, at 1416.
66. Harrison, supra note 18, at 1415.
67. Harrison, supra note 18, at 1433–34.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
69. Harrison, supra note 18, at 1433–34.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
71. Harrison, supra note 18, at 1433–34.
72. This explanation contradicts the Supreme Court’s declaration in Yick Wo v. Hopkins
that “the equal protection of the laws” means “the protection of equal laws.” See 118 U.S. 356,
369 (1886).
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Noah Webster’s 1828 Dictionary defines the word “protection” as
meaning “defense; shelter from evil; preservation from loss, injury or
annoyance.”73 This definition shows that the Equal Protection Clause
required the states to defend and shelter all people equally under their
respective laws. No state could enforce its laws against murder to
“protect” some people, such as white southerners, but not others, such
as blacks or northerners residing in the South. Unlike the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause is thus centrally
concerned with the application or operation of laws that are already on
the books or that are reported common law rights and that do not
discriminate on their face. The guarantee of the “equal protection of the
laws” means that a state must enforce its facially neutral laws and
common law rules equally with regards to all persons. A state cannot,
for instance, use its police power to protect whites but not blacks, or
enforce its contract law for the benefit of whites but not blacks. The
Equal Protection Clause applies to both executive and judicial
enforcement of otherwise valid laws.
As a historical matter, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
sought to ensure that southern states would protect blacks from violence
and from being denied the equal protection of those facially neutral laws
that were already on the books.74 Philosophically, the Equal Protection
Clause recognized the Lockean principle that individuals sacrifice the
individual freedoms with which they are born and retain in the state of
nature in exchange for the equal protection of the laws.75
It is well-established that the American people understood that by
enacting the Fourteenth Amendment they were writing into federal
constitutional law the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which had abolished the
Black Codes.76 The Black Codes were a series of racially discriminatory
laws adopted by southern states in 1865 and 1866 to reduce freedmen to
second-class social status.77 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 read as
73. “Protection” definition, NOAH WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY (1828), available
at http://www.1828-dictionary.com/d/search/word,protection.
74. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1437 (discussing how the Equal Protection Clause
enabled Congress to pass the Ku Klux Act of 1871).
75. See BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, Editor’s App. 47 (S. Tucker ed. 1803)
[hereinafter “BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES”] (explaining “that the whole should protect all of
its parts, and that every part should pay obedience to the will of the whole; or, in other words,
that the community should guard the rights of each individual member, and that (in return for
this protection) each individual should submit to the laws of the community; without which
submission of all it was impossible that protection could be certainly extended to any”).
76. Harrison, supra note 18, at 1388.
77. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1402–05. Senator Lyman Trumbull maintained that
abolition under the Thirteenth Amendment permitted Congress to pass laws protecting blacks
from badges of slavery, such as the Black Codes, and to protect blacks’ legal rights. He
accordingly said:
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follows:
[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to
any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby
declared to be citizens of the United States; and such
citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any
previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property, as
is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the
contrary notwithstanding.78
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 thus guaranteed two forms of legal
equality. First, it barred states from “making” or “enforcing” any law
that failed to give citizens “of every race and color” the “same”
common law rights as were “enjoyed by white citizens.” And second, it
prevented the states from unequally enforcing otherwise valid laws that
were facially nondiscriminatory so as to protect some classes of citizens
and not others. This provision addressed such obvious problems as how
blacks could possibly buy and own property if they could not rely on the
police for “protection” when violent whites came to throw them off
their land.
The Fourteenth Amendment was proposed and ratified to, at a
minimum, constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866.79 President
Andrew Johnson had vetoed the Act because he felt that it exceeded
Congress’s power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on

Since the abolition of slavery, the Legislatures which have assembled in the
insurrectionary States have passed laws relating to the freedmen, and in nearly
all the States they have discriminated against them. They deny them certain
rights, subject them to severe penalties, and still impose upon them the very
restrictions which were imposed upon them in consequence of the existence of
slavery, and before it was abolished. The purpose of the bill under
consideration is to destroy all these discriminations, and to carry into effect the
constitutional amendment.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
78. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
79. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1408–09.
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slavery.80 Congress responded by overriding his veto and ultimately
ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment.81 The substantive rights or
privileges or immunities protected by the Act are all obviously state
common law rights, such as the right to make contracts, own property,
inherit, and testify.82 It was these common law rights of state citizenship
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause were meant to safeguard.83 All originalist scholars, including
Raoul Berger, agree that at a minimum the Fourteenth Amendment
constitutionalized the list of rights in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.84 The
Slaughter-House Cases eviscerated that purpose and was therefore
clearly wrong.
The two primary forms of legal equality guaranteed in the Civil
Rights Act were thus infused into the Fourteenth Amendment. As
Professor Harrison has argued, the guarantee of equal enforcement of
facially nondiscriminatory laws was encapsulated in the Equal
Protection Clause, while the guarantee of equality in the “making” of
laws was enshrined in the Privileges or Immunities Clause.85 Modern
readers may wonder how the Privilege or Immunities Clause might be
understood as ban on discriminatory law making.
The answer is that the Clause forbids the making of laws that give
one class of citizens an “abridged” or shortened or lessened set of rights
as compared with another class of citizens.86 The verb “abridge” is used
in precisely this antidiscriminatory way in the Fifteenth Amendment,
which says, “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”87 Of course, the verb
“abridge” can also apply to individual abridgements of rights as when
an individual’s right to the freedom of speech or of the press is
80. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1404.
81. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1404.
82. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1388.
83. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1388.
84. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, SELECTED WRITINGS ON THE CONSTITUTION 185 (1987)
(“[T]he uncontroverted evidence, confirmed in these pages, is that the framers [of the
Fourteenth Amendment] repeatedly stated that the amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866
were ‘identical’ . . .”); see also ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 75 (1992) (“It
was the demonstrable consensus of the Thirty-ninth Congress that section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment ‘constitutionalized’ the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”); MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE
PEOPLE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT 72 (1999) (“Recall that,
whatever else it did, the second sentence of section one constitutionalized the 1866 Civil Rights
Act.”); 2 RALPH A. ROSSUM & G. ALAN TARR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE BILL OF
RIGHTS AND SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS 53 (8th ed. 2010) (“The Fourteenth Amendment was
obviously designed to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”).
85. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1414–33.
86. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1397.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XV (emphasis added).
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“abridged” in violation of the First Amendment. Rights can be
shortened or lessened by one person at a time or by one class of people
at a time. The original plain public meaning of the verb “abridge” in the
Privileges or Immunities Clause thus obviously forbids both
discriminatory “abridgements” and “abridgements” that occur as denials
of individual rights that are deeply rooted in history and tradition.88
Because the Slaughter-House Cases strangled the Privileges or
Immunities Clause in its crib, discriminatory abridgements of rights are
today analyzed under the Equal Protection Clause, while abridgements
of individual rights are analyzed using substantive due process.89
In the nineteenth century, the words “privileges” and “immunities”
were synonymous with the phrase “positive law rights,” and these terms
were often used side by side.90 The word “privilege” in particular comes
from the Latin words “privy,” which means private, and “legis,” which
means law.91 A “privilege” is therefore not a right enjoyed under natural
law but is instead only a right that is enjoyed under positive law. Noah
Webster’s 1865 Dictionary defined the word “privilege” as being “a
right or immunity not enjoyed by others or by all,” and Webster’s cited
the words “immunity,” “franchise,” “right,” and “liberty” as being
synonyms.92 Webster’s defined the word “immunity” as meaning
“[f]reedom from an obligation” or a “particular privilege.”93 The word
“immunity” has the same positive law connotation as does the word
“privilege”.94 And Webster’s defined the word “right” as meaning a
“[p]rivilege or immunity granted by authority.”95 Similarly, William
Blackstone described the “rights and liberties” of Englishmen as being
“private immunities” and “civil privileges.”96 And a federal court in
Magill v. Brown said that “‘privileges and immunities’ relate to the
rights of persons, place or property; a privilege is a peculiar right, a
private law, conceded to particular persons or places.”97

88. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1423.
89. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1414.
90. See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3063–78 (2010)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the meaning of “privileges” and “immunities”).
91. THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 841 (Robert K. Barnhart ed., 1988).
92. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1039 (C.
Goodrich & N. Porter rev. 1865) [hereinafter “WEBSTER’S 1865”]; see also 2 C. RICHARDSON, A
NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 627 (1839) (defining “privilege” as “an
appropriate or peculiar law or rule or right; a peculiar immunity, liberty, or franchise”).
93. WEBSTER’S 1865, supra note 92, 661; see also RICHARDSON, supra note 94, at 403
(defining “immunity” as “[f]reedom or exemption, (from duties,) liberty, privilege”).
94. BARNHART, supra note 91, at 510.
95. WEBSTER’S 1865, supra note 92, at 1140.
96. BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 75, at 129.
97. Magill v. Brown, 16 F. Cas. 408, 428 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 8,952).
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The substance of these rights or “privileges or immunities”
encompassed all of the common law rights of contract, property, torts,
and inheritance guaranteed in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.98 The Act
thus guaranteed that all citizens of every race and color should enjoy the
same state law rights as to property, contract, family law, and tort.99 As
all commentators on the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
have argued, the drafters and ratifiers of the Amendment understood the
words “privileges or immunities” to mean much the same thing as was
meant by those exact same words in the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV. This Clause was understood in 1868 as having the
expansive meaning that Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington
had given the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause while riding
circuit in 1823.100 In Corfield v. Coryell, Justice Washington defined the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV in quite expansive
terms. He said that:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states? We feel no hesitation in
confining these expressions to those privileges and
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which
belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and
which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the
several states which compose this Union, from the time of
their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What
these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more
tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be
all comprehended under the following general heads:
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety;
subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government
may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The
right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in
any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture,
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of
the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions
of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and
dispose of property, either real or personal; and an
exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid
by the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as
some of the particular privileges and immunities of
98. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1388.
99. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1388.
100. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1399.
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citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general
description of privileges deemed to be fundamental: to
which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated
and established by the laws or constitution of the state in
which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which
might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and
immunities . . . .101
This sprawling list of constitutionally protected privileges and
immunities encompasses a huge number of federal, state, and common
law rights so long as they are deeply rooted in American history and
tradition as the first bold faced passage above indicates. Newfangled
rights, like the so-called right to privacy, are simply not privileges or
immunities because the right to privacy is not deeply rooted in
American history and tradition.
Justice Washington also set up a second rights limiting principle in
the second bold-faced passage in the excerpt quoted above. Justice
Washington said that all privileges or immunities are “subject
nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe
for the general good of the whole.”102 And this is where the Privileges
or Immunities Clause’s ban on class legislation comes into play. The
government can only pass a law that diminishes traditional common law
privileges or immunities if the law serves the “general good of the
whole [people]” but not if it is mere class legislation.103 Professor
Harrison thus argues that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects Corfield’s expansive list of rights, but
subject to the caveat that states can legislate to abridge rights when
doing so protects the general good of the whole people.104 Professor
Harrison therefore reads the word “abridge” in the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as forbidding only class-based legislation.105 The
Clause allows states to make laws that further the good of the whole
people, but states may not discriminate against classes of people either
on the basis of race or some other criterion that does not benefit the
public generally. In other words, Professor Harrison reads the Privileges
or Immunities Clause as if it said, “No state shall make or enforce any
law which abridges the rights of citizens of the United States in a way
that improperly discriminates or that does not promote the general
good of the whole people.” Professor Harrison goes to great lengths to
show that the framers viewed the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551–52 (1823) (emphases added).
Id. at 522.
See id.
See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1452.
See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1422.
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Fourteenth Amendment as being solely an antidiscrimination
provision.106 Harrison thus claims erroneously that incorporation of the
Bill of Rights was a mistake at least as a matter of law. He overlooks
that a state can quite literally abridge rights one citizen at a time as well
as by one class of citizens at a time.
The Privileges or Immunities Clause describes the general rights of
citizens as being privileges or immunities, instead of rights, because the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant by that Clause to protect
only the rights of citizens and not the rights of non-citizens or of all
people.107 The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, in contrast, apply to all persons and not merely
to citizens. The rights detailed in Corfield were thus special rights
possessed only by citizens and not necessarily rights that were available
to all inhabitants of the United States. The framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment left open the possibility that future legislatures might not
want to give aliens all of the rights of citizens.108 Republican
Representative Horatio Burchard of Illinois said, “The privileges and
immunities of a citizen of the United States are those particular
advantages or exemptions secured or granted to them, but not extended
to all persons, and from which aliens may lawfully be debarred.”109
The Privileges or Immunities Clause does not bar the states from
altering the rights of its citizens that are deeply rooted in history and
tradition so long as the alteration is made in a just, general law enacted
for the good of the whole people. What is clearly banned, however, is
legislation that favors one class or caste of people over another.110 Put
another way, the Privileges or Immunities Clause bars discrimination by
forbidding the states from giving greater privileges or immunities to one
class of citizens as compared to another class of citizens.111
What was the original public meaning of class legislation or of
improper discrimination in 1868? Raoul Berger and former Chief
Justice William Rehnquist claimed in the 1970s that the Fourteenth
Amendment only banned discrimination based on race and national
106. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1410–33. For instance, Representative Samuel
Shellabarger said that the Privileges or Immunities Clause “[r]equires that the laws on their face
shall not ‘abridge’ the privileges or immunities of citizens. It secures equality toward all citizens
on the face of the law. It provides that those rights shall not be ‘abridged;’ in other words, that
one man shall not have more rights upon the face of the laws than another man. By that
provision equality of legislation, so far as it affects the rights of citizenship, is secured.” CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 71 (1871).
107. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1442–47 (discussing differences in rights available to
citizens and aliens).
108. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1442 n.229.
109. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1442 n.229.
110. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1413.
111. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1413.
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origin and nothing more.112 Justice Felix Frankfurter, and a majority of
the New Deal Supreme Court held specifically that sex discrimination
was not a suspect classification under the Fourteenth Amendment in
Goesaert v. Cleary, a decision that was in tension with language in
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital113 and that was correctly overruled in
Craig v. Boren.114 Supporters of this New Deal rational basis test
argument claim that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment simply
sought to end discrimination against the freed slaves and nothing more.
The Slaughter-House majority seemed to take a similar view saying:
“We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way
of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision.”115
But this narrow conception of the Fourteenth Amendment as barring
only race discrimination and not other forms of discrimination is at war
with both the text and the original public meaning of the Amendment.
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment is written broadly,
guaranteeing “any person” equal protection of the laws and barring the
states from making any law that abridges the privileges or immunities of
“citizens of the United States.”116 The text of Section One gives
absolutely no indication that the Amendment applies to only race
discrimination and not to other forms of discrimination more generally.
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment thus stands in stark contrast
with Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects only
the right of “males” to vote.117 The text of Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment also differs from the text of Section One of the
Fifteenth Amendment which only forbids abridging the right to vote “on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”118 And
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment contrasts with the No
Religious Test Clause which bars Congress from conditioning the right
to hold public office on the basis of religion but leaves open the
112. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 191 (1977); see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[e]xcept in the area of the law in which the Framers
obviously meant [Section One] to apply—classifications based on race or on national origin, the
first cousin of race—the Court’s decisions may be described as an endless tinkering with
legislative judgments, a series of conclusions unsupported by any central guiding principle”).
113. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
114. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), overruled by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
210 (1976).
115. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1872).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
117. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (ensuring that states shall not abridge the right to
vote of “male inhabitants”).
118. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.”).
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possibility that eligibility to hold public office could be restricted on
some other basis.119 Simply put, when the framers of both the original
Constitution and of the Reconstruction amendments wanted a
constitutional provision to apply to only race, color, or previous
condition of servitude, they made their intent explicit in the text.120
Thus, when the Framers of the Nineteenth Amendment wanted to give
women the right to vote, they wrote an amendment that explicitly said,
“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”121 If
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment wanted to merely end classbased legislation that was racially discriminatory, they would have said
so explicitly. The fact that they chose broader language shows that they
meant to ban all forms of class legislation and not merely the Black
Codes.
The language of the Fourteenth Amendment tracks other
constitutional provisions which have a broad application despite the
narrow historical contexts in which those provisions were ratified.122
For example, the Thirteenth Amendment’s sweeping, unqualified
language bans the enslavement of any individual,123 even though the
Thirteenth Amendment was, as a historical matter, a direct response to
the slavery of African Americans.124 Surely no one would claim that
some new form of non-race-based slavery is permissible under the
Thirteenth Amendment. Obviously such a new system of slavery would
be blatantly unconstitutional.
Similarly, no one would claim that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, which bars the states from depriving “any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,”125 only
guarantees racial groups due process rights because in 1868 the framers
were primarily concerned with protecting the due process rights of
African Americans. The language “any person” should have the same
meaning in the Equal Protection Clause as it does in the Due Process
Clause. Because both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
apply to “any person,” it is quite incoherent to claim that that the Equal
119. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (“no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to
any Office or public Trust under the United States”).
120. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 278.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (emphasis added).
122. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1421.
123. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”)
(emphasis added).
124. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1401.
125. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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Protection Clause pertains only to race, national origin, or some other
subset of society. To make this claim, one would have to explain how
the term “any person” can have two different meanings within the same
sentence. It is instead much more plausible to conclude that the
unqualified language of the Fourteenth Amendment applies broadly to
protect all classes of citizens from abridgements of their privileges or
immunities and all classes of persons from denials of due process or of
the equal protection of the laws. As we will now explain, Section One
of the Fourteenth Amendment did in fact protect all citizens from class
legislation and from the legal imposition of systems of caste.
Before making this argument, we should note that some scholars,
such as Professor Melissa Saunders, with whom we agree with regards
to the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class legislation, disagree with
Professor Harrison’s and Professor Currie’s view of the Privileges or
Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses that we have just articulated.
Saunders is bothered by a handful of remarks made by a few legislators
during Reconstruction indicating that they thought that the Equal
Protection Clause in fact guaranteed equality in law making as well as
in law execution.126 For instance, Representative James Garfield said
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited the states from “mak[ing] or
enforc[ing] laws which are not on their face and in their provisions of
equal application to all the citizens of the State . . . like the air of
heaven, covering all and resting upon all with equal weight.”127 The
problem with Professor Saunders’ argument is that the isolated snippets
of legislative history upon which she relies are not plausibly related to
the original objective public meaning of the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as we have already discussed. Professor Saunder’s
snippets reflect nothing more than the subjective understanding of a few
lawmakers who misread the Amendment’s text. Legislative history may
sometimes be helpful in explaining the objective public meaning of
legal texts, but legislative history is manifestly not helpful when it
openly defies the text’s objective dictionary meaning. It simply does not
matter that Congressman Garfield did not understand that the noun in
the Equal Protection Clause is “protection” and not “equal,” while it is
the Privileges or Immunities Clause that is about the “making” of laws.
Rebutting Professor Harrison’s textual analysis requires much more
than just a few snippets of legislative history in conflict with the
constitutional text.
Nevertheless, it is not necessary that one agree with Professor
Harrison, as we do, to accept the notion that Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a whole banned all class legislation. Whether
126. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 288–93.
127. Id. at 289.
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the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equality via two clauses or one
is not critical. For that reason, both Professor Harrison and Professor
Saunders recognize that the Amendment bans all class legislation even
if they disagree as to how it does.128
B. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Ban on Caste and Class Legislation
The terms “caste” and “class” had related and at times overlapping
meanings and both referred to social hierarchies which privileged some
individuals and groups while disadvantaging and degrading others. Yet
nineteenth century contemporaries generally assigned distinct meanings
to each term. We discuss both terms below.
1. Definition of “Caste” and “Class Legislation”
The word “class” was used in the context of “class legislation”
which was any form of legislation that singled out groups or individuals
for special privileges or burdens apart from those born by the rest of the
members of society. During the antebellum period, class laws were
often called “special” or “partial” laws129 because they did not apply to
the people as a whole and because they often granted monopolies or
other special privileges to a favored group or imposed unique burdens
on a particular disfavored group.130 Generally, special laws created
unique privileges for a particular class, and partial laws created unique
disadvantages for a particular class, although the value of distinguishing
between special and partial laws is debatable.131
The word “class” had a generic definition in the nineteenth century.
It was generally defined as a “rank; order of persons or things; scientific
division or arrangement.”132 The designation therefore of a particular
128. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1470; Saunders, supra note 17, at 249.
129. Professor Saunders reports, “In the mid-nineteenth century, lawyers and judges began
to use the term “class legislation” as a synonym for partial or special laws. See, e.g., Monroe v.
Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665, 673 (1867) (argument of counsel); Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St.
573, 606–07 (1863) (using class legislation to describe legislation in which “operation is limited
to . . . certain classes of persons”).” Saunders, supra note 17, at 252 n.29.
130. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 252 n.29 (citing numerous cases from the era that
defined “special” or “partial” laws).
131. Professor Saunders is also mindful of this debate. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 269
n.102 (citing Correspondence between the House of Representatives of the State of Maine and
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 58 Me. 590, 593 (1871) (opinion of Appleton, C.J.,
Walton, & Danforth, JJ.) (observing that “a discrimination in favor of one . . . is a discrimination
adverse to all other[s]”), and Note, Developments in the Law—Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1065, 1086 n.47 (1969) (“[W]hen a benefit is extended to one group but refused to another,
the excluded group may be seen as suffering a relative burden.”)).
132. GOODRICH, supra note 41, at 75; WORCESTER, supra note 41, at 128 (“A rank or order
of persons or things; a division; a set of pupils or students of the same form, rank, or degree; a
general or primary division.”); “Class” definition, NOAH WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY
(1828), available at http://www.1828-dictionary.com/d/word/class (“An order or rank of
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group of people as a protected class did not depend on whether that
group was a minority, nor did it depend on whether that group had been
previously subjected to persecution, nor did the class need to be
distinguished by hereditary or immutable features. As Thomas Cooley
put it in his treatise, “[E]very one has a right to demand that he be
governed by general rules.”133 Cooley repeated John Locke’s famous
tenet that legislators “‘are to govern by promulgated, established laws,
not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and
poor, for the favorite at court and the countryman at plough.’”134
In contrast, the word “caste” generally referred to rigid and
immutable social divisions based on hereditary traits with which a
person was born. A definition of the word “caste” did not appear in
American dictionaries until the mid-nineteenth century.135 When
dictionaries began defining the word and when people began using it in
common parlance, the Indian caste system was almost always used as
the word’s defining benchmark. This makes sense because the
Portuguese first used the word “caste” to describe the Indian system of
social hierarchy.136 A typical definition of caste: “In Hindostan, a tribe
or class of the same profession, as the caste of Bramins; a distinct rank
or order of society.”137 Senator Charles Sumner explained that a “[caste]
system had two distinct elements: first, separation, with rank and
privilege, or, their opposite, with degradation and disability[;] secondly,
descent from father to son[;] so that it was perpetual separation from
generation to generation.”138 Sumner observed that in the Indian caste
system one person “claimed hereditary rank and privilege” and another

persons; a number of persons in society, supposed to have some resemblance or equality, in
rank, education, property, talents, and the like; as in the phrase, all classes of men in society.”).
133. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 459 (3d ed. 1874)
[hereinafter “CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS”].
134. Id.
135. Neither Samuel Johnson’s 1786 Dictionary nor Noah Webster’s 1828 Dictionary
contained a definition for the word “caste.” Charles Sumner said that “the word is too modern,
however, for our classic English literature” and noted how dictionaries excluded the word.
Sumner, supra note 40, at 7.
136. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 152 (1857)
[hereinafter “WEBSTER’S 1857”] (“In Hindostan, a name (from casta, race) first given by the
Portuguese to the several classes into which society is divided, having fixed occupations, which
have come down from the earliest ages. There are four great and many smaller castes. 2. A
distinct order in society.”).
137. See, e.g., GOODRICH, supra note 41, at 64, 75; WORCESTER, supra note 41, at 107–08,
128 (“Caste, n. A distinct, hereditary order or class of people among the Hindoos, the members
of which are of the same rank, profession, or occupation; an order or class”); Sumner, supra
note 40, at 6–10 (discussing the Indian caste system at length).
138. Sumner, supra note 40, at 7.
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is “doomed to hereditary degradation and disability.”139 In India, people
were born into a particular caste and were unable to change their caste.
In describing the caste system of Europe, Sumner said:
[P]eople were distributed into classes and the son
succeeded to the condition of his father whether of
privilege or disability the son of a noble being a noble with
great privileges the son of a mechanic being a mechanic
with great disabilities and this inherited condition was
applicable even to the special labor of the father nor was
there any business beyond its tyrannical control. According
to Macaulay the tinkers formed an hereditary caste.140
Accordingly, nineteenth century dictionaries defining “caste” referred to
it as a “hereditary order,”141 “fixed occupations,” and a “distinct order in
society”142—all of which express the principles of immutability and
heredity which were the key features of caste.
Notably, the nineteenth century definition of caste was not limited to
only racial or even physical features. Instead a “caste” could mean “a
tribe or class of the same profession,”143 people with “fixed
occupations,”144 people with “the same rank, profession, or occupation,”
or simply “an order or class.”145 These definitions clearly encompassed
classifications based on status or conduct which had nothing to do with
racial or physical features. And the nineteenth century definition of
caste also included classifications based on religion.146
A caste was therefore considered one kind of a class, and laws
supporting a caste system were simply one form of class legislation.
Accordingly, one of the definitions of “caste” was that it constituted a
“class.”147 As Senator H. Wilson put it in arguing for black suffrage,
class legislation was the means by which a system of caste could be
structured and maintained.148
One important qualification was that class legislation was
permissible during the Antebellum period if it served an important
139. Id. at 10 (referencing the Indian caste system).
140. Id. at 7. Sumner also referenced caste systems in Persia, Egypt, Peru, Assyria, and
Attica.
141. WORCESTER, supra note 41, at 107–08, 128.
142. WEBSTER’S 1857, supra note 136, at 152 (emphasis added).
143. GOODRICH, supra note 41, at 64, 75.
144. WEBSTER’S 1857, supra note 136, at 152.
145. WORCESTER, supra note 41, at 107–08, 128.
146. See infra Part II.A.
147. WORCESTER, supra note 41, at 107–08, 128.
148. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. app at 153 (1869) (statement of Sen. H.
Wilson) (criticizing the argument that it is “the duty of statesmanship to maintain by class
legislation the abhorrent doctrine of caste”).
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public purpose, benefiting society as a whole.149 As Justice Field
explained, “[s]pecial burdens are often necessary for general benefits,”
such as “supplying water, preventing fires, lighting district, cleaning
streets, opening parks, and many other objects.”150 Justice Field added
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “[c]lass legislation,
discriminating against some and favoring others,” but not “legislation
which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application” to
certain individuals or groups.151 Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment
permits laws that discriminate if they “are designed, not to impose
unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon any one, but to promote, with
as little individual inconvenience as possible, the general good.”152
Class legislation therefore differs from laws regulating conduct which
are generally applicable to all persons. For instance, criminal laws
prohibiting stealing or civil laws delineating a standard of care in tort
actions regulate the conduct of all persons. Thus the legislature could
safely pass a law prohibiting embezzlement, but it could not pass such a
law if it applied only to the employees of a specific bank.153 We will
elaborate on class legislation doctrine more in Part III.
2. Historical Evidence of Opposition to Class Legislation
Opposition to class legislation had deep roots in the common law
and was a fundamental principle of the founders of this country.154
Aversion to such laws was grounded in the Lockean philosophy that
government existed for the purpose of protecting private citizens’
natural rights.155 And there was widespread belief that laws should have
149. Justice Bushrod Washington said in Corfield that citizens’ privileges and immunities
were “subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the
general good of the whole.” 6 F. Cas. at 552. See also Saunders, supra note 17, at 261 n.68
(providing examples, such as Commonwealth v. Blackington, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 352, 358–59
(1837), a case involving a partial law challenge to a law prohibiting the sale of intoxicating
liquors, and Hewitt v. Charier, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 353, 356 (1835), a case dealing with a partial
law challenge to a law conferring a special benefit on licensed medical practitioners).
150. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
151. Id. at 32.
152. Id. at 31–32.
153. See Budd v. State, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 483 (1842) (special criminal law applicable only
to employees of a certain bank). Professor Saunders provides more examples of cases in which
the challengers maintained the laws at issue singled individuals or classes of people for special
benefits or burdens. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 252 n.28 (citing, among other cases, Reed
v. Wright, 2 Greene 15, 27–28 (Iowa 1849), Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121 (Vt. 1825), and Lewis
v. Webb, 3 Me. 326 (1825)).
154. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 255–56; see also Yudof, supra note 19, at 1374–77.
155. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 123–24 (describing how “[t]he
great and chief end . . . of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under
government, is the Preservation of their Property . . . their Lives, Liberties, and Estates”)
[hereinafter “TWO TREATISES”]; BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 75, at 124 (“The
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equal application to all members of society and should not be used as a
means of favoring or disfavoring specific groups or individuals. As
Locke put it, there should be “one Rule for Rich and Poor, for the
Favourite at Court, and the Country Man at Plough.”156
a. Evidence from the Common Law and the Founding
Even before the Founding in 1789, some states banned class
legislation in their state declarations of rights or bills of rights.157 For
instance, Virginia’s Declaration of Rights of 1776 prohibited the
granting of “exclusive or separate Emoluments or Privileges from the
Community, but in Consideration of public Services.”158 James
Madison articulated the pervasive belief of the founders that
government should be “neutral between different parts of the Society,”
that “equality . . . ought to be the basis of every law,” and that laws
should not place “peculiar burdens” on some individuals or “peculiar
exemptions” on others.159
Later generations recognized that one of the founders’ primary goals
was to abolish class legislation and to form a government dedicated to
providing for all of its citizens. As Representative Stephen L. Mayham
said in 1870:
[W]hen this Constitution was adopted there was no
sentiment that was more universal in this nation than that of
condemnation of all monopolies and privileged classes. It
was to rid themselves of enormous and oppressive
monopolies in the way of taxation and stamp duties that the
colonists had severed their connection with Great Britain;
and it was in the interest of equality and freedom of
commerce, as well as freedom of person, that this
Government was founded. It would be a slander upon the
intelligence and patriotism of our fathers to say that this
principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights, which
were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature; but which could not be preserved in peace
without . . . mutual assistance.”); see also William Leggett, Editorial, True Functions of
Government, N.Y. EVENING POST, Nov. 21, 1834, reprinted in 1 A COLLECTION OF THE
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF WILLIAM LEGGETT 162–63 (Theodore Sedgwick, Jr. ed., 1840)
(discussing how class legislation undermines the Lockean purpose of government).
156. TWO TREATISES, supra note 155, § 142.
157. See Philip A. Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate
about Equal Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 8 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 346 (1992).
158. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, § 4; Hamburger, supra note 157, at 346 n.124.
159. Saunders, supra note 17, at 256. Saunders also references the position of Jeffersonian
Republicans that government should provide “equal rights for all, special privileges for none,”
as well as the position of the Maine Whigs in the 1830s who advocated “[e]qual rights, equal
laws, and equal privileges for all classes of the community.” (citations omitted).
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provision of the Constitution, which is the only one under
which this doctrine of protection is claimed, intended it to
foster monopolies and create invidious distinctions of caste
based upon business or wealth.160
Senator James W. Nye similarly said in 1866:
Our forefathers were made to chafe under monarchical
insult and imposition. They learned to know by experience
that common protection would never be awarded by
privileged class. They entered into the contest in defense of
their natural and inalienable rights, and made the cause of
popular justice in the strength and ennobling feature of the
conflict.161
And Representative Owen Lovejoy said in 1860:
The object of government, according to the theory of the
revered sages who organized this Republic, is a very simple
one, namely, to protect the people in the peaceful
enjoyment of their natural rights. In other words, it is a
mutual pledge, each to all and all to each, to secure this
result; designating the modes in which this end shall be
achieved. Consequently, pensions, bounties, peculiar
privileges, class legislation, and monopolies, sought from
Government, is for one portion of the people to become
beggars or vampires of the rest. For classes thus to
beleaguer Government is as disgraceful to communities as
it is to individuals . . .162
In his constitutional treatises, Thomas Cooley wrote extensively that
the Constitution of 1787 contained a broad ban on class legislation that
applied to both the federal government and the states.163 For one,
Cooley saw “implied restrictions” on Congress’ taxing power in Article
I, Section Eight,164 which states, “The Congress shall have Power To
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
160. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 180 (1870) (speech by Rep. Stephen L.
Mayham) (discussing the merits of a tariff).
161. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1071 (1866) (statement of Sen. James W. Nye).
Nye also condemned the conduct of southern states: “In the recent attempt at revolution the
intended perpetuity of human bondage, added to the intended monopoly of wealth and political
power, were the mainspringings of the rebellion.” Id.
162. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., Special Sess. app. 174–75 (1860) (speech by Rep. Owen
Lovejoy).
163. See THOMAS COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1880)
[hereinafter “GENERAL PRINCIPLES”].
164. Id. at 58–60, 98.
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provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States.”165 As he said, “a tax can have no other basis than the
raising of a revenue for public purposes, and whatever governmental
exaction has not this basis is tyrannical and unlawful . . . . Where,
however, a tax is avowedly laid for a private purpose it is illegal and
void.”166 But Cooley also said that these “implied restrictions” applied
to all the Article I, Section Eight powers, and not just to the taxing
power:167 “Every legislative body is to make laws for the public good,
and not for the benefit of individuals; and it is to make them aided by
the light of those general principles which lie at the foundation of
representative institutions.”168 Cooley also said that the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment embodied this public
purpose doctrine. Inherent in the “underlying principle of the law of
eminent domain” is the government’s power “to control and regulate
those rights of a public nature which pertain to its citizens in common,
and to appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit,
as the public safety, necessity, convenience, or welfare may demand.”169
Tying together congressional power to tax and take property, Cooley
explained that “[t]axation takes property from the citizen for the public
use, but it does so under general rules of apportionment and uniformity,
so that each citizen is supposed to contribute only his fair share to the
expenses of government, and to be compensated for doing so in the
benefits which the government brings him.”170 In contrast, eminent
domain takes a specific piece of property from an individual and utilizes
just compensation as a means of “equalization.”171 In his section on
contract and property rights, Cooley also said that the Contracts Clause
banned class legislation passed by the states, describing how the Clause
only allows regulation of contracts for a public purpose.172 Cooley also
described how the Constitution banned monopolies: “[E]xclusive
privileges are to some extent invidious and very justly obnoxious, and it
is not reasonable to suppose that the State would grant them, except
when some important public purpose or some necessary public
convenience cannot be accomplished or provided without making the
165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
166. GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 163, at 57–58.
167. Cooley’s assertion is bolstered by some of the language in Article I Section 8, which
allows Congress “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis
added).
168. See GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 163, at 98.
169. Id. at 332.
170. Id. at 333.
171. Id. at 334.
172. See id. at 310–11.
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grant exclusive.”173 A state could only grant an exclusive privilege that
served a public purpose, such as for building a bridge.174
Several other constitutional provisions further support Cooley’s view
that the Constitution of 1787 banned class legislation. For instance, the
Preamble declares that the purpose of the Constitution is to “provide for
the common defence” and “promote the general Welfare.”175 And the
Full Faith and Credit Clause only allows Congress to pass “general
laws.”176 Bans on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws in Article I,
Sections Nine and Ten perhaps were also designed to protect against
class legislation. As discussed below, the Religion Clauses also banned
class legislation at least with respect to religion.177 The Establishment
Clause prevented the government from granting a special monopoly to
one religion; and the Free Exercise and No Religious Test Clauses
barred the government from subjecting those who were religious to
unique burdens. So Cooley’s position that the Constitution banned class
legislation starting in 1787 is well grounded in constitutional text.
b. Evidence from State Constitutions Around the Time of the Founding
Around the time of the Founding, several states had incorporated
various bans on caste and class legislation into their state
constitutions.178 These provisions show that opposition to caste and
class legislation has been strong since the Founding. These state
constitutional provisions banning class legislation lend support to
Cooley’s view that the federal Constitution may also have originally
banned all federal class legislation. Alternatively, these clauses could
indicate that the states thought that they had to include these protections
in their state constitutions because the federal Constitution did not ban
class legislation in contradiction to Cooley. Either way, these provisions
demonstrate the deep-rooted opposition to class legislation in American
173. Id. at 306. Cooley does not specify which constitutional provision bar the states from
granting monopolies, but he seemed to find the prohibition in the Contracts Clause.
174. Id. at 235–36, 306.
175. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added); see also William Leggett, Editorial, True
Functions of Government, N.Y. EVENING POST, Nov. 21, 1834, reprinted in 1 A COLLECTION OF
THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF WILLIAM LEGGETT 162 (Theodore Sedgwick, Jr. ed., 1840)
(describing how the “proper” function of government is “the making of general laws,” and that
“all men are equally important to the general welfare, and equally entitled to protection”).
176. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof.”).
177. See infra Part II.B.
178. See generally Steven G. Calabresi et al., Individual Rights Under State Bills of Rights
in 1787 and 1791: What Rights are Really Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?,
85 S. CAL. L. REV 1451 (2012).
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history in the 1770s and 1780s.
In 1787, three states, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia,
explicitly banned feudalism, which is a quintessential form of class and
caste, in their state constitutions.179 These states comprised twenty-three
percent of the total number of states and forty-three percent of the
national population in 1787.180 The provisions banning feudalism
specifically evoked the language of class legislation and systems of
caste, and these provisions declared hereditary privileges impermissible
and they foreshadowed the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on caste and
class legislation. For instance, Massachusetts’s constitution said that:
No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any
other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive
privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what
arises from the consideration of services rendered to the
public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor
transmissible to children, or descendants, or relations by
blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or
judge, is absurd and unnatural.181
By 1790, eight states, including Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts,
North Carolina, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and
Virginia, had provisions in their state constitutions banning the granting
of titles of nobility.182 These states comprised forty-six percent of the
number of states and fifty-seven percent of the total population.183 Once
again, these provisions used the language of caste and class legislation
in targeting hereditary rights as being especially repugnant. For
instance, Maryland’s constitution read, “That no title of nobility or
hereditary honors ought to be granted in this State.”184 And New
Hampshire’s constitution similarly declared, “No office or place
whatsoever in government, shall be hereditary—the abilities and
integrity requisite in all, not being transmissible to posterity or
relations.”185

179. See id. at 1530.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, Part 1, art. 6; see also N.C. DECL. OF RIGHTS OF
1776, § 22 (“That no hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors ought to be granted or
conferred in this State.”); VA DECL. OF RIGHTS OF 1776, § 4 (“That no man, or set of men, are
entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in
consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of
magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary.”).
182. See Calabresi et al., supra note 178, at 1531–32.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS, § 42.
185. N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. 9.
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By 1791, three states, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Vermont,
had broad equality guarantees in their state constitutions.186 These states
constituted twenty-one percent of the states and comprised twenty-four
percent of the population.187 These equality provisions guaranteed that
laws could only be enacted if they would benefit the population as a
whole and if they did not single out specific groups for special burdens
or privileges. For instance Vermont’s constitution stated that: “. . . it is
our indispensable duty to establish such original principles of
government as will best promote the general happiness of the people of
this State, and their posterity, and provide for future improvements,
without partiality for, or prejudice against, any particular class, sect, or
denomination of men whatever.”188 Invoking the language of class
legislation, these provisions further show the deeply rooted opposition
to class legislation in this country.
c. Evidence from the Antebellum Period
During the antebellum period, widespread opposition to class
legislation was also found in state-level bans on special and partial
laws.189 As the Maine Supreme Court said, “[I]t can never be within the
bounds of legitimate legislation to enact a special law, or . . . grant[] a
privilege and indulgence to one man” by stating that one man is exempt
from application of a general law, while denying the benefits to “all
other persons.”190 Instead, laws should be “prescribed for the benefit
and regulation of the whole community” because all individuals have
“an equal right” to their “protection.”191 Chancellor Kent similarly
wrote in 1816 that laws should “have a general and equal application”
and should be “impartial in the imposition[s] which [they] create.”192
States pragmatically recognized that permitting explicit favoritism or
discrimination would undermine the democratic process and encourage

186. See Calabresi et al., supra note 178, at 1527–28; Delaware also had an equality
guarantee which was concerned with class legislation directed against Christians. See DE. DECL.
OF RIGHTS, § 3 (“That all persons professing the Christian religion ought forever to enjoy equal
rights and privileges in this state, unless, under colour of religion, any man disturb the peace, the
happiness or safety of society.”).
187. See Calabresi et al., supra note 178, at 1527–28.
188. See, e.g., VT. CONST. of 1786, Pmbl; PA. CONST. 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 8
(“That every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and
property, and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion towards the expence of that
protection, and yield his personal service when necessary, or an equivalent thereto.”).
189. See generally Saunders, supra note 17, at 251–68.
190. Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326, 336 (1825).
191. Id. at 335.
192. WILLIAM KENT, MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES KENT, LL.D 163 (1898) (quoting an
1816 opinion of Kent’s from when he was a member of the Governor’s Council of Revision).
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corruption in government.193 Such an undemocratic system would favor
the powerful and politically connected and disadvantage unpopular
minorities.194 As the Supreme Court of Massachusetts said, “It is
manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural
justice . . . that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages
which are denied to all others under like circumstances.”195 Courts also
questioned whether it was constitutional to bar individuals from holding
public office based on their political views.196 Instead, most agreed that
the best way to protect minorities and society as a whole was through
generally applicable laws that did not confer special privileges or
burdens on certain groups. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained
that when “general laws are enacted, which bear . . . on the whole
community, if they are unjust and against the spirit of the constitution,
the whole community will be interested to procure their repeal.”197 This
obviously would not be the case where special or partial laws burdened
only a few. Political groups, such as the Maine Whigs, also argued for
“[e]qual rights, equal laws, and equal privileges for all classes of the
community.”198
Andrew Jackson and his followers spoke out especially strongly in
opposition to class legislation politically at the national level in the
1830s. As Jackson put it, government should “confine itself to equal
protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favors alike on the
high and the low, the rich and the poor.”199 Although “[d]istinctions in
society will always exist under every just government,” for “[e]quality
of talents, of education, or of wealth can not be produced by human
193. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 254 n.35 (highlighting the decisions in Durkee v. City
of Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, 470 (1871) and Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121, 123 (Vt. 1825)
(argument of counsel) to demonstrate the disfavor with which courts viewed legislation that
promoted preferential treatment of certain individuals).
194. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 255 n.36 (noting the decision in Wally's Heirs v.
Kennedy, 10 Tenn 554, 557 (1831), and Judge Catron's concurrence in Vanzant v. Waddel, 10
Tenn. 260, 270–71 (1829) denouncing acts of the legislature that oppress “one or a few citizens”
and calling them “too odious to be tolerated in any government where freedom has a name”);
see also William Leggett, Editorial, Monopolies, N.Y. EVENING POST, Nov. 29, 1834, reprinted
in 1 A COLLECTION OF THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF WILLIAM LEGGETT 85 (Theodore Sedgwick,
Jr. ed., 1840) (“a]ll acts of partial legislation are undemocratic, that they are subversive of the
equal rights of man . . . and, in their final operation, [they will] build up a powerful aristocracy,
and overthrow the whole frame of democratic government.”).
195. Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396, 405 (1814).
196. See Mayor of Baltimore v. State ex rel. Bd. of Police, 15 Md. 376, 484 (1860);
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 133, at 390–91.
197. Ervine’s Appeal, 16 Pa. 256, 268 (1851); see also Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10
Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 606 (1831) (Green, J.) (“[T]he minority are safe, [if] the majority, who make
the law, are operated on by it equally with others.”).
198. What the Whigs Want, BANGOR DAILY WHIG AND COURIER, Sept. 3, 1839, at 16.
199. President Jackson’s Veto Message Regarding the Bank of the United States (July 10,
1832), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ajveto01.asp.
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institutions,” government should not pass laws that “add . . . artificial
distinctions” to the “natural . . . advantages” that some individuals have
over others.200 Perhaps most famously, Jackson vetoed the re-charter of
the Second National Bank of the United States, which he viewed as
being a quintessential special law.201 Jackson thought the bank was a
monopoly because of its significant role in the economy and because no
other banks were permitted to operate under a federal government
charter of incorporation. Jackson argued that the Constitution only
permitted Congress to grant monopolies in very limited situations, such
as for patents and copyrights. And he believed that without an explicit
textual provision like the Patent and Copyright Clause, Congress lacked
the power to grant monopolies even for patents and copyrights. In his
message vetoing the renewal of the Bank’s charter, Jackson wrote that:
Every act of Congress, therefore, which attempts by grants
of monopolies or sale of exclusive privileges for a limited
time, or a time without limit, to restrict or extinguish its
own discretion in the choice of means to execute its
delegated powers is equivalent to a legislative amendment
of the Constitution, and [is] palpably unconstitutional.202
Jackson thought government-created monopolies, such as the Bank of
the United States, were violations of Locke’s principles of equality:
Many of our rich men have not been content with equal
protection and equal benefits, but [they] have besought us
to make them richer by act of Congress. By attempting to
gratify their desires we have in the results of our legislation
arrayed . . . interest against interest, and man against man,
in a fearful commotion which threatens to shake the
foundations of our Union. . . . If we can not at once, in
justice to interests vested under improvident legislation,
make our Government what it ought to be, we can at least
take a stand against all new grants of monopolies and
exclusive privileges, against any prostitution of our
Government to the advancement of the few at the expense
of the many . . . .203
200. Id.
201. J. R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 144–45 (1978) (quoting
Jackson). Jackson also said at the time that government should not add “artificial distinctions”
by seeking “to grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the
potent more powerful”; Yudof, supra note 19, at 1376.
202. President Jackson’s Veto Message Regarding the Bank of the United States (July 10,
1832), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ajveto01.asp.
203. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

37

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 1

946

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

Jackson therefore encouraged people to “take a stand against all new
grants of monopolies and special privileges, against the prostitution of
our Government to the advancement of the few at the expense of the
many.”204 It is notable that Jacksonian equal protection was confined to
economic or social class legislation, such as state-granted monopolies,
and did not encompass class legislation that discriminated on the basis
of race.205
Many nineteenth century state constitutions explicitly prohibited
class legislation. By 1868, thirteen out of thirty-seven states had
provisions in their state constitutions that effectively barred special or
partial laws.206 A typical provision read, “No law shall be passed
granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities
which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.”207
In states where state constitutions lacked such explicit language, courts
used other broadly worded provisions to strike down special and partial
laws.208 Thomas Cooley documented numerous state court decisions
invalidating special and partial laws based on their respective state
constitutions.209 Cooley said that the widely held, fundamental precept
of state constitutional law was that “[t]hose who make the laws ‘are to
govern by promulgated, established laws, not to be varied in particular
cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor.’”210 Cooley explained,
“Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be
the aim of the law, because ‘[s]pecial privileges are always obnoxious,
and discriminations against persons or classes are still more so.’”211
There is also significant evidence that opposition to class legislation
played a crucial role in the political fight against slavery. Although
slavery certainly should have been recognized as violating bans on
special or partial laws, many state courts rejected challenges to
204. Id.
205. See Yudof, supra note 19, at 1379–80.
206. See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 39, at 97.
207. OR. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 21.
208. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 258 (citing state court cases using provisions such as
“no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the
community, but in consideration of public services,” separation-of-powers provisions, and “law
of the land” or “due process” clauses.).
209. Id. at 259–60.
210. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 133, at 392; see also Saunders, supra note
17, at 260 n.62 (“[E]very one has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules, and a
special statute which . . . singles his case out as one to be regulated by a different law from that
which is applied in all similar cases, would not be legitimate legislation.”) (quoting
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 133, at 392).
211. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 133, at 393; see also People v. Twp. Bd. of
Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 486 (1870) (Cooley, J.) (“[D]iscrimination by the State between different
classes . . . and the favoring of one at the expense of the rest . . . is not legitimate legislation, and
is an invasion of that equality of right and privilege which is a maxim in State government.”).
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slavery,212 and many politicians as well were unsympathetic to the
disfavored status of African Americans.213 Instead, many abolitionists
successfully argued that slaveholders represented a powerful special
interest group that had seized control of the government, potentially
undermining the republic’s stability.214 These abolitionists specifically
avoided arguing that slavery was immoral or that whites should
empathize with the plight of the slaves.215 The argument was based on
political power, and it appealed to a wide variety of political groups
who worried about the economic, social, and political consequences of
special and partial laws and who recognized that government should
simply not be in the business of picking favorites.216 This approach to
abolition became a unifying force for the Republican Party and attracted
defectors from other political affiliations, such as Jacksonians, who
objected to class legislation.217
Debates over slavery often invoked the language of class legislation
and caste. For instance, Representative Norton Townshend said in 1852:
I protest against all these interpolations into the Democratic
creed, and against any such interpretation of Democracy as
makes it the ally of slavery and oppression. Democracy and
slavery are directly antagonistic. Democracy is opposed to
caste, slavery creates it; Democracy is opposed to special
privileges; slavery is but the privilege specially enjoyed by
one class-to use another as brute beasts and take their labor
without wages; Democracy is for elevating the laboring
masses to the dignity of perfect manhood; slavery grinds
the laborer into the very dust . . . slavery is but the extreme
of class legislation . . . slavery is nothing more than the
privilege some have of living out of others . . . .218
Representative John F. Farnsworth also said, “As a moral being, as a
man, I hate slavery in the States of this Union as I hate serfdom in
Russia—which, by the way, is about to be abolished in that Empire,
212. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 264 n.80 (citing a string of state court decisions,
including Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38 (1837) and Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5
Cush.) 198 (1849), that rejected the applicability of state constitutional provisions in challenges
to racially discriminatory practices).
213. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 264–65 (citing Jacksonian Democrats’ opposition to
blacks’ equality).
214. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 73–74, 87–102 (1970).
215. Id. at 99.
216. Id. at 163–69.
217. Id. at 163–69.
218. CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 713 (1852) (statement of Norton S.
Townshend).
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while we are quarrelling over the extension of slavery in this—just as I
hate caste in India—just as I hate oppression everywhere.”219 President
Andrew Johnson later described slavery as a “monopoly.”220 Even
supporters of slavery recognized that slavery constituted a caste system.
Senator Lewis Cass said:
Between three and four millions of people, differing in race
and color from the pre-dominant caste, are held in bondage.
I have seen a good deal of slavery, and I believe its evils
are much magnified, and that the slaves generally in our
southern States are treated with as much kindness and
consideration as are compatible with their relative
condition of bond and free.221
After slavery was abolished, many recognized that the mistreatment
of blacks was not merely a problem of racial animus but was part of a
much larger problem of class legislation. Senator Sumner summarized
the widespread mood in 1866 in discussing the mistreatment of blacks
in the South:
The pretension thus organized is hateful on another ground.
It is nothing less than a Caste, which is at once irreligious
and un-republican. A Caste cannot exist except in defiance
of the first principles of Christianity and the first principles
of a Republic. It is Heathenism in religion and tyranny in
government. The Brahmins and the Sudras in India, from
generation to generation, have been separated, as the two
races are now separated in these States. If a Sudra
presumed to sit on a Brahmin’s carpet he was punished
219. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., Special Sess. 120 (1861) (statement of Rep. John F.
Farnsworth); see also CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 230 (1857) (statement of
Lemuel D. Evans) (“ . . . servitude of caste, which is collective slavery . . . ”); CONG. GLOBE,
33d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 769 (1854) (statement of Rep. Seward) (contrasting the lack of
slavery in Europe with the existence of slavery in the United States and stating, “ . . . the slavery
of caste, like African slavery. Such slavery tends to demoralize equally the subjected race and
the superior one.”).
220. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 3 (1866) (message of President Andrew
Johnson) (“Slavery was essentially a monopoly of labor, and as such locked the States where it
prevailed against the incoming of free industry. Where labor was the property of the capitalist,
the white man was excluded from employment, or had but the second best chance of finding it;
and the foreign emigrant turned away from the region where his condition would be so
precarious. With the destruction of the monopoly, free labor will hasten from all parts of the
civilized world to assist in development various and immeasurable resources which have
hitherto lain dormant . . . . The removal of the monopoly of slave labor is a pledge that those
regions will be peopled by a numerous and enterprising population, which will vie with any in
the Union.”).
221. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 399 (1850) (statement of Sen. Lewis Cass).
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with banishment. But our recent rebels undertake to play
the part of Bramhins, and exclude citizens, with better title
than themselves, from essential rights, simply on the
ground of Caste, which, according to its Portuguese origin,
caste, is only another term for race. But this pretension is in
yet other respects hostile to good government. It is
essentially a Monopoly in a country which sets its face
against all monopolies as unequal and immoral. If any
monopoly deserves unhesitating judgment it must be that
which absorbs the rights of others and engrosses political
power. How vain it is to condemn the petty monopolies’ of
commerce and then’ allow this vast, all-embracing
monopoly of Human Rights. Clearly, most clearly, and
beyond all question, such a government cannot he
considered a republican in form. Call it an Oligarchy, call it
an Aristocracy, call it a Caste, call it a Monopoly; but do
not call it a Republic.222
Senator Sumner clearly equated the caste-style mistreatment of African
Americans to the burdens of government-granted monopoly power to
favored groups or businesses. Granting a government monopoly license,
or enacting any other type of economic class legislation, was therefore
no different from the Indian caste system or the mistreatment of African
Americans in this country. Sumner’s rhetoric was likely intended to
persuade dissenters that African Americans deserved the same equal
right to be free of class legislation that white Americans enjoyed. So
Sumner compared the mistreatment of African Americans to the
mistreatment of oppressed groups in other legal systems that everyone
understood as unjust—namely, the Indian caste system and government
grants of monopoly. Although comparing a government-granted
monopoly to a caste system might sound odd to modern ears, in the
nineteenth century government grants of monopoly were widely viewed
as being antithetical to democracy and as being a throwback to Bad
King George. For this reason, Sumner could credibly say:
The Rebellion began in two assumptions, both proceeding
from South Carolina: first, the sovereignty of the States,
with the pretended right of secession; and secondly, the
superiority of the white race, with the pretended right of
Caste, Oligarchy, and Monopoly, on account of color.223

222. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 683–84 (1866) (statement of Sen. Charles
Sumner).
223. Id. at 686.
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Similarly, President Andrew Johnson decried the Black Codes because
“‘there is no room for favored classes or monopolies,’ for ‘the principle
of our Government is that of equal laws,’ which ‘accord equal justice to
all men, special privileges to none.’”224
In the years leading up to 1868, there was widespread support for
abolishing class legislation, not simply constitutionalizing the ban on
racial discrimination from the Civil Rights Act of 1866. An editorial in
the Chicago Tribune in January 1866 explained that the Black Codes
were a repugnant, aristocratic form of class legislation contrary to
American values:
We have seen, through bitter experience, the evils of class
legislation as practi[c]ed by the States, in the form of slave
and black codes. We cannot but perceive the evils of the
system in England, and all monarchical governments,
where the laws are allowed to recognize distinctions
between persons and classes . . . . And if the several States
can practi[c]e class legislation, as between whites and
blacks . . . they can also create class distinctions in the
future between native and adopted citizens, between rich
and poor, or between any other divisions of society. The
most effectual way to reach the root of this matter, is to
amend the Constitution so as to forbid class legislation
entirely by prohibiting the enactment of laws creating or
recognizing any political distinctions because of class, race
or color between the inhabitants of any State or Territory,
and providing that all classes shall possess the same civil
rights and immunities, and be liable to the same penalties,
and giving Congress the power to carry the clause into
effect. . . . [W]e believe that we might as well level the evil
of caste at one blow, as to fight it by driblets and sections,
through another long course of years.225
The editorial’s rhetoric clearly goes well beyond a call merely for the
ending of racial discrimination. Similarly, in February 1866 the North
American Gazette described how Congress was discussing a
constitutional amendment that would “secure for the citizens of any one
State the same rights as are enjoyed by the citizens of other States, thus
terminating the discriminations made against sections and classes and
races.” 226 The view was, as James Wilson, Chair of the House Judiciary
224. 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1789-1897, 361–
62 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896) (emphasis added) [hereinafter “MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS”]; Saunders, supra note 17, at 273.
225. Editorial, Class Legislation, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1866, at 2.
226. Constitutional Amendments, PHILA. N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE, Feb. 15, 1866, at 1.
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Committee and sponsor of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, put it, that a
democratic government should resist advancing legislation that
promotes one class of citizens over another.227 Senator Sumner
explained how banning class legislation effectively enforced the
Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery:
You have, sir, decreed that colored persons shall enjoy the
same civil rights as white persons; in other words, that,
with regard to civil rights, there shall be no Oligarchy,
Aristocracy, Caste, or Monopoly, but that all shall be equal
before the law without distinction of color. And this great
decree you have made as “appropriate legislation” under
the Constitutional Amendment “to enforce” the abolition of
slavery.228
So strong was opposition to class legislation in the mid-nineteenth
century, that some attempted to read a ban on class legislation into the
meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, even though the text of the Act
did not support such an understanding.229
d. Evidence from the History of the Ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment
The legislative history shows that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment specifically intended to abolish all forms class legislation,
which certainly included slavery and discrimination on the basis of
race.230 The Thirty-ninth Congress that drafted the Fourteenth
Amendment was comprised largely of Republicans and of Jacksonian
Democrats who fervently opposed all forms of class legislation.231
These Republicans and Jacksonian Democrats supported abolition and
the guarantee of civil rights for African Americans, not necessarily out
of a sense of morality or empathy for African Americans—though some
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment certainly felt that way—but out
of a hatred for class legislation in all its hideous forms.232 And the
Reconstruction Congresses sought to constitutionalize in the federal
Constitution as it applied to the states the antebellum doctrine banning
special or partial laws, which state courts had failed to use to protect
227. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 174 (1866).
228. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 684 (1866) (statement of Charles Sumner).
229. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1760 (1866) (statement of Senator Trumbull
that the Act “declares that in civil rights there shall be an equality among all classes of
citizens”). Calabresi and Rickert explain how the Act does not support this assertion. See
Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 29.
230. Saunders, supra note 17, at 269–70.
231. Saunders, supra note 17, at 269–70.
232. Saunders, supra note 17, at 269–70.
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African Americans.
The legislative history reveals considerable opposition to the Black
Codes, not because they discriminated on the basis of race,233 but
because they singled out a certain class of individuals for unique
disadvantage. Senator Lyman Trumbull, the cosponsor of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, criticized the Black Codes for “depriv[ing] [some]
citizen[s] of civil rights which are secured to other citizens” and
violating Blackstone’s maxim that “‘the restraints introduced by the law
should be equal to all.’”234 Senator William Pitt Fessenden described the
Black Codes as being unacceptable “class legislation.”235 Senator
Henderson objected to the “unequal burdens” placed on freedmen.236
Many others objected that the Black Codes effectively reduced
freedmen to second class citizens.237 And President Andrew Johnson
opposed the Black Codes because “there is no room for favored classes
or monopolies,” for “the principle of our Government is that of equal
laws,” which “accord[] ‘equal and exact justice to all men,’ special
privileges to none.”238
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment carefully drafted a final
version of the Amendment that made no specific mention of race
precisely so as to ensure that the Fourteenth Amendment would be
understood as banning all systems of class and caste, and not just
discrimination on the basis of race. The Thirty-ninth Congress explicitly
considered and rejected a draft of the Amendment that merely banned
racial discrimination, and not systems of caste or class. That rejected
version of the Fourteenth Amendment read,
Section 1. No discrimination shall be made by any state,
nor by the United States, as to the civil rights of persons
because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

233. See JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 82–83 (1983) (pointing out that “for most speakers, what made the
[Black Codes] so odious was not that [they] based classification on race as opposed to some
other characteristic”).
234. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
235. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 704 (1866); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. app. at 156 (1866) (statement of Rep. Delano (R-Ohio)) (referring to “unequal” and
“discriminating” laws); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Poland (R-Vt.)) (referring to “partial [] legislation”); The Proposed Amendment to the
Constitution, N.Y. COM. ADVERTISER, Jan. 23, 1866, at 2 (referring to “class legislation”).
236. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3034 (1866) (statement of Sen. Henderson (RMo.)) (arguing that Black Codes subject the freedmen to “unequal burdens”).
237. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 271 n.112 (citing a series of statements by members of
the Thirty-ninth Congress).
238. 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 224, at 361–62 (Dec. 4,
1865).
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Section 2. From and after the fourth day of July, in the year
one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six, no
discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the
United States, as to the enjoyment by classes of persons of
the right of suffrage, because of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.
Section 3. Until the fourth day of July, one thousand eight
hundred and seventy-six, no class of persons, as to the right
of any of whom to suffrage discrimination shall be made by
any state, because of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude, shall be included in the basis of representation.239
Notably, this version used the language of class legislation (“classes of
persons” in Section Two and “class of persons” in Section Three), but
the scope of the ban on class legislation was limited to a ban on
discrimination on the basis of race, color, and previous condition of
servitude. The new and final version rejected this narrow ban and
instead forbade all caste and class legislation.
And members of the Thirty-ninth and Fortieth Congresses
understood that the objective public meaning of the final version of the
Fourteenth Amendment was that the Amendment broadly banned all
forms of caste and class legislation, and not just laws that discriminate
on the basis of race. Senator Jacob Howard said that the Amendment
“abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the
injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to
another.”240 Representative Thomas Eliot said the Amendment would
“prohibit State legislation discriminating against classes of citizens.”241
Representative Hotchkiss described the Amendment as having been
constructed to ban “discriminat[ion] between its citizens and [all laws
that] give one class of citizens greater rights than it confers upon
another.”242 Senator Timothy Howe said that the Fourteenth
Amendment would give the federal government “the power to protect
classes against class legislation.”243 Republicans generally understood
the Amendment as striking down feudalistic systems and aristocracy:
“But,” say some, “this section is designed to coerce the
South into according suffrage to her blacks.” Not so, we
239. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 32 (citing BENJ. B. KENDRICK, THE
JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 83–84 (1914) for the text of
the proposed amendment and referencing statements made by Senator Sumner that the proposed
amendment’s scope was too narrow).
240. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
241. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2511 (1866).
242. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866).
243. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 883 (1868).
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reply; but only to notify her ruling caste that we will no
longer bribe them to keep their blacks in serfdom. An
aristocracy rarely surrenders its privileges, no matter how
oppressive, from abstract devotion to justice and right. It
must have cogent, palpable reasons for so doing.244
Senator Sumner also described the Amendment in broad, powerful
terms:
Rights, that Slavery, with all its brood of wrong, was
upheld; and it is now in the name of State rights, that Caste,
fruitful also in wrong, is upheld. The old champions
reappear, under other names, and from other States, each
crying out, that, under the national Constitution,
notwithstanding even its supplementary amendments, a
State may, if it pleases, deny political rights on account of
race or color and thus establish that vilest institution, a
Caste and an Oligarchy of the skin. . . . On these simple
texts, conferring plain and intelligible powers, the
champions insist that “color” may be made a
“qualification;” and that, under the guise of “regulations,”
citizens, whose only offense is skin not colored like our
own, may be shut out from political rights; and that in this
was a monopoly of rights, being at once a Caste and an
Oligarchy of the skin, is placed under the safeguard of the
National Constitution.245
And Representative Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania made it clear
that the Amendment banned even nonracial class legislation: “[T]he
same laws must and shall apply to every mortal, American, Irishman,
African, German or Turk”246 because “the same law which punishes one
man shall punish any other for the same offense . . . the law which gives
a verdict to one man shall render the same verdict to another, whether
he is Dutch, Irish, or Negro.”247
Popular newspapers also recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment
broadly banned all class legislation and systems of caste.248 The San
244. Nat’l Republican Union Comm., Address to the American People, BANGOR DAILY
WHIG & COURIER, Sept. 22, 1866, Issue 73, col. A.
245. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 902 (1869) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner).
Senator Sumner often invoked the language of class legislation when discussing racial equality.
For instance, he used the phrase, “oligarchy of the skin,” nine times on the Senate floor from
1865 to 1872. Search using HeinOnline, May 18, 2012.
246. Thaddeus Stevens, The Pending Canvass!, Speech Delivered at Bedford, Pa. (Sept. 4,
1866), in THADDEUS STEVENS PAPERS 11 (Beverly Wilson Palmer ed., 1993).
247. Id.
248. See Calabresi & Ricket, supra note 19, at 35–36 (citing the San Francisco Daily
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Francisco Daily Evening Bulletin said that the Amendment served as an
“opportunity . . . for the masses to break down the domination of caste
and aristocracy.”249 The Boston Daily Advertiser described the
Amendment’s purpose as “compel[ling] the States to . . . throw the same
shield over the black man as over the white, over the humble as over the
powerful.”250 The Boston Daily Advertiser also said, “The National
Union Committee put the case very well when they stated the object of
the amendment of the Constitution to be, ‘to notify the ruling caste of’
the South that we will no longer bribe them to keep ‘their blacks in
serfdom’”251 And the Cincinnati Commercial said that the Amendment
constitutionalized “the great Democratic principle of equality before the
law” and invalidated all “legislation hostile to any class.”252 The
Commercial added:
With this section engrafted upon the Constitution it will be
impossible for any Legislature to enact special codes for
one class of its citizens, as several of the reconstructed
States have done, subjecting them to penalties from which
citizens of another class are excepted if convicted of the
same grade of offense, or confer privileges upon one class
that it denies to another.253
These sources indicate that the public meaning of the Amendment
was a broad ban on all class legislation and systems of caste. As
Calabresi and Rickert say:
By connecting the old-world problems of aristocracy and
feudalism with race discrimination and caste in America,
these commentators provide more evidence that the
American public conceived of the word caste at a higher
level of generality than the word race. The Framers and
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment would have
understood it to ban European feudalism or the Indian caste
system, as well as the special-interest monopolies that so
outraged Jacksonian Americans.254
Significantly, the Thirty-ninth Congress did not believe that laws
prohibiting interracial marriage would violate the Fourteenth
Evening Bulletin describing the amendment as an “opportunity . . . for the masses to break down
the domination of caste and aristocracy.”).
249. Southern Experiment, S.F. DAILY EVENING BULL., Nov. 9, 1866, Issue 29; col B.
250. Editorial, Reconstruction, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, May 24, 1866, Issue 123; col B.
251. BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 22, 1866, Issue 71; col. A.
252. The Constitutional Amendment, CINCINNATI COM., June 21, 1866, at 4.
253. Id.
254. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 36.
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Amendment, even though such laws seem to clearly discriminate on the
basis of race. The majority view was that antimiscegenation laws would
remain valid because they did not “discriminate against” a particular
race or class but applied equally to everyone.255 The reasoning relied on
a technicality, allowing antimiscegenation laws to escape the ban on
class. Since under these laws whites could only marry whites and
African Americans could only marry African Americans, it was argued
that antimiscegenation laws applied to the two races equally. In
retrospect, this argument overlooks that antimiscegenation laws were in
fact forms of class legislation singling out interracial couples for a
special burden without a legitimate public purpose and in reality served
as nothing more than a smokescreen for degrading African Americans
and people who choose to marry African Americans.256 But the
legislative history on this topic makes it clear that the principal issue
was whether the laws constituted class legislation, not whether they
discriminated on the basis of race.
Following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, members of
the Congress that had produced the Amendment clearly understood that
the objective public meaning of the Amendment was that it banned all
forms of class legislation and all caste systems. Although some
statements in the legislative history contradict Professor Harrison’s
understanding that the Privileges or Immunities Clause guaranteed
equality in law making, and the Equal Protection Clause guaranteed that
the government apply the laws equally, at the very least all the
legislative history supports the notion that the Amendment as a whole
banned class legislation.257 James Garfield stated that Section One of
the Fourteenth Amendment barred states from “making or enforcing
laws which are not on their face and in their provisions of equal
application to all the citizens of the State . . . like the air of heaven,
covering all and resting upon all with equal weight.”258 And Senator
Oliver Morton declared that the Equal Protection Clause means “that no
person shall be deprived by a State of the equal benefit of the laws.”259
Morton added that the Clause “was intended to strike at all class
255. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 274–75 n.126 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 505 (1866) (statements of Sen. Fessenden (R-Me.) and Sen. Trumbull (R-Ill.))).
256. See generallty Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 31 (arguing that antimiscegenation
laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class legislation because they alter citizens’
privileges and immunities based on race).
257. Of course these statements do not firmly rebut Harrison because they can be explained
as the subjective misunderstanding of some Republicans during Reconstruction. See supra p. 25
(discussing).
258. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. H. app. 153 (1871). But see Saunders, supra note
17, at 290–92 (noting scholarly debate as to whether the statements of Senator Garfield and
Senator Morton actually did refer to the Equal Protection Clause).
259. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 847 (1872).
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legislation, to provide that the laws must be general in their effects . . . it
was intended to promote equality in the States, and to take from the
States the power to make class legislation and to create inequality
among their people.”260 Morton explained that “the word ‘protection,’”
as used in the clause, “means not simply the protection of the person
from violence, the protection of his property from destruction,
but . . . the equal benefit of the law.”261 Senator Thayer of Nebraska
declared, “For the first time in our history [the Fourteenth Amendment]
struck down that prop of despotism, the doctrine of caste.”262 Senator
George Edmunds of Vermont also commented that the Constitution
“protected a right of her citizens against class prejudice, against caste
prejudice, against sectarian prejudice.”263
e. Evidence from After Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
In the years following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court also understood that the Fourteenth Amendment had
constitutionalized the antebellum doctrine against special or partial
laws. In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court dealt with a classic piece
of antebellum class legislation: a monopoly. Justice Bradley’s dissent
dutifully identified the state-granted slaughterhouse monopoly as class
legislation and declared it unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equality guarantee.264 Justice Bradley wrote that “a law
which prohibits a large class of citizens from adopting a lawful
employment deprives those citizens of the equal protection of the
laws.”265 In a follow-up case eleven years later, Justice Bradley wrote
that it is a “denial of the equal protection of the laws to grant to one
man, or set of men, the privilege of following an ordinary calling in a
large community, and to deny it to all others.”266 But the SlaugtherHouse majority was unable to accept that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended to infringe on state rights so heavily.267 The only
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 322 (1870).
263. 3 CONG. REC. 1870 (1875).
264. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 122 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
265. Id.
266. Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House and Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City LiveStock Landing and Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 766 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring).
267. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 77–78 (“Was it the purpose of the fourteenth
amendment, by the simple declaration that no State should make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, to transfer the security
and protection of all the civil rights which we have mentioned, from the States to the Federal
government? And where it is declared that Congress Shall have the power to enforce that article,
was it intended to bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights
heretofore belonging exclusively to the States? All this and more must follow if the proposition
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way for the majority to justify the state-granted monopoly was to
declare that the clause barring government-mandated class legislation
(the Privileges or Immunities Clause) did not apply to the states. The
Court’s reading of the Fourteenth Amendment has been resoundingly
condemned as indefensible, and we agree that the Court’s reading is
incorrect.268 The fact that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was
excised from the Fourteenth Amendment in a case involving
quintessential class legislation supports Professor Harrison’s thesis that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause was the section of the Fourteenth
Amendment dealing with law making and was designed to outlaw class
legislation, such as monopolies.
Despite the holding in the Slaughter-House Cases, future cases
indicated that the Supreme Court still understood that the Fourteenth
Amendment banned class legislation. For instance, in Gulf, C. & S.F.
Ry. Co. v. Ellis, the Supreme Court struck down under the Fourteenth
Amendment a state law that awarded attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs injured
by trains because the law subjected railroad companies to a peculiar
burden not placed on other corporations or individuals.269 The Court
explained that allowing states to subject “certain individuals or
corporations to hostile and discriminating legislation is to make the
protecting clauses of the fourteenth amendment a mere rope of sand, in
no manner restraining state action.”270 The Court took it for granted that
the Fourteenth Amendment banned all forms of class legislation and
actually cited antebellum state cases to explain its Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence.271 The Court never contemplated that the
of the plaintiffs in error be sound. . . . [T]he effect is to fetter and degrade the State governments
by subjecting them to the control of Congress in the exercise of powers heretofore universally
conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character. . . . We are convinced that no
such results were intended by the Congress which proposed these amendments, nor by the
legislatures of the States which ratified them.”).
268. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 n.1, 527 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(scholars of the Fourteenth Amendment agree “that the Clause does not mean what the Court
said it meant in 1873”); Akhil Amar, Substance and Method in the Year 2000, 28 PEPP. L. REV.
601, 631, n.178 (2001) (“Virtually no serious modern scholar—left, right, and center—thinks
that this [interpretation] is a plausible reading of the Amendment.”); Brief for Constitutional
Law Professors as Amici Curiae, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 181521), 2009 WL 4099504, at *33 (arguing that the scholarly consensus is that the majority
opinion is “egregiously wrong”).
269. 165 U.S. 150, 165–66 (1897).
270. Id. at 154.
271. See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 17, at 297 n.233 (citing Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v.
Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 156 (1897), which in turn quotes Dibrell v. Morris’ Heirs (Tenn.) 15 S. W.
87, 95, Baxter, (“[W]hether a statute be public or private general or special, in form, if it
attempts to create distinctions and classifications between the citizens of this state, the basis of
such classification must be natural, and not arbitrary”), as well as Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn.
(2 Yer.) 230, 270 (1829) (“Every partial or private law . . . is unconstitutional and void.”)).
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Amendment only applied to racial classifications, and the dissenting and
concurring justices did not dispute the majority’s contention that the
Amendment banned all class legislation. On that point, the court was
unanimous.
Other Supreme Court opinions similarly understood that the
Fourteenth Amendment banned all class legislation. In an oft-cited
opinion, Justice Field explained that under the Fourteenth Amendment,
government could “not [] impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions
upon any one, but [could] promote, with as little individual
inconvenience as possible, the general good.”272 The laws must “operate
alike upon all persons and property under the same circumstances and
conditions” because “[c]lass legislation, discriminating against some
and favoring others, is prohibited” by the Fourteenth Amendment.273 In
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., the Supreme Court said that “the
great amendments to the Constitution which followed the late civil war
had rendered [class] legislation impossible for all future time.”274 In
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, the majority opinion explicitly
said that the Fourteenth Amendment “prohibit[s] discriminating and
partial legislation by any State in favor of particular persons as against
others in like condition.”275 And even in Pace v Alabama, which upheld
antimiscegenation rules, the majority similarly stated that the Fourteenth
Amendment “prevent[ed] hostile and discriminating State legislation
against any person or class of persons.”276 Even though the court at
times initially indicated that the Fourteenth Amendment would not
protect African Americans,277 the court soon changed course.278
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court was unanimous in
saying that the Fourteenth Amendment banned class legislation. Justice
Bradley, writing for the majority, described “class legislation” as
“obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.”279
Justice Bradley explained that an example of class legislation would be
a law “denying to any person, or class of persons, the right to pursue

272. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885).
273. Id.; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 68 (1886) (citing Barbier as the correct
explanation of the Fourteenth Amendment); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 72 (1887) (same);
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 39 (1892) (same); Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards, 183
U.S. 79, 105 (1901).
274. 157 U.S. 429, 596–97 (1895).
275. 129 U.S. 26, 28–29 (1889).
276. 106 U.S. 583, 584 (1882).
277. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1873) (“We doubt very much whether
any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class . . . on
account of their race, will ever be held to come within [its] purview.”).
278. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 382 (1898).
279. 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883).
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any peaceful avocations allowed to others.”280 In dissent, Justin Harlan
wrote, “If the constitutional amendments be enforced, according to the
intent with which, as I conceive, they were adopted, there cannot be, in
this republic, any class of human beings in practical subjection to
another class, with power in the latter to dole out to the former just such
privileges as they may choose to grant.”281
Riding circuit in 1882, Justice Field’s opinions also discussed the
Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class legislation. He wrote that the
Fourteenth Amendment “stands in the constitution as a perpetual shield
against all unequal and partial legislation by the states,”282 and “‘that the
law which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon all.’”283
The weight of the historical evidence thus suggests that the
Fourteenth Amendment banned all forms of class legislation and all
systems of caste. The Amendment’s framers recognized the problems
associated with not having such a ban, as evidenced primarily by the
treatment of African-Americans up to that time. Consequently, they
adopted a ban on all class legislation that had existed at the state level
since before the Founding. Under Cooley’s view, the Amendment
mirrored the Bill of Rights, simply articulating principles already
embodied in the Constitution. As Cooley wrote:
It was not within the power of the States before the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment, to deprive citizens
of the equal protection of the laws; but there were servile
classes not thus shielded, and when these were made
freemen, there were some who disputed their claim to
citizenship, and some State laws were in force which
established discriminations against them. To settle doubts
and preclude such laws, the fourteenth amendment was
adopted; and the same securities which one citizen may
demand, all others are entitled to.284
Either way, there can be no doubt that all class legislation violated the
Constitution after 1868.

280. Id. at 23–24.
281. Id. at 62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
282. County of San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R.R., 13 F. 722, 741 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (Field,
J.).
283. Id. at 739.
284. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 133, at 466. Cooley also wrote in his
treatise in a section entitled “unequal and partial legislation” that the Equal Protection Clause
guaranteed that “the same securities which one citizen may demand, all others are entitled to.”
See id. at 397. Dean Yudof also notes that Representative John Bingham from Ohio also made
the same point in 1859. See Yudof, supra note 19, at 1373 n.43.
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II. RELIGION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. Religion as a Caste
The nineteenth century definition of caste surely included
discrimination on the basis of religion. As already discussed, the
definition of caste was not limited to discrimination on the basis or race,
national origin, or physical appearance.285 The key features of a caste
system were heredity and immutability which could accompany many
kinds of systems of caste ranging from European feudalism to the
Indian caste system, which was the paradigmatic caste system for the
framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. India’s
caste system in turn was based explicitly on religious distinctions and
was not openly based on racial distinctions. Nineteenth century
dictionaries cited examples of a caste as including a “class of people
among the Hindoos”286 and “the caste of [the] Bramins.”287 Hinduism
played an important role in structuring and enforcing the Indian caste
system, although the system was not entirely grounded in Hinduism.
The Brahmins were the priestly class at the pinnacle of the hierarchy
and served an important religious function, providing spiritual guidance
and leading religious services.
And other nonracial and religious hierarchies, such as European
feudalism, the treatment of Jews in Europe prior to the French
Revolution, as well as the many social distinctions that were made in
Persia, Egypt, Peru, Assyria, and Attica, were all recognized as being
caste systems in the mid-nineteenth century.288 In 1872, Senator Charles
Sumner, one of the leaders of Reconstruction, remarked that:
Religion and reason condemn Caste as impious and
unchristian, making republican institutions and equal laws
impossible; but here is Caste not unlike that which
separates the Sudra from the Brahmin. Pray, sir, who
constitutes the white man a Brahmin? Whence his lordly
title? Down to a recent period in Europe the Jews were
driven to herd by themselves separate from Christians; but
this discarded barbarism is revived among us in the ban of
color. There are millions of fellow citizens guilty of no
offense except the dusky livery of the sun appointed by the
heavenly Father, whom you treat as others have treated the
Jews, as the Brahmin treats the Sudra. But pray, sir, do not
pretend that this is the great Equality promised by our
285.
286.
287.
288.

See supra Part II.A.
WORCESTER, supra note 41, at 107–08, 128.
GOODRICH, supra note 41, at 64, 75.
See, e.g., Sumner, supra note 40, at 7.
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fathers.”289
Senator Sumner’s explicit references to the mistreatment of Brahmins
and Jews show that he understood that systems of caste can be based on
religious distinctions. Representative Charles Van Wyck made the same
point saying that: “The meanness of caste in this country on account of
color is no more wicked than the caste of nation, religion, or blood in
Great Britain.”290
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in a case involving the
controversial theologian Francis Abbot, discussed how classifications
based on religion lead to caste:
A division of society into two ranks, a theological
aristocracy on one side, a lower caste on the other,—the
former wielding all the instruments of the law and all the
power of the government to degrade men of the faith of
Jefferson, Franklin, Ethan Allen, or Governor Plumer;
commanding what doctrines shall not be preached;
suppressing the freedom of the pulpit; abolishing the rights
of property given to independent religious uses; and
confiscating such property for the use of a state religion,—
all this is as repugnant to the plain and vital principles of
the constitution, as to the sense and spirit of the people who
made the constitution. The governmental work of that
generation has been sufficiently extolled for eighty-five
years past as a triumphant vindication of human rights,
affording a sure protection against ecclesiastical oppression
in particular, and perpetuating throughout the state such
refuge as wheelwright found for a season at Exeter in exile
for conscience’ sake. That work must be undone, and a
degenerate age must be ready to welcome the return of the
worse despotisms, before a system of religious caste can be
introduced. When an infidel does not stand as well in law
before the tribunals of justice as a Christian, in any sense of
the word, our free institutions are a failure. To sneer at freethinkers of free thought is to make a thoughtless use of free
speech, and to scoff at a privilege which we are bound to
protect. The Constitution does not assume to create
religious rights or to distribute them. It reverently
recognizes and maintains them as original and universal, as
rights which human government can neither grant nor
289. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 382–83 (1872); Calabresi & Rickert, supra note
19, at 43.
290. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 469 (1868).
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withhold, which are not of human tenure, and which no
man can give up. A single unresisted infringement,
established as a precedent, subjugates the weak, and leaves
them at the mercy of the strong. Every man and every
parish is liable to hold unpopular theological opinions. And
when the right to hold and inculcate such opinions is not
sacred, and the violation of it is not sacrilege; when the
constitutional defences of that right are dismantled, and it is
left with no better security than the generosity and
tolerance of an ecclesiastical court, or the caprice of a
ruling class; when freemen are reduced to the consolation
of remembering that the writ for burning heretics is
obsolete, and of hoping that civilization will not suffer it to
be revived,—the theory of our government is exploded and
its original authority at an end.291
On a superficial level, it could be argued that there is no
discrimination on the basis of religion today such that it could be said
that we have a religious system of “caste.” People can freely change
religions—or choose not to practice any religion—without direct
coercion by the government or private individuals. A person born into
one religion is not stuck there for life. Even so, there are clearly some
religions and religious subgroups which have some caste-like aspects to
them.
For example, Judaism likely qualifies as a caste, although it is not a
caste that faces a lot of open discrimination in the United States at the
moment. According to Jewish law, a Jewish person is defined as
someone who either was born to a Jewish mother or converted to
Judaism.292 Once a person is considered Jewish according to Jewish
law, he or she cannot become a non-Jew.293 So, even if a Jew renounces
his or her belief in Judaism or converts to another religion, he or she is
still considered Jewish. Even such a person’s children and
grandchildren would be considered Jewish, as long as the matrimonial
descent is maintained. Being Jewish is thus hereditary and immutable
and has inherent elements of caste. Prejudice and discrimination against
Jews as an inferior caste is far less common today in the United States
than it was prior to the 1960s, but it persists in some places even today.
The definition of a Jew is also well known in the non-Jewish world
and has historically been used as a basis for persecuting Jews and

291. Hale v. Everett, 53 N.H. 9, 275–76 (1868) (emphasis added).
292. See SHULCHAN ARUCH EVEN HAEZER 8:5; BABYLONIAN TALMUD, KIDDUSHIN 66b,
68b.
293. See RAMA, YOREH DE’AH 268:12; TALMUD BECHOROS 30B.
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treating them as an inferior caste.294 For instance, the Nazis did not
define a person as Jewish based on his or her religious beliefs, but based
on the person’s inherited status as a Jew.295 Whether an individual
defined himself or herself as a Jew or was a member of the Jewish
community was irrelevant to the Nazi definition.296 Consequently,
“[m]any Germans who had not practiced Judaism for years found
themselves caught in the grip of the Nazi terror. Even people with
Jewish grandparents who had converted to Christianity were defined as
Jews.”297 The Nazis clearly viewed a person’s Jewish status as
hereditary and immutable. Such entrenched persecution mirrors the
immutability of the Indian caste system. It is also reminiscent of the
disgraceful state laws in this country that defined individuals as
“African American” based on the “proportion of colored blood” in the
individual’s genealogy.298
Another religion where children effectively inherit their parents’
religious status and beliefs is Islam. Children born to Islamic parents
will usually be raised as Moslems and will be Moslems when they reach
adulthood. Conversion from Islam to another religion is considered
apostasy and is punishable by death, according to many Islamic scholars
and regimes.299 Status as a Moslem is thus in essence inheritable and
almost immutable just as is status as a Jew. Moslems inevitably are a
kind of caste as are Jews.
Children born to other religious parents may have caste-like
attributes as well. Take, for instance, a child born into an Amish home.
The child is born into a religious way of life without any choice in the
matter. The child attends Amish schools and is taught Amish values and
directed in Amish religious practices. Because of parental and social
influences, the child likely has no opportunity or even ability to
abandon the Amish religion until he or she is an adult. The child’s
religious status as an Amish practitioner is thus to some degree
hereditary and immutable. Even a child born into a less rigid religious
294. In 1872, Senator Sumner explicitly referenced Jews as an oppressed caste. See supra
p. 53.
295. The United States Holocaust Museum, http://www.ushmm.org/outreach/en/article.
php?ModuleId=10007695 (last visited on Dec. 20, 2011).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (“[T]here is a difference of opinion in
the different states; some holding that any visible admixture of black blood stamps the person as
belonging to the colored race . . . others, that it depends upon the preponderance of
blood . . . and still others, that the predominance of white blood must only be in the proportion
of three-fourths . . . .”) (case citations omitted).
299. See Tuan N. Samahon, The Religion Clauses and Political Asylum: Religious
Persecution Claims and the Religious Membership-Conversion Imposter Problem, 88 GEO. L.J.
2211 (2000).
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home will likely not change religions by virtue of the dominating
influence of his or her parents.
Religious groups that fall within the definition of caste, such as Jews
and Moslems, should certainly be protected from discrimination by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s no-caste principle. For this reason, we will
argue below that a government program offering unequal educational
opportunities for religious children relative to secular children violates
the Fourteenth Amendment.300 Whether all religious individuals should
receive the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection from discrimination on
the basis of caste simply because some religious individuals constitute a
caste, is a more difficult question. But answering it is unnecessary
because the Amendment’s ban on all class legislation clearly protects all
religious individuals including mainline Protestants, Catholics,
members of the Eastern Orthodox Church, Mormons, and practitioners
of Hinduism, Buddhism, and all other faiths.
B. Religion as a Class
As already discussed, a system of forbidden class legislation is one
that singles out particular groups or individuals for special privileges or
burdens quite apart from those borne by the rest of the members of
society. Class legislation is by definition legislation which does not
apply broadly to the general populace and which grants monopolies or
other special privileges to a favored group or impose unique burdens on
a particular disfavored group. The original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment held that government could only make
distinctions among classes of people if doing so was rational and
necessary to serve a public purpose. Thus, in its 1897 ruling in Gulf,
Colorado & Santa Fé Railway Co. v. Ellis, the Supreme Court reviewed
the constitutionality of a law that awarded attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs
suing railroad companies but not to plaintiffs suing other corporations
or individuals.301 The Supreme Court found that giving this benefit to
plaintiffs suing railways but not to plaintiffs suing other corporations
served no public purpose. So the Court struck down the law as
unconstitutional class legislation. Under the principles enunciated in the
Ellis case, classifications based on religion also serve no public purpose.
They therefore violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class
legislation.
In fact, the Constitution’s Religion Clauses served as among the first
bans on some forms of class legislation discriminating against religion
starting in 1787 and 1791.302 The Free Exercise Clause and the No
300. See discussion infra Part VI.A.
301. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fé Ry., 165 U.S. 150, 152–53 (1897).
302. See Hamburger, supra note 157, at 336–40. Hamburger describes how states and the
framers accepted that the legislature could not discriminate on the basis of religion and that
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Religious Test Clause both essentially barred Congress from passing
special or partial laws that place unique burdens on religion. And the
Establishment Clause prevents Congress from passing a special or
partial law that grants one religion a unique privilege or immunity that
effectively disfavors all other religions. The Establishment Clause
essentially blocks Congress from granting a monopoly on religion to
one specific religion. As Professor McConnell has said:
[T]he Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was
designed to “avoid undue concentrations of power”—
specifically, to prevent the federal government (and, after
the Fourteenth Amendment, all governments) from
assuming the power to control the religious life of the
American people . . . . Just as we want no governmental
control of news media, telecommunications, or the arts, the
First Amendment stands for the premise that religious
decisions should be made by individuals, families, and
voluntary associations, and not by the state.303
The Religion Clauses of the original Constitution and of the federal Bill
of Rights were thus consistent with the Lockean principle of allowing
only general rules applicable to all religions only on similar terms. To
be sure, the three Religion Clauses did not by themselves provide as
sweeping protection against discrimination on the basis of religion as is
mandate by the antidiscrimination command of the Fourteenth
Amendment.304 But they were a good first start.
The Fourteenth Amendment dramatically expanded the limited ban
on class legislation initially outlined in the 1787 and 1791 federal
constitutional Religion Clauses. The Fourteenth Amendment broadly
banned all class legislation across the board, whether based on religion
or on any other improper classifications that gave some classes of
citizens greater rights than were enjoyed by other classes of citizens.
With regards to religion, the Amendment banned all forms of
discrimination on the basis of religion, not just the few narrow forms
specified in the Religion Clauses. There is no evidence in the legislative
history that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to carve
individuals were entitled to the same privileges and rights as everyone else without regard to
their religion. Hamburger quotes Madison that “in matters of religion no man’s right is abridged
by the institution of civil society, and that religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.” Id. at
340 (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 121
(1785)).
303. Michael W. McConnell, Governments, Families, and Power: A Defense of
Educational Choice, 31 CONN. L. REV. 847, 848 (1999) [hereinafter “McConnell, Governments,
Families, and Power”].
304. See generally infra Part IV (discussing the limited protection of the religion clauses).
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religion out of the broad ban on class legislation that they meant to
enact. And it is therefore unlikely that the ban on religious class
legislation after 1868 should have simply regurgitated the minimal ban
on class legislation set forth in the original Religion Clauses. The
framers knew how to narrow the scope of constitutional language when
they wanted to do so,305 and there is not even a hint from the legislative
history that the framers thought that religion should receive less
protection than other groups. In contrast, the framers debated quite
vigorously whether women should be protected from class legislation
and what kind of protection from class legislation African Americans
should receive.306
And if class legislation protects against discrimination on the basis
of race, it surely bans discrimination on the basis of religion because
multiple protections for religion in the text of the Constitution predate
the Fourteenth Amendment, indicating that from 1791 forward religion
was already a suspect class. The Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses protect religious liberty. And the No Religious Test Clause
guarantees that individuals will not be barred from holding public office
based on their religion. In contrast, in 1787 and in 1791 there were no
such clauses indicating that race was a suspect class. Indeed, African
Americans were subjected to extraordinary oppression and were barred
from holding public office and even from the rights of citizenship prior
to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is extremely improbable
that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would have created a
new, far-reaching protection from class legislation that applied only to
racial classes which had been totally unprotected from discrimination
prior to 1868, yet deny protection to religious classes of people that
actually had been recognized prior to 1868 as having suspect class
status! The more rational approach would have been for the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment to grant the new protection from class
legislation to those groups which had been recognized as being suspect
classes prior to 1868 and then decide which other groups like racial
minorities or women should or should not also receive that same level
of protection.
And in fact the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment followed this
logic precisely when considering whether women should receive
protection from class legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
framers chose to ban class legislation that discriminated on the basis of
305. For instance, the Privileges or Immunities Clause only applies to “[c]itizens of each
State” Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment only guarantees males the right to vote; and
the Fifteenth Amendment only outlaws abridging the right to vote based on “race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
306. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 74 (citing backlash from feminists over the
inclusion of the word “male” in the Fourteenth Amendment).
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race but not class legislation that discriminated on the basis of gender,
even though women should have been protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ban on caste systems and on class-based laws.307 The
framers refused to begin considering gender a suspect class by
following a two-step process. First, they carefully considered and
extensively debated whether women should be included in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection against hostile class legislation.308
This step was necessary because prior to 1868 women had few
constitutional rights and had been subjected to extensive discrimination.
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment needed therefore to consider
whether to include women in the Amendment’s broad language or to
create a carve-out excluding them from the Amendment’s protection.
They chose the latter route. Next, they explicitly excluded women from
the protection of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment in Section Two,
which protects the voting rights of only “male citizens.”309 Professor
Calabresi and Ms. Rickert note that feminists did not object to the
broad, unqualified language of Section One banning systems of class
legislation, which they understood as including protection for
women.310 It was only the discriminatory language of Section Two
which used the word “male” that they objected to.311 In contrast to the
extensive discussion about excluding women from the Amendment’s
protection against class legislation, there was absolutely no discussion
of excluding religion from the Amendment’s protection, and there was
obviously no textual exclusion either. The Fourteenth Amendment’s ban
on class-based laws that discriminate against religion matches the ban
the Amendment would have imposed against class-based laws that
discriminate on the basis of sex had the word “male” not been
deliberately inserted into Section Two. It is thus difficult to see how the
Amendment’s framers could possibly have meant to exclude religion
from the Amendment’s ban on systems of class and caste.
And if the Fourteenth Amendment protects women from hostile
class legislation, it surely protects religion from hostile class legislation
as well. Professor Calabresi and Ms. Rickert have argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not begin protecting women until 1919
when the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified.312 They point out that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly excluded women from
the antidiscrimination command of the Fourteenth Amendment by using
307. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 66–70.
308. See id.
309. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (ensuring that states shall not abridge the right to
vote of “male inhabitants”).
310. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 49.
311. Id.
312. See id. at 70–85; see also infra pp. 62–63 (discussing further).
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the words “male inhabitants” in Section Two. But Calabresi and Rickert
argue that when the Nineteenth Amendment granted women political
rights including the right to vote, women automatically gained civil
rights protection from hostile class legislation under the Fourteenth
Amendment as well. Their reasoning is that granting a group of people
political rights without granting that group civil rights is incoherent.
They claim that the Fourteenth Amendment has an amoeba-like quality,
automatically sucking up new groups with caste or class features to
receive equal civil rights as those groups obtain equal political rights in
future generations. It is hard to imagine that the Fourteenth Amendment
would be able to automatically grant equal rights to groups, such as
women, that never before enjoyed equality, even in 1868, yet exclude
religious groups whose status as a suspect class dated all the way back
to 1787.
Finally, it should be highlighted that by 1868, all state constitutions
protected religion, usually in multiple ways, even though state
constitutions at that time contained little protection against racial
discrimination. Twenty-seven out of the thirty-seven states (73%) had
clauses in their state constitutions in 1868 when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified that banned the establishment of religion.313
All thirty-seven state constitutions in 1868 had Free Exercise Clause
analogues.314 Twenty-four states (65%) in 1868 had clauses prohibiting
religious qualifications for holding public office.315 In contrast, only
five states (14%) in 1868 had clauses barring some form of
discrimination on the basis of race.316 It is hard to imagine that these
same states, with resounding protections of religion as a suspect class
prior to 1868 and only minimal protection of race as a suspect class,
would come together and ratify a Fourteenth Amendment that banned
only class legislation on the basis of race but not class legislation on the
basis of religion.

313. Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 39, at 31–32.
314. Id. at 33.
315. Id. at 36.
316. ARK. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (1868) (barring deprivation of rights “on account of race,
color, or previous condition”); FLA. CONST. art. 16, § 28 (1868) (“There shall be no civil or
political distinction in this State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,
and the Legislature shall have no power to prohibit, by law, any class of persons on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude, to vote or hold any office, beyond the conditions
prescribed by this Constitution”); LA. CONST. Title 1, art. 13 (1868) (guaranteeing “equal rights
and privileges . . . without distinction or discrimination on account of race or color”); S.C.
CONST. art. 1, § 39 (1868) (“Distinction, on account of race or color, in any case whatever, shall
be prohibited”); TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (1868) (“[N]or shall any citizen ever be deprived of
any right, privilege, or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden, or duty, on account of race,
color, or previous condition.”).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

61

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 1

970

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

C. The Fourteenth Amendment Automatically Protects Groups with
Political Rights
In America, a logical and fundamental theory of rights is that groups
that have political rights, such as the right to vote and run for public
office, are also guaranteed equal civil rights.317 This truism exists
because political rights—the right to be counted in society and the
ability to participate in the shaping of society—are uniquely valued in
society.318 Some people, such as children or convicted felons, have civil
rights but lack political rights. Other people, such as resident aliens,
have some civil rights but not others and have no political rights. But
groups of people that have political rights certainly have civil rights as
well.319 To say otherwise would mean that the legislature could, for
example, strip a group of people of the right to contract or the right to
work outside the home, but that it could not eliminate that group’s right
to vote or hold public office. Such a construction is implausible. The
history of women’s rights is instructive.
In 1868, women did not have constitutionally protected political and
civil rights. Although women should have qualified as a caste because
of their immutable and hereditary physical features, women were not
guaranteed equal civil rights or protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
from class based legislation because Section Two of the Fourteenth
Amendment restricted voting rights protection to men only.320 It
therefore became implausible to construe the antidiscrimination
command of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment as including
women when Section Two of the Amendment explicitly excluded them

317. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 70–76.
318. See Steven G. Calabresi, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Guarantee Equal Justice
for All?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 152 (2011); see also Calabresi & Rickert, supra note
19, at 67–70.
319. The view that political rights can be granted or held back might seem strange to the
modern observer because political rights are sometimes viewed as fundamental rights. See
Harper v. Va. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (stating that “the right to vote is too
precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned”). In Harper, the court dubiously
held that a poll tax violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. The majority explicitly rejected any
need to adhere to the original meaning of the Constitution and instead relied on its perception of
the evolving meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 669 (stating that “the Equal
Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era . . . we have never
been confined to historic notions of equality”). In so doing, the majority failed to cite any
original sources for the fundamental right to vote. And it failed to explain why it was necessary
to ratify the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-third, and Twenty-fourth Amendments if the
evolving meaning of the Equal Protection Clause otherwise engulfed the purpose of those
provisions. Rather, Justice Black’s dissent was likely more in line with the Constitution’s
original meaning. See id. at 672–75 (Black, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Equal Protection
Clause merely mandates rational basis review of voting restrictions, not strict scrutiny).
320. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (amended 1920).
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from its protections.321 And indeed feminists were outraged when they
learned that the word “male” would be included in Section Two because
they understood the dire implications.322
But in 1919 when the Nineteenth Amendment granted women the
right to vote, the Fourteenth Amendment’s equality guarantee
automatically expanded to protect women from class-based laws.323 The
reason for this is that granting a group of people the right to vote while
simultaneously denying that group of people equal civil rights is simply
irrational.324 The reason the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified to give
African-American men the right to vote just two years after ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment is precisely because the Fourteenth
Amendment only granted African-Americans equal civil rights, not
equal political rights.325 And it is clear from the legislative history that
the framers understood that the Fourteenth Amendment was insufficient
to guarantee African-Americans the right to vote.326 It took the
Reconstruction framers only two years to realize that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal civil rights for African-Americans
needed to be supplemented by the Fifteenth Amendment’s guarantee of
equal political rights to the same group. Thus, when fifty-two years after
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment women got the right to
vote, women suddenly had the same political rights as did white and
African-American men. From 1920 on, it became implausible to argue
that women had a constitutional right to vote for president, senator, and
governor, but they could not be trusted to make a contract or own
property without their husband’s consent.
It should be underscored that granting political rights under the
Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments does not render the Fourteenth
Amendment superfluous. First, the Fourteenth Amendment banned all
systems of caste and class-based laws, thus creating a new level of civil
rights protection previously not guaranteed by the Constitution. This
broad-based civil rights protection extends to many groups beyond just
classes defined by race, gender, and religion. For instance, antebellum
bans on class legislation mainly involved groups who were politically
connected (or politically disfavored) or economic distinctions that were
deemed unjustified or lacking in having a sufficient public purpose.327
And other groups, such as children, immigrants, or the disabled would
321. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 66–67.
322. Id. at 66.
323. See id. at 66–70.
324. Id. at 66–68.
325. See id. at 74–75 (discussing history of this issue).
326. Id.
327. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 251–64 (discussing the history and implications of
reading the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth Amendments together).
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also likely qualify for some protection from class based laws. Second,
without the Fourteenth Amendment, legislatures could pass class
legislation or establish caste systems, such as European feudalism or the
Indian caste system, even though they could not take away the right to
vote based on gender or race. Prior to 1868, the Constitution protected a
variety of other civil rights, such as those enumerated in the Bill of
Rights, but it did not outlaw systems of caste or class-base legislation
explicitly as the Fourteenth Amendment did. Thus the Fourteenth
Amendment ensures that critical civil rights not otherwise articulated in
the Constitution or its Amendments get protected.
The political rights of religious individuals are explicitly protected in
the Constitution. The No Religious Test Clause guarantees that
individuals will not be barred from holding office based on their
religion.328 The Clause makes no distinction as to whether the test
discriminates against a particular religion or against all religions
generally. The Clause thus rejects the argument commonly used by
proponents of religious discrimination that discrimination on the basis
of religion furthers an antiestablishment purpose.329 And in fact,
religious individuals were the only group of people—the only suspect
class in modern language—to receive explicit protection of their
political rights in the original Constitution of 1787.330
The No Religious Test Clause not only bans laws imposing a
religious test for holding office, but we think that it also implies that
legislatures cannot restrict the ability to vote based on religion. It would
be irrational to read the Constitution as prohibiting legislatures from
barring individuals from holding public office based on their religion
but as allowing legislatures to restrict voting rights based on religion.
How could the Constitution possibly be read to trust someone to hold
public office, including the office of the President, but not trust that
person with the right to vote? Under the Twenty-sixth Amendment we
allow citizens to vote starting from the age of eighteen,331 but we do not
allow them to hold the greater trust of becoming a member of Congress
until the age of twenty-five,332 a Senator until the age of thirty,333 or the
President until the age of thirty-five.334 Suppose a law were passed that
prevented people of all religions from voting, instead of just preventing
328. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification
to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”).
329. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721–22 (2004) (explaining that refusing to fund
private religious organizations while funding parallel private secular organizations served an
important antiestablishment interest).
330. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
331. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
332. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
333. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl 3.
334. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
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members of a particular religion from voting? Such a law would still be
invalid under the implication of the No Religious Test Clause because
the Clause makes no distinction as to whether the discrimination it
forbids targets a specific religious group or all religious individuals
generally. So it seems that once the original Constitution in 1787
guaranteed religious individuals the right to hold federal public office, it
also guaranteed them other political rights like the right to vote in
federal elections. Since the Constitution specifies in Article I, Section
Two that voting eligibility must be the same for voting in U.S. House of
Representatives elections as it is in voting for members of the most
numerous branch of the state legislature, the states as well as the federal
government are constitutionally barred from denying any citizen the
right to vote on the basis of religion.335
Because religious individuals thus have fully protected political
rights against the federal and state governments—the right to hold
public office, the right to vote, and the right to serve on juries—they
automatically, like women since 1920, have fully protected equal civil
rights that protect them from federal and state class-based legislation.
Neither Congress nor the state legislatures can restrict the political
rights of a single religion or of all religions as a whole. And Congress
and the state legislatures therefore also cannot restrict the civil rights of
a single religion or of all religions as a whole. To say otherwise would
lead to the illogical result that religious individuals had a
constitutionally protected right to vote and be elected president, senator,
or governor, but not to make contracts, buy property, or share a lunch
counter with secular individuals. It would thus be utterly irrational to
conclude that the antidiscrimination command of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not ban discrimination on the basis of religion.
One possible counterargument is that because the individual political
and civil rights of religious citizens are already protected by the very
specific language of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, one
ought not to read the Fourteenth Amendment’s general ban on
discriminatory class-based legislation as superseding the very specific
and on-point language of the Religion Clauses. This argument is
perhaps best illustrated by the Supreme Court’s opinions affirming
political rights for religious individuals under the Free Exercise
Clause.336 In Torasco v. Watkins, for example, the Supreme Court held
that a Maryland law requiring that a notary commissioner declare his or
her belief in God violated the First Amendment (it was unclear whether
335. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 2.
336. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 620 (1978) (striking down a Tennessee
statute barring “ministers of the gospel, or priest[s] of any denomination whatever” from
participating in the state’s constitutional convention (quoting TENN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
(1796)).
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the court was using the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment
Clause).337 The Supreme Court explained that the No Religious Test
Clause was necessary prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights for such
claims of political rights, but that the First Amendment “broke new
constitutional ground in the protection it sought to afford to freedom of
religion.”338 Indeed the Supreme Court does not appear to have ever
used the No Religious Test Clause as the basis for a decision it has
rendered.339 And under current Supreme Court case law, laws that
restrict the right to vote or that restrict many but not all civil rights
based on religion likely violate both the Establishment Clause340 and the
Free Exercise Clause.341
But the Supreme Court’s case law on the Free Exercise,
Establishment, and No Religious Test Clauses is largely inconsistent
with the original meaning of these clauses, and there is state conduct,
such as the adoption of Blaine Amendments, that under current case law
does not violate the Religion Clauses but which should be read as
violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s antidiscrimination principle. The
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses combat only certain specific
types of governmental actions that hurt religious citizens but that do not
implicate political rights.342 These two clauses create protections
uniquely required for religion. In contrast, the No Religious Test Clause
guarantees religious individuals’ political rights. The Torasco court’s
declaration that the No Religious Test Clause is superfluous following
ratification of the First Amendment is indefensible as an original matter
or under any plausible theory of textual interpretation.
To see why the Fourteenth Amendment’s antidiscrimination
command adds and should add concrete protections for religion above
337. See, e.g., Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1961).
338. Id. at 492.
339. A search for “no religious test” in all Supreme Court cases turned up sixteen results,
none of which used the clause to render a decision.
340. See infra Part IV.B. (explaining the Establishment Clause tests in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) and Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997), as well as the
Free Exercise Clause); see also Colo. Christian U. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1257–59 (10th
Cir. 2008) (holding that a law banning funding to only “pervasively sectarian” schools violated
the original meaning of the Establishment Clause because the Establishment Clause demanded
“equal treatment of all religious faiths without discrimination or preference”); Douglas Laycock,
“Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 875, 922–23 (1986) (explaining that the Establishment Clause prohibited both
discrimination against specific religious groups and discrimination against all religious groups
in general).
341. See infra Part IV.A. (discussing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)). Such a law also might violate the Due Process Clause
because of enforceability problems, such as determining who was sufficiently religious to have
his or her right to vote restricted.
342. See infra Part IV.
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and beyond those afforded by the Religion Clauses, it is necessary to
briefly canvass the protection of religion from hostile class legislation
since 1787.
D. History of Religious Equality in America
The protection of religious liberty from hostile class legislation has a
very long history in this country predating the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment by centuries.343 Several of the original thirteen
North American colonies were purposely established to be safe havens
for religious minorities and some of those colonies through their laws
ensured religious toleration, albeit imperfect in our modern eyes.344 And
it is generally recognized that the core purpose of the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment was the protection of
religion from certain kinds of hostile class legislation and the
furtherance of religious liberty.345 The equal protection of religion can
be seen in state constitutions, in pre-1868 court cases, in the political
history of the Fourteenth Amendment, and in the legislative history of
the Fourteenth Amendment. This diverse and widespread historical
evidence shows an overwhelming sensitivity to the need to protect
religion from hostile class legislation. As Thomas Cooley wrote, “[T]he
general voice has been, that persons of every religious persuasion
should be made equal before the law, and that questions of religious
belief and religious worship should be questions between each
343. See generally Hamburger, supra note 157, at 295–367 (discussing history of religion
and equal protection in the Eighteenth century).
344. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1424–30 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell,
Origins] (noting the religious toleration in Maryland, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
and Carolina and discussing the development of religious protection in the colonies).
345. See, e.g., Kurland, supra note 16, at 5 (arguing that the religion clauses must be “read
together as creating a doctrine more akin to the reading of the equal protection clause than to the
due process clause, i.e., they must be read to mean that religion may not be used as a basis for
classification for purposes of governmental action”); see also Sch. Dist. v Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (the “single end” of the religion clauses is “to promote and
assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all and to nurture the
conditions which secure the best hope of attainment of that end”); Jesse H. Choper, The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 678 (1980)
(arguing that the “central aim of the Religion Clauses [is] protection of religious liberty”);
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1282–83
(1994); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1 (1985)
[hereinafter “McConnell, Accommodation”] (“[R]eligious liberty is the central value and
animating purpose of the Religion Clauses . . . .”); Meyler, supra note 15; Lawrence G. Sager,
The Free Exercise of Culture: Some Doubts and Distinctions, 129 DAEDALUS 193, 193–207
(2000); Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 9 (2004).
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individual man and his Maker.”346 It is therefore inconceivable that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant to incorporate a ban on
class-based laws that discriminated on the basis of race but not against
class-based laws that discriminated on the basis of religion. Religion
had by 1868 been a suspect class since colonial times. Surely, if racial
classifications are to receive strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment and to be upheld only in the face of a compelling public
purpose, the same must be true of laws that classify on the basis of
religion.
1. Historical Persecution of Religion and the Founders’ Response
The framers of the Constitution and Bill of rights were well aware of
the ugly history of religious persecution in England when they wrote
those documents.347 For instance, church elections were famously
manipulated by the King. King Henry II thus allowed the church to hold
“free” elections but ordered it to elect his clerk;348 and King Henry VIII
assumed full personal control of the church and claimed the power to
appoint church officials.349 Prior to the rise of King Charles I, the
Church of England dominated the landscape in Elizabethan and Stuart
England, and the supporters of the Church of England thoroughly
suppressed religious dissenters such as Protestants and Roman
Catholics.350 By the 1630s, high Church Anglicans allied with Charles I
and his Catholic Queen causing Protestant dissenters to flee England for
the safety of living in the Massachusetts Bay and Connecticut Colonies.
This exodus for the new world continued in the 1640s during the
waging of the English Civil War between Oliver Cromwell and the
dissenting Protestants and Charles I and his high church Anglicans.
Following the English Civil War, Protestants executed King Charles I
and his Archbishop of Canterbury and similarly persecuted dissenters
from Puritanism. Cromwell and his allies confiscated property, denied
free religious exercise, and imprisoned non-Protestants.351 Following
the return of the monarchy in 1660, the persecution of Protestant
346. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 133, at 467.
347. See McConnell, Origins, supra note 344, at 1421–74; see also Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 702–04 (2012) (recounting the
history of religious persecution in England and how it impacted the framers when they wrote the
First Amendment); Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 114–17 (1943) (commenting that
the First Amendment was designed to protect religious individuals from persecution by banning
such practices as “taxes on knowledge” (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244–
49 (1936)).
348. See W. L. WARREN, HENRY II 312 (1973).
349. See G. R. ELTON, THE TUDOR CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 327–32
(1960).
350. See McConnell, Origins, supra note 344, at 1421.
351. See id. at 1421–22.
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dissenters resumed and the persecution of Catholics continued.352 The
Test Act of 1672 denied public and military office to non-Anglicans and
required that everyone follow the religious practices of the Church of
England.353
Eager to escape the religious persecution of England, many
dissenters fled to America, but unfortunately they brought some bad
English habits with them. The Puritans in the Massachusetts Bay
Colony, for example, persecuted dissenters, even executing some
Quakers.354 In Virginia, Puritans and Catholics were expelled because
the Church of England was the established church there, and Baptists
were horsewhipped.355 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780
eventually guaranteed equal treatment of religions but only for
Christians,356 and Massachusetts proved to be unfriendly to
Presbyterians, Baptists, and Quakers.357 Many other states also had
religious test oaths requiring public officials to declare their adherence
to a particular religion.358 By 1787, eleven states prohibited nonChristians from holding public office, and four prohibited nonProtestants from holding office.359
Jews also suffered tremendous persecution in England historically,360
as they did throughout Europe.361 In the Twelfth and Thirteenth
Centuries, Jews were subjected to mob violence in England perpetrated
by both the royal crown and private individuals.362 Blood libels
persisted, and there were many incidents of mobs murdering Jews and
stealing Jewish property.363 During this time, Jews were singled out for
many special legal disadvantages, including higher taxes, prohibitions
352. See id.
353. See id.
354. Id. at 1422–23.
355. Id. at 1423.
356. MASS. CONST., pt. I, art. III (1780) (“And every denomination of Christians,
demeaning themselves peaceably, and as good subjects of the commonwealth, shall be equally
under the protection of the law: and no subordination of any one sect or denomination to another
shall ever be established by law.”).
357. McConnell, Origins, supra note 344, at 1423.
358. See J. Suzanne Bell Chambers, Note, Applying the Break: Religion and the
Peremptory Challenge, 70 IND. L.J. 569, 597 n.192 (1995) (describing how in Georgia, South
Carolina, and New Hampshire only Protestants could serve in the legislature but how other
states, such as Vermont and Pennsylvania, had less severe restrictions).
359. McConnell, Origins, supra note 344, at 1474.
360. See generally Shira Shoenberg, Virtual Jewish History Tour: United Kingdom, JEWISH
VIRTUAL LIBRARY, www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/vjw/England.html (last visited Oct. 26,
2012) [hereinafter “Virtual Jewish History Tour: United Kingdom”].
LIBRARY,
361. See
Report
on
Global
Anti-Semitism,
JEWISH VIRTUAL
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/anti-semitism/global2004.html (last visited Oct. 26,
2012) (describing anti-Semitism in many other European countries).
362. See Virtual Jewish History Tour: United Kingdom, supra note 360.
363. Id.
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on owning land, bans on inheritance from parent to child, and
substantial restrictions on trade and occupation.364 Finally, in 1290,
King Edward I formally expelled all the Jews from England a full 202
years before the Spanish Inquisition expelled the Jews from Spain. It
was not until the 1650s, under Oliver Cromwell, that the Jews were
again allowed back into England, and Jews in England continued to
have limited legal rights and religious freedom from the 1650s until the
mid-nineteenth century.365
It was against this backdrop of bloody religious warfare and
intolerance that the framers of the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights
sought to guarantee religious liberty. By enacting the Establishment
Clause, in the very first clause in the Bill of Rights, the framers ensured
that there would never be a national church. As James Madison said, the
Establishment Clause responded to the concern that “one sect might
obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion
to which they would compel others to conform.”366 By enacting the Free
Exercise Clause in the Bill of Rights, the framers barred the government
from discriminatorily targeting religious worship. And regarding the No
Religious Test Clause, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, later Chief
Justice of the United States, wrote:
[T]he sole purpose and effect of [the ban on religious tests
for office] is to exclude persecution, and to secure to you
the important right of religious liberty . . . . In our country
every man has a right to worship God in that way which is
most agreeable to his own conscience. If he be a good and
peaceable citizen, he is liable to no penalties or incapacities
on account of his religious sentiments; or in other words, he
is not subject to persecution.367
The Religion Clauses thus worked in concert to guarantee religious
liberty and guard against the religious persecution which had pervaded
England and the colonies.368 For this reason, Thomas Jefferson
described both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause
as “building a wall of separation between Church & State.”369
364.
365.
366.
367.

Id.
Id.
See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730–31 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (remarks of J. Madison).
Oliver Ellsworth, A Landholder VII, in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 448, 449 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 1983)
(originally published in the Connecticut Courant, Dec. 17, 1787); McConnell, Origins, supra
note 344, at 1474.
368. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
703 (2012).
369. 16 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 282 (Albert Ellery
Bergh ed., 1905), available at http://www.constitution.org/tj/jeff16.htm.
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Prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, several states proposed
amendments to the original Constitution of 1787, which give us a sense
of the passion the framers had for protecting religious freedom. For
instance, New York proposed “[t]hat the people have an equal, natural,
and unalienable right freely and peaceably to exercise their religion,
according to the dictates of conscience.”370 New Hampshire proposed,
“Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or to infringe the rights
of conscience.” 371 And James Madison proposed, “The civil rights of
none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor
shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal
rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.”372
These proposed amendments demonstrate how extraordinarily
significant religious liberty was to the founders. Though the final
version of the Free Exercise Clause that was ultimately ratified did not
guarantee the level of equality mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment,
the notion that religious individuals should not be equal before the law
would have been considered odious to the framers of the original
Constitution.
2. State Constitutions and Court Cases Prior to 1868
Many early state constitutions guaranteed equality of religion in ways
that mirrored the bans we discussed earlier on special and partial
laws.373 For instance, Vermont’s 1786 territorial constitution, which was
one of the first constitutions to contain a broad equality guarantee in
American history,374 stated: “[I]t is our indispensable duty, to establish
such original principles of government, as will best promote the general
happiness of the people of this State, and their posterity, and provide for
future improvements, without partiality for, or prejudice against, any
particular class, sect, or denomination of men whatever . . . .”375 The
language “sect, or denomination” referred to religion and reflected the
370. 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 327 (J. Elliot 2d ed., 1836) (July 26, 1788) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]; see also McConnell, Origins, supra note 344, at 1480–81
(noting that Virginia, North Carolina, and Rhode Island made similar proposals).
371. See 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 370, at 326 (emphasis added).
372. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 366, at 434 (proposal of James Madison, June 8,
1789) (emphasis added).
373. Meyler, supra note 15, at 293–94.
374. See Calabresi et al., supra note 178, at 1527 (listing Massachusetts and Pennsylvania
as the other two states to initially contain equality guarantees).
375. VT. CONST. of 1786, pmbl. Delaware’s constitution also had a provision that involved
banning religious discrimination, but it did so somewhat awkwardly and even discriminatorily
in retrospect. See DEL. DECL. OF RIGHTS, § 3 (1776) (“That all persons professing the Christian
religion ought forever to enjoy equal rights and privileges in this state, unless, under colour of
religion, any man disturb the peace, the happiness or safety of society.”).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

71

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 1

980

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

view that religion was a suspect classification and discrimination on the
basis of religion was the quintessential form of improper discrimination
with which the framers were concerned at that time. Some state
constitutions guaranteed that an individual’s civil rights would not be
burdened or privileged on account of his religion. A typical provision
read, “The civil rights, privileges, or capacities of any citizen, shall in
no way be diminished, or enlarged, on account of his religious
principles.”376 Some state constitutions even created a positive
legislative duty to protect religion and possibly foster free exercise. For
instance, the Texas Constitution said, “[I]t shall be the duty of the
Legislature to pass such laws as (may) shall be necessary to protect
every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of their own
mode of public worship.”377 Some guaranteed an individual’s right to
exercise his religion without the influence of governmental burdens or
privileges. For instance, the Maryland Constitution provided:
That, as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such
manner as he thinks most acceptable to him; all persons,
professing the Christian religion, are equally entitled to
protection in their religious liberty; wherefore no person
ought by any law to be molested in his person or estate on
account of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his
religious practice. 378
376. ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 6; see also N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX (“[N]o
Protestant inhabitant of this Colony shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil right, merely on
account of his religious principles, [and] all persons professing a belief in the faith of any
Protestant sect . . . shall fully and freely enjoy every privilege and immunity, enjoyed by others
their fellow-subjects.”); PA. CONST. of 1776, pmbl. (“[G]overnment ought to be instituted . . .
for the security and protection of the community as such, and to enable the individuals who
compose it to enjoy their natural rights . . . without partiality for, or prejudice against any
particular class, sect, or denomination of men.”); id. at art. II (“Nor can any man, who
acknowledges the being of a God, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen,
on account of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship.”); S.C. CONST. of
1778, art. XXXVIII (“[A]ll denominations of Christian Protestants in this State, demeaning
themselves peaceably and faithfully, shall enjoy equal religious and civil privileges.”); VT.
CONST. of 1786, ch. I, art. III (“[N]or can any man be justly deprived or abridged of any civil
right as a citizen, on account of his religious sentiments, or peculiar mode of religious
worship.”); VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 11 (“No man shall be . . . enforced, restrained,
molested or burdened, in his body or goods, or otherwise suffer on account of his religious
opinions or belief; but all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their
opinions in matters of religion, and the same shall in no wise affect, diminish or enlarge their
civil capacities.”).
377. TEX. CONST. of 1866, art. I, § 4; see also Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 39, at 40
(noting that Nebraska and Ohio had similar provisions).
378. MD. CONST. OF 1776, DECL. of RIGHTS, para. 33 (1776) (emphasis added); see also
ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 7 (“[N]o preference shall ever be given by law to any religious
sect, society, denomination, or mode of worship . . . .”); CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 4 (“The
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These provisions provided religious practitioners with significantly
enhanced protection from class legislation than did the Free Exercise
Clause and Establishment Clause of the federal Constitution. And they
reflect a commitment to religious equality.
A few states even explicitly endorsed religious equality. The
Massachusetts constitution, though establishing Christianity as the state
religion, explicitly endorsed equality for the different branches of
Christianity: “[E]very denomination of [C]hristians, demeaning
themselves peaceably, and as good subjects of the Commonwealth, shall
be equally under the protection of the law: And no subordination of any
one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by law.”379
Similarly, Maryland’s clause read, “[A]ll persons are equally entitled to
protection in their religious liberty; wherefore, no person ought, by any
law to be molested in his person or estate, on account of his religious
persuasion, or profession, or for his religious practice.”380
By 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, many states
had outright bans against class legislation imbedded in their religion
clauses. Professor Calabresi and Sarah Agudo have pointed out that
twenty-seven out of the thirty-seven states (73%) had clauses in their
state constitutions that banned the establishment of religion.381 But most
of these clauses did much more than merely prevent the legislature from
passing a law “respecting an establishment of religion,” as the federal
Constitution mandates.382 Instead they actually banned religious class
legislation. A typical clause read, “No preference shall be given by law
to any Christian sect or mode of worship.”383 Giving a preference to a
religious group is a special law, comparable to giving an economic
preference to a class of merchants. A related but distinct formulation of
state establishment clauses read, “[N]o person shall by law be
compelled to join or support, nor be classed with, or associated to, any
congregation, church, or religious association.”384 Compelling
individuals to join or support a certain religion effectively grants a
monopoly to that religion because it eliminates the ability of
“consumers of religion” to select their preferred religion. The supply of
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed in this State . . . .”).
379. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. III (1780) (emphasis added).
380. See, e.g., MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. 36 (1867) (emphasis added); see also ME
CONST. of 1819, art. 1, § 3 (“[A]nd all persons demeaning themselves peaceably, as good
members of the State, shall be equally under the protection of the laws, and no subordination nor
preference of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by law, nor shall
any religious test be required as a qualification for any office or trust, under this State . . . .”).
381. Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 39, at 31–32.
382. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
383. CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. 1, § 4.
384. Id. art. 7, § 1.
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religion is restricted to a single religion, demand for religion is affixed
by the government, and the competitive market for religion is
terminated. In sum, twenty-two states (59%) in 1868, a majority, had
this stronger language in their establishment clauses when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. These clauses clearly indicate that
a majority of the states in 1868 recognized the problem of religious
class legislation and sought to eradicate it more fully than would be
accomplished simply by approving a replica of the federal
Establishment Clause.
Some early court cases also emphasized the equal protection of
religion in their opinions.385 In the 1799 case of Runkel v. Winemiller,
Judge Chase granted a writ of mandamus to a minister in a dispute with
his congregation, relying on the principle that “the pastors, teachers and
ministers, of every denomination of [C]hristians, are equally entitled to
the protection of the law, and to the enjoyment of their religious and
temporal rights.”386 In this context, equal protection meant that
contractual obligations and rights applied equally to all members and
leaders of a church without any special privilege or burden.387 In the
1876 decision in Ferriter v. Tyler, the Vermont Supreme Court declared
that the Vermont constitution was:
[D]esigned . . . to secure to every subject equal civil rights,
irrespective of his religious faith; so that his being a
Catholic or a Protestant—his being a Calvinist or an
Arminian—his being an orthodox evangelical or a freethinker—his being a Baptist or a Universalist—an
Episcopalian or a Quaker, should not make him the object
of discriminating legislation or judicial judgment to his
disadvantage, as compared with those of different faith and
practice,—so that no law should be aimed or executed
against him because he professed and practiced one form of
religious belief or disbelief rather than another, within the
limits of personal immunity consistent with good order and
the peace of society under the government.388
385. See Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. 292, 307 (1815) (involving a dispute over glebe
rights, the Court quoted the Vermont legislature’s preamble to a related act concerning glebe
lots: “[B]y the first principles of our government it is contemplated that all religious sects and
denominations of Christians, whose religious tenets are consistent with allegiance to the
constitution and government of this state, should receive equal protection and patronage from
the civil power”).
386. Runkel v. Winemiller, 4 H. & McH. 429, 450 (1799).
387. Id. at 450–51.
388. Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444, 465 (1876) (holding that a school did not have to grant a
religious exemption and could expel a child for missing school to attend church on a religious
holiday).
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3. Religion and Abolition
Religion played an important role in the abolition of slavery.389 The
first American and British abolitionists were deeply religious
individuals who recognized the moral depravity of slavery.390 Quakers,
Methodists, and Presbyterians were some of the early abolitionists.391
Religious abolitionists viewed slavery as “irreconcilable with the
manifested will of our Great Creator, and with the imperative
declaration of our blessed Savior ‘all things whatsoever ye would that
men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the law and the
prophets.’”392 As Justice Joseph Story put it while riding circuit, slavery
was illegal because it was “repugnant to the great principles of Christian
duty, the dictates of natural religion, the obligations of good faith and
morality, and the eternal maxims of social justice.”393 Religious
abolitionists believed that it was their religious duty to end slavery, and
they embarked on a large-scale political campaign in New England and
in Congress itself where groups of clergymen and other religious
individuals sought to end slavery under the law.394 Other abolitionists
took a more radical view: “By what rule is [assisting runaway slaves]
justifiable? By the commands of the bible, and the whole spirit of the
gospel.”395
White slave owners often restricted African-American slaves’
religious practices to prevent religiously inspired rebellions. Southern
389. See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious
Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106, 1131–37 (1994); see
also CHARLES RAPPLEYE, SONS OF PROVIDENCE: THE BROWN BOTHERS, THE SLAVE TRADE, AND
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 225–31 (2006).
390. See THOMAS SOWELL, BLACK REDNECKS AND WHITE LIBERALS 116 (2005) (“[T]he
principal impetus for the abolition of slavery came first from very conservative religious
activists—people who would today be called ‘the religious right.’”).
391. See Bradley S. Tupi, Religious Freedom and the First Amendment, 45 DUQ. L. REV.
195, 246 (2007) (citing W. O. BLAKE, THE HISTORY OF SLAVERY AND THE SLAVE TRADE 169–72
(1858)).
392. The Soc’y of Friends of Ind., Address to the Citizens of the State of Ohio, Concerning
What Are Called The Black Laws (1848), reprinted in SLAVERY, RACE, AND THE AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM, 1700–1872, SER. NO. 7, in 2 STATUTES ON SLAVERY: THE PAMPHLET LITERATURE
101, 101 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1988).
393. United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (Story, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551). Benjamin Rush also said, “Slavery is repugnant to the
principles of Christianity . . . . It is rebellion against the authority of a common Father. It is a
practical denial of the [effect] of the death of a common Savior. It is [encroaching on the
authority] of the great Sovereign of the universe who has solemnly claimed an exclusive
property in the souls of men.” See Tupi, supra note 391, at 246–47 (quoting MINUTES OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF A CONVENTION OF DELEGATES FROM THE ABOLITION SOCIETIES 24 (1794)).
394. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1132–33 (describing their abolition campaigns).
395. Id. at 1132 n.119 (quoting REV. W. BEARDSLEY, NARRATIVE AND FACTS, RESPECTING
ALANSON WORK, JAS. E. BURR AND GEO. THOMPSON, PRISONERS IN THE MISSOURI PENITENTIARY,
FOR THE ALLEGED CRIME OF NEGRO STEALING (1842)).
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slave owners and governments became concerned that religion was
leading to abolition and to slave rebellion. Notably, Charles Finney, a
preacher in New York, led a popular religious revival in 1824–1825
based on a liberal theology that emphasized social work.396 Many of
Finney’s followers significantly furthered the abolitionist cause and
became prominent abolitionists in the mid-nineteenth century.397 Nat
Turner and Denmark Vesey were also preachers who led significant
rebellions against white slave owners.398 Nat Turner’s bloody rebellion
led to the death of seventy whites and caused many whites to fear that
religion was a potential threat to their system of slavery.399 Denmark
Vesey invoked the Bible to inspire rebellion. As one slave testified, “At
this meeting Vesey said . . . that we ought to rise up and fight against
the whites for our liberties . . . . [H]e read to us from the Bible, how the
Children of Israel were delivered out of Egypt from bondage.”400
As a result, southerners established harsh laws restricting slaves’
ability to exercise their religion, including draconian regulations on
black religious assemblies.401 For instance, in the District of Columbia,
“all meetings for religious worship, beyond the hour of ten o’clock at
night, of free negroes, mulattoes or slaves, shall be and they are hereby
declared to be unlawful.”402 And in South Carolina, it was “unlawful for
‘assemblies of slaves, free negroes, mulattoes and mestizoes’ to meet
‘in a confined or secret place.’”403 Law enforcement personnel could
administer “corporal punishment, not exceeding twenty lashes, upon
such slaves, free negroes, &c., as they may judge necessary for
deterring them from the like unlawful assemblage in the future.”404
Many laws prohibited slaves from preaching or religious practice unless
396. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1131–32 n.114.
397. Id.
398. See Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for
Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1051–52
(1996).
399. Lash, supra note 389, at 1133.
400. See Rutherford, supra note 398, at 1052 n.9 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Rolla’s
Statement, in 1 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 76
(Herbert Aptheker ed., 1990)).
401. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1134–35 n.133 (detailing some of the oppressive laws in
different states).
402. WORTHINGTON G. SNETHEN, THE BLACK CODE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA IN
FORCE SEPTEMBER 1ST, 1848, at 46 (A. & F. Antislavery Society, 1848), reprinted in 2
STATUTES ON SLAVERY: THE PAMPHLET LITERATURE 179, 224 (reprinting and quoting
Ordinances of the Corporation of Washington (Oct. 29, 1836)).
403. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1134–35 n.133 (quoting GEORGE M. STROUD, SKETCH OF
THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
89 (1827), reprinted in 1 STATUTES ON SLAVERY: THE PAMPHLET LITERATURE 157, 245 (Paul
Finkelman ed., 1988) (citing 2 Brevard’s Digest)).
404. Id.
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in the presence of whites.405 Under this tight regulation, religious
gatherings invariably espoused proslavery ideology and encouraged
slaves to “obey their masters.”406 There were also laws prohibiting
blacks from reading the Bible,407 becoming ministers,408 preaching,409
and leaving their plantations on “Sundays, fast days, and holy days.”410
This religious oppression repulsed many observers and drove many
to support abolition.411 As Charles Sumner wrote:
Is it not strange that the Church, or any body of men, upon
whom the faintest ray of Christianity has fallen, should
endeavor to exclude the African, ‘guilty of a skin not
coloured as their own,’ from the freest participation in the
privileges of worshipping the common God?—It would
seem as if prejudice, irrational, as it is uncharitable, could
no further go.412
Former slave and prominent abolitionist Henry Highland Garnet
declared in a speech, “Nearly three millions of your fellow citizens, are
prohibited by law . . . from reading the Book of Life.”413
Charles Gardner also observed, “[A]ccess to that heavenly chart,
which is laid down by Jehovah as the only safe rule of faith and
practice, the liberty of reading and understanding how he may serve G-d
acceptably.”414 He further said, “See then, the wickedness of those laws
which go contrary to the law of God, and say to the slave, ‘You shall
405. See, e.g., Act of 1805, ch. XLVII, 1805 VA. ACTS (barring slaves from going to
religious ceremonies except those conducted by whites); Act of December 1831, ch. 94, 1845
MD. LAWS (prohibiting all religious meetings for blacks unless conducted by whites); Act of
1847, § 2, 1847 MO. LAWS 104 (preventing blacks from preaching unless a police officer was
present to “prevent all seditious speeches”).
406. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1134–35 (citing to 3 THE BLACK ABOLITIONIST PAPERS
435 n.17 (C Peter Ripley ed., 1991)).
407. Id.
408. See, e.g., Act of 1832, ch. IV, 1832 N.C. SESS. LAWS 7.
409. See, e.g., Act of 1847, § 2, 1847 MO. LAWS 104 (“[N]o meeting or assemblage of
negroes . . . for the purpose of religious worship, or preaching, shall be held or permitted when
the services are performed or conducted by negroes . . . unless some sheriff, constable, marshal,
police officer or justice of the peace, shall be present.”).
410. Rutherford, supra note 398, at 1051.
411. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1137.
412. Letter from Charles Sumner to John Jay (May 25, 1843), in 1 THE SELECTED LETTERS
OF CHARLES SUMNER 129, 129–30 (Beverly W. Palmer ed., 1990). Kurt T. Lash cited this
statement from Sumner as an example of how abolitionists advanced their position by asserting
slavery violated religious freedoms. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1137 n.142.
413. Speech by Henry Highland Garnet: Delivered Before the National Convention of
Colored Citizens, Buffalo, New York (Aug. 16, 1843), in 3 THE BLACK ABOLITIONIST PAPERS
403, 406 (C. Peter Ripley ed., 1991).
414. Speech by Charles W. Gardner, delivered at the Broadway Tabernacle, New York,
New York (May 9, 1837), in 3 THE BLACK ABOLITIONIST PAPERS, supra note 413, at 206.
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not read these Scriptures, nor understand them, nor teach them to your
children, nor obey them.’ Is it not morally right, and politically safe, to
abolish such a system?”415
4. Recognizing the Need to Protect Religion
The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment shows that the
framers of that Amendment recognized the oppression of slaves’
religious practices and existing discrimination on the basis of religion
and sought to rectify it.416 James Wilson, Chair of the House Judiciary
Committee and sponsor of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, noted slavery’s
“incessant, unrelenting, aggressive warfare upon . . . the purity of
religion.”417 Lyman Trumbull, the cosponsor of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, also highlighted the religious oppression of blacks, specifically
noting laws preventing them from “exercising the function of a
minister” and making it “a highly penal offense for any person . . . to
teach slaves.”418 Congressman James Ashley said that “[slavery] has
silenced every free pulpit within its control.”419 And Senator Henry
Wilson said, “[r]eligion . . . never has been and never will be allowed
free exercise in any community where slavery dwarfs the consciences of
men.”420 Wilson also remarked, “The bitter cruel relentless persecutions
of the Methodists in the South, almost as void of pity as those which
were visited upon the Huguenots in France, tell how utterly slavery
disregards the right to free exercise of religion.”421 Senator George
Edmunds of Vermont later commented that the Constitution bans
discrimination based on classifications that are “sectarian,” 422 which
was a code word for “Catholic” in the nineteenth century and reflected
bigotry towards non-Protestant denominations.423
415. Id. at 211.
416. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1146–49.
417. Id. at 1146 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1199 (1864)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
418. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
419. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. (1864)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
420. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
421. Id. at 1148 n.190 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
422. 3 CONG. REC. 1870 (1875) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment “protected a right
of her citizens against class prejudice, against caste prejudice, against sectarian prejudice”);
Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 41 n.188.
423. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828–29 (2000); see Douglas Laycock, Comment,
Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes
but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 188–89 (2004); see also Steven K. Green, The
Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 41, 53–54 (1992).
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In 1866, President Andrew Johnson recognized the history of
religious persecution and pointed out how the American Constitution
protects religious liberty:
The ancient republics absorbed the individual in the State,
prescribed his religion, and controlled his activity. The
American system rests on the assertion of the equal right of
every man to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; to
freedom of conscience, to the culture and exercise of all his
faculties.424
Representative Banks similarly condemned the way in which
establishments of religion had historically been used as a means of
oppression:
[I]n a State which has an established religion, any citizen
might be compelled to conform to its doctrines, and to
leave his descendants to the same mental and moral
servitude, deprived of the freedom of belief, and without
that freedom of worship to which, according to the laws of
nature and of God, every man is entitled. Society is
necessary to the existence of man, and government
indispensable to his civilization, prosperity, and power. But
the perpetual subjection of every person born within its
jurisdiction, without consent and in disregard of protest or
removal, is not necessary in any form of political society. It
does not rest upon any theory of justice, and the whole
course of civilization disproves its justice or wisdom.425
Banks went on to praise American democracy for furthering religious
liberty.
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment also recognized the free
exercise of religion as one of the privileges or immunities protected by
that Amendment and as being a fundamental right.426 In 1871, John
Bingham, the author of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, stated that
the free exercise of religion was within the “scope and meaning” of
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.427 Henry L. Dawes
424. President Andrew Jackson, First Annual Message (Dec. 4, 1865), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29506.
425. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., app. 95–96 (1868) (Report to Committee on
Foreign Affairs by Rep. Banks).
426. See MICHAEL K. CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 43 (1986); Lash, supra note 389, at 1146–49. Scholars also discuss
how the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Free Exercise Clause. Akhil Reed Amar, The
Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1149, 1157–58 (1991).
427. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871).
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similarly remarked that the Privileges or Immunities Clause had
“secured the free exercise of . . . religious belief.”428 In listing the rights
secured by the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Senator Jacob Howard
mentioned “the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight
amendments to the Constitution.”429 John Sherman said that the “right
to worship God according to the dictates of one’s own conscience is not
only a right, but a privilege which in a Christian country a man ought to
enjoy.”430 Congressman Maynard commented that “privileges and
immunities” includes the “personal right” of “freedom . . . in
religion.”431 Senator John Stockton mentioned the First Amendment
Religion Clauses as an example of how the Fourteenth Amendment
“prohibits the states from doing what the Congress was always
prohibited from doing.”432 These statements are unsurprising since it
was recognized that one of the privileges and immunities violated by
slavery was the free exercise of religion.433
And the legislative history also reflects that the framers recognized
the religious oppression in other countries and connected it to caste and
class-based systems of law and the problems of discrimination in this
country.434 Senator Charles Sumner condemned the religious caste
system in India and the persecution of the Jews in Europe prior to the
French Revolution, implying that there was a need to protect against
contemporary religious discrimination.435 Representative Charles Van
Wyck said, “The meanness of caste in this country on account of color
is no more wicked than the caste of nation, religion, or blood in Great
Britain.”436 Senator Garrett Davis also compared the oppression of
blacks to the oppression of Jews and Gypsies in other countries: “the
negro slaves, as separate and distinct and insoluble almost as Jew and
Gypsy.”437 Following ratification, Representative William Purman
428. Cf. id. at 475.
429. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1865).
430. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 844 (1872).
431. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 310 (1871).
432. Id. at 572.
433. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (Henry Wilson expressing
this view).
434. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1872).
435. Id. at 381–83.
436. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 469 (1868).
437. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 249 (1866); see also CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong.,
1st Sess. 453 (1860) (statement of Mr. Clingman) (“Why northern as well as southern men, and
even Canadians, characterize them as the most worthless of the human race. Formerly the
Abolitionist ascribed their degradation to the want of political and social privileges. But during
the middle ages, in Europe, the Jews were not only without political privileges, but were, as a
class, odious and severely persecuted, yet they were, nevertheless, intelligent, energetic, and
wealthy. In point of fact, in some portions of the northern states, the negro has been made a pet
of, and but for his native inferiority, must have thriven and even become distinguished.”).
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recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment banned class legislation
directed at religion, asking rhetorically, “Shall hostile legislation in
States be permitted to oppress any class of citizens on account of
religion, nativity, politics, or complexion, or deny to any such class their
inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, and thus defeat the very spirit and provision of the
Constitution itself?”438 In discussing the ramifications of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Representative Samuel McKee said:
[I]f any gentleman chooses to associate with a colored man,
with a black man, or any other man or race of men, even
the Hindoo or the Hottentot, he can do it. I believe in every
man having the same show in this world for life, and when
he develops all the capacities that fit men for the highest
rights of citizenship, then let him have them.439
Court opinions also explicitly recognized that the Fourteenth
Amendment banned religious class legislation. In Pollock v. Farmers’
Loan & Trust Co., Justice Field, in his concurring opinion, said:
Whenever a distinction is made in the burdens a law
imposes or in the benefits it confers on any citizens by
reason of their birth, or wealth, or religion, it is class
legislation, and leads inevitably to oppression and abuses,
and to general unrest and disturbance in society. It was
hoped and believed that the great amendments to the
Constitution which followed the late civil war had rendered
such legislation impossible for all future time. But the
objectionable legislation reappears in the act under
consideration. It is the same in essential character as that of
the English income statute of 1691, which taxed Protestants
at a certain rate, Catholics, as a class, at double the rate of
Protestants, and Jews at another and separate rate.440
Riding circuit in 1879, Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, Justice Field struck down
a law permitting prison guards to shave the queues of prisoners because
the law was directed at the religious practices of Chinese immigrants
and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class
legislation on the basis of religion.441 Justice Field wrote that “hostile

438.
439.
440.
added).
441.
1879).

2 CONG. REC. 423 (1874).
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 452 (1866).
Pollock v. Farmers, 157 U.S. 429, 596 (1895) (Field, J., concurring) (emphasis
Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 255–56 (Field, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Cal.
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and discriminating legislation by a state against persons of any class,
sect, creed or nation, in whatever form it may be expressed, is forbidden
by the fourteenth amendment of the constitution.”442 Similarly, in
American Sugar-Refining Co. v. Louisiana, Justice Brown stated:
Of course, if such discrimination were purely arbitrary,
oppressive, or capricious, and made to depend upon
differences of color, race, nativity, religious opinions,
political affiliations, or other considerations having no
possible connection with the duties of citizens as taxpayers,
such exemption would be pure favoritism, and a denial of
the equal protection of the laws to the less favored
classes.443
The Wisconsin Supreme Court also recognized that religious groups
“certainly have the same right to equal protection of the laws as secular
organizations.”444
This history shows that protecting religion was very much on the
minds of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is hard to
imagine that the framers would have limited the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment to rectifying the existing problem of discrimination on the
basis of race without rectifying the existing problem of discrimination
on the basis of religion. Arguably, the framers felt that by granting
African-Americans rights under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, African-Americans would automatically receive all other
constitutional protection, including free exercise.445 But if that were
true, then it would have been sufficient to simply guarantee AfricanAmericans the same constitutional rights as all other citizens. Instead
the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed to all citizens equality in their
privileges or immunities of federal and of state citizenship. Thus was
born a whole new constitutional right—the right not to be discriminated
against in class legislation. It is extremely unlikely that the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment would observe and condemn religious
oppression directed at African-Americans and yet take no action to
442. Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
443. Am. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 92 (1900); see also Connolly v. Union
Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 568–69 (1902) (McKenna, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Brown
in Am. Sugar Ref. Co.)); Alaska Fish Salting & By-Products Co. v. Smith, 6 Alaska 173, 179 (D.
Alaska 1919), aff’d, 255 U.S. 44 (1921).
444. In re Garrabad, 54 N.W. 1104, 1106 (Wis. 1893); see also Fountain Park Co. v.
Hensler, 155 N.E. 465, 468 (Ind. 1927) (holding that a statute granting the power of eminent
domain to a religious group constituted improper class legislation).
445. This assumption was evidently untrue with regards to political rights because two
years later the framers had to reconvene to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment granting blacks
political rights. But it might have been true with regards to other civil rights, such as religious
practice.
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guarantee religious freedom for everyone in the future, especially at a
time when the framers were taking action to prevent racial
discrimination in the future. It is considerably more plausible that the
framers observed the problems of both religious and racial oppression
and ratified a two-in-one solution to wipe them both out.446
E. Foreign Constitutions and Laws Guaranteeing Equality
At least forty-five foreign constitutions ban discrimination on the
basis of religion, just as they ban discrimination based on other
impermissible classifications, such as race and gender.447 Although
foreign constitutions are generally not helpful for establishing the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,448 they do indicate that,
as a general rule, when constitutional framers get together to guarantee
equality, they protect religion from discrimination too.449 These foreign
constitutional provisions show that banning discrimination on the basis
of religion is a core principle of western constitutional democracy.
Judges that are concerned with keeping American constitutional law in
line with generally accepted western democratic principles surely would
recognize that discrimination on the basis of religion, like
discrimination on the basis of race and gender, is intolerable.
The evidence here is overwhelming and is cited in an appendix to
this Article because it is too lengthy to include here in text or
footnotes.450 The list shows that the vast majority of western
constitutional democracies countries have constitutionally guaranteed
equality for religion, and even some nondemocratic countries ban
discrimination on the basis of religion too.451 Almost every European
446. A significant counterargument is that evidence of the framers’ intent to exclude
religion from the Fourteenth Amendment is demonstrated by the history of Blaine Amendments,
which openly discriminate against religion in the funding of private organizations. We address
this issue in the section on Blaine Amendments, infra Part V.
447. This list is by no means exhaustive but gives us a fairly accurate snapshot of modern
worldview on religious discrimination. See Appendix for text of these provisions. In the
Appendix, we also include provisions from Israel’s Declaration of Independence, the Soviet
Union’s constitution, and the Hawaiian constitution, although we did not count any of these
provisions towards the list of forty-five. Also, Belgium’s constitution probably guarantees
religious equality. Its equality provision states, “No class distinctions exist in the State.” 1994
CONST. art. 10 (Belg.). Belgium’s Constitution further guarantees equal funding for religious
schools. Id. at art. 24. But because it does not specifically ban religious discrimination, we
excluded it from the list.
448. See The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L.
519, 525–27 (2005) (Justice Scalia’s explanations of why foreign law is not relevant for
determining the original meaning of the U.S. Constitution).
449. Id. at 524 n.3, 526.
450. See Appendix.
451. We recognize that the way in which courts in each of these countries interpret these
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constitution guarantees equality for religion, and every continent has at
least one country with an equality guarantee prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of religion. Large diverse countries, such as India,452
Germany,453 and Russia,454 have these provisions; smaller, more
homogenous countries, such as Iceland,455 Ireland,456 and Estonia,457
have them too. Older constitutions, such as the Dutch458 and
Canadian459 ones, have these guarantees; newer constitutions such as
the ones from Chechnya460 and Bosnia and Herzegovina,461 also have
them. The general trend among countries worldwide is to include
equality guarantees for religion in constitutions. A typical provision—
the Canadian Equal Protection Guarantee—reads, “Every individual is
equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection
and benefit of the law, without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,

provisions is just as important as whether countries have these provisions at all. For instance, a
court could theoretically interpret its provision as only banning laws targeting specific religions
but not laws targeting religion in general. Or a court might think that only freedom of
conscience or private religious exercise is entitled to equal protections but not religious
exercises that relate to the public domain or which affect other members of society. Indeed, the
British government recently argued in court filings that a Christian’s wearing a cross in public
and a Christian pharmacist’s refusal to sell contraception were not protected forms of religious
exercise. See Eweida & Chaplin v. United Kingdom; Ladele and McFarlane v. United Kingdom.
And the British government further argued that discrimination against religious individuals in
the workplace is unproblematic as long as those individuals have the right to resign and seek
employment elsewhere. Ladele and McFarlane at 9, 11; Eweida & Chaplin at 11. So further
research into the way in which courts in these countries apply their Equal Protection Clauses is
necessary for a complete comparative analysis. Nevertheless, the mere existence of these
provisions is significant and useful for our purposes. And we think that the plain meaning of
these clauses strongly indicates a worldwide recognition that discrimination on the basis of
religion is unacceptable—no matter how individual courts might theoretically limit the breadth
of those provisions.
452. INDIA CONST. art. 15, 16, 29, 30, 325.
453. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC
LAW], May 23, 1949, art. 3 (Ger.).
454. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 14, 19
(Russ.).
455. STJÓRNARSKRÁ LÝÐVELDISINS ÍSLANDS [CONSTITUTION] 1964, art. 64 (Ice.).
456. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40, 44.
457. PÕHISEADUS [CONSTITUTION], June 28, 1992, art. 12 (Est.).
458. GRONDWET VOOR HET KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN [CONSTITUTION], 1983, ch. 1
art. 1 (Neth.).
459. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, para. 15 (U.K.).
460. КОНСТИТУЦИЯ ЧЕЧЕНСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ, [CONSTITUTION], Mar. 27, 2003, art. 16
(Chechnya).
461. USTAV BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE [CONSTITUTION] art. I para. 7, art. II, para. 4 (Bosn. &
Herz.).
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sex, age or mental or physical disability.”462
International conventions have similarly protected religion. The
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms states, “The enjoyment of the rights and
freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association
with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”463 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads, “Everyone is entitled to
all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.”464
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 also provides extensive protection
against discrimination on the basis of religion for individuals in the
workplace, as it does for discrimination on the basis of race and gender.
For instance, the Act states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin . . . . 465
We should add that under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 not only is
discrimination on the basis of race and gender barred, but also the
existence of a racially hostile or sexually hostile work environment is
barred as well.466 Companies thus cannot hire in a nondiscriminatory
way but allow for the existence of a hostile work environment. The
same thing must of course be true regarding the ban on religion
discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Just as no private
employer can legally refuse to hire or promote someone on the basis of
religion, no employer can maintain a workplace that is hostile to
religion or that discriminates on account of religion either. If a religious
group seeks to use office space for religious reasons or if employees
462. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, para. 15 (U.K.) (emphasis added).
463. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 14, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (emphasis added).
464. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 2 (Dec. 12, 1948)
(emphasis added).
465. 42 U.S.C. § 2000E-2 (2006) (emphasis added).
466. See id.
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want to wear religious symbols, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should be
read as giving them that right.
Taken together, these foreign and international human rights clauses
barring discrimination on the basis of religion indicate that when people
get together to ban discrimination and guarantee equality, they include
religion alongside race and gender. The same thing happened in the
United States with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For some reason,
however, the U.S. Supreme Court has never caught on to this global and
American trend for banning discrimination on account of religion.
III. CLASS LEGISLATION AND MODERN CASE LAW
A. Class Legislation Doctrine
In assessing whether a particular statute constituted class legislation,
nineteenth century courts applied a two-step test. First, courts asked
whether a law created a unique burden or privilege either against or in
favor of a defined class of people. If the answer to this first question
was “yes” then the court would ask whether the law furthered a public
purpose and is a just law enacted for the good of the whole people, in
which case it would be constitutionally permissible. In other words,
under the nineteenth century test for disallowing class legislation, laws
can discriminate as long as they “are designed, not to impose unequal or
unnecessary restrictions upon any one, but to promote, with as little
individual inconvenience as possible, the general good.”467 The
nineteenth century two-step test could probably be described as a
rational basis test with a legitimate public purpose requirement.
Under the current rational basis test, a law simply needs to have a
rationale, no matter how dubious the goal or whether the stated rationale
is actually the one that the legislature relied on in passing the law. In
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of a law forbidding “any person not a licensed
optometrist or ophthalmologist to fit lenses to a face or to duplicate or
replace into frames lenses or other optical appliances.”468 Practically,
this meant that “no optician can fit old glasses into new frames or
supply a lens, whether it be a new lens or one to duplicate a lost or
broken lens, without a prescription.” 469 The Court held that the law had
a rational basis and was therefore constitutional.470
But under a class legislation analysis of the kind we defend here, the
law in Williamson v. Lee Optical should have been struck down. The
467.
468.
469.
470.

Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31–32 (1885).
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 485 (1955).
Id. at 486.
See id. at 491.
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law created a special privilege for optometrists and ophthalmologists,
artificially boosting demand for their services when unlicensed
individuals could have performed the same work perfectly well and
safely. There was absolutely no public purpose being served by the law
since it did not have a public welfare objective, such as the promotion
of the public health or safety. And the law probably even hurt
consumers by artificially driving up costs and nonsensically adding red
tape. Instead, the law was merely special interest legislation designed to
generate business for optometrists and ophthalmologists. To be sure, the
threshold for overcoming the public purpose requirement is not and
should not be very high absent the making of a suspect classification—
the government need only show that the law in question serves a
rational public purpose. But a naked desire to help or hurt one group of
people or industry over another is not by itself proof of a public
purpose. The Lee Optical court’s error was its failure to take seriously
its responsibility to assess the validity of the purpose, which the law in
question pursued.
The nineteenth century two-step test for invalidating class legislation
does not apply in the same way to all Fourteenth Amendment cases. In
cases involving fundamental rights, such as those enumerated and
protected in the Bill of Rights, or with respect to suspect classifications
which are presumptively irrational, such as classifications on the basis
of race, sex, or religion, the nineteenth century two-step test leads to a
strict scrutiny analysis.471 No law discriminating on the basis of race,
sex, or religion should be upheld unless it survives strict scrutiny and
serves a compelling and general governmental interest.472 This approach
is sensible as a practical matter because most laws discriminate, and are
nonetheless constitutional in part because the mere requirement that
laws serve a “public purpose” or provide “general welfare benefit” is in
practice a pretty flabby level of protection. The government could
probably justify many if not most kinds of discriminatory laws under a
public purpose rationale. And leaving core constitutional rights and
protections, or making suspect classifications without a thicker
guardrail, would leave vital constitutional guarantees open to significant
trampling. So, layering a strict scrutiny requirement on top of the
nineteenth century two-step test is perfectly sensible and consistent with
the Fourteenth Amendment’s equality guarantee and with the post
United States v. Carolene Products and incorporation case law.473
The Supreme Court’s 1942 opinion in Skinner v. Oklahoma474 is
instructive. There, the court received a Fourteenth Amendment
471.
472.
473.
474.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
Id.
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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challenge to an Oklahoma law requiring sterilization of prisoners
convicted of two or more “felonies involving moral turpitude.”475 By its
own terms, the Oklahoma law included convictions for larceny as being
felonies that involved moral turpitude but it exempted convictions for
high class felonies involving “revenue acts, embezzlement, or political
offenses.”476 The old common law distinctions between larceny and
embezzlement were highly technical and overall not very meaningful.
For instance, if a person entered a chicken coop and stole chickens, he
would commit an act of larceny and could be sterilized; but if he were
instead the bailee of the chickens and misappropriated them, then that
action would constitute embezzlement, and he could escape
sterilization.477 The law was based on the now-debunked “science” that
society could eliminate crime by sterilizing repeat offenders thereby
preventing those criminals from disseminating their criminally inclined
genes.478
Among the enthusiastic defenders of the “science” of eugenics were
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and the new leader of Nazi Germany,
Adolph Hitler. Holmes had famously opened the door to eugenic
sterilization in Buck v. Bell, a case which upheld as constitutional—in
spite of a class legislation equal protection claim—a compulsory state
sterilization law of the unfit, including the mentally retarded.479 Justice
Holmes concluded his opinion with the words: “Three generations of
imbeciles are enough.”480 Justice Pierce Butler, later a foe of the New
Deal, was the lone dissenter, and he filed no opinion.
Professor Victoria Nourse has detailed how, when Skinner v.
Oklahoma was decided in 1942, everyone still understood the
Fourteenth Amendment as a ban on class legislation, and some scholars
and lawyers viewed sterilization laws as a classic example of the evils
of class legislation at work.481 Previous sterilization cases, such as Buck
v. Bell, were decided in part on class legislation grounds,482 and the
lawyers in Skinner made their arguments in that case explicitly in class
legislation terms.483 Skinner was ultimately decided as a class
475. Id. at 536 (quoting Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57,
§§ 171, et seq. (West 1935)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
476. Id. at 537 (quoting Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57,
§ 195. (West 1935)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
477. See id. at 539 (detailing some examples).
478. See VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR
TRIUMPH OF EUGENICS 150 (2008).
479. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
480. Id.
481. See NOURSE, supra note 478, at 28–29, 167–68 (describing the class legislation
approach at the time).
482. See id. at 185 n.35 (citing other sterilization cases).
483. Id. at 67–68, 141, 149.
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legislation case and is relevant for seeing how strict scrutiny and class
legislation analyses intersect.484
The Oklahoma law that was challenged in Skinner raised several
class legislation problems. First, larceny and embezzlement were
basically the same kind of offense.485 They were both forms of thievery
distinguished only by a technicality which bore no relevance to the
severity of the criminal action.486 Arbitrary, coin-flip quality
distinctions constitute class legislation and this law made such an
arbitrary coin-flip distinction. It was as irrational and class-based as a
law allowing titles of nobility or any other form of hereditary
favoritism. Second, a deeper look at the distinction between larceny and
embezzlement reveals that larceny included “low class” crimes, such as
stealing chickens, while embezzlement included “high class” crimes,
such as misappropriation of funds.487 Thus, under the Oklahoma law in
Skinner, a lowly chicken thief got sterilized while a white-collar
financier, convicted of bank fraud, was exempt from sterilization. The
law thus created an aristocracy of crime, violating Locke’s maxim that
there should be “one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and
the countryman at plough.”488 Third, some of the prisoners held in the
prison out of which the Skinner case arose wondered why they were the
only ones being sterilized when many other people, such as the mentally
impaired, were not subject to compulsory sterilization even though they
probably carried defective or degenerate genes as well.489 And fourth,
some critics of the eugenics movement worried in 1942 that eugenics
laws would open the door to sterilizing other disfavored groups.490
Presumably, the prevailing majority in the legislature could use
sterilization to eradicate dissenters or to target racial minorities. In fact,
Adolph Hitler’s Germany was engaged in precisely such an effort, in
1942, at the very time that Skinner was decided.
The Skinner court initially subjected the Oklahoma law to the
nineteenth century class legislation two-step test under the Fourteenth
Amendment. First, the Court recognized that the law discriminated
against people convicted of larceny relative to people convicted of
embezzlement.491 And second, the Court deferred to the legislature’s
public policy goals showing typical New Deal Supreme Court deference
to the legislature, however arbitrary the law in question might have
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
Id. at 538–39.
Id.
Id.
JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTEND AND END OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT ch. 10, at 142 (1690); NOURSE, supra note 478, at 167–68.
489. Id. at 67–68.
490. Id. at 28–29
491. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538–39.
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seemed.492 Just as predicted, the public purpose qualification proved
quite flabby.
But the Court did not end its Fourteenth Amendment analysis there.
It went on to make three crucial observations, which served as the basis
for subjecting the law to strict scrutiny. First, the Court commented that
the law “involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race.”493 Second, the Court remarked, “The power to sterilize, if
exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil
or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the
dominant group to wither and disappear.” 494 And third, the Court noted,
“There is no redemption for the individual whom the law touches. Any
experiment[,] which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is
forever deprived of a basic liberty.” 495 Based on these observations, the
Court applied strict scrutiny and found the law’s arbitrary line-drawing
untenable when balanced against the fundamental right exercised and
the substantial damage caused.496
Skinner v. Oklahoma thus stands as a nineteenth century class
legislation case where a fundamental liberty—the right to procreate—
was being denied to low class thieves but not to high class thieves. This
was something that not even the deferential New Deal Supreme Court
could ignore. The law in question discriminated among different classes
of thieves, but it did not do so to promote the general interest but did so
instead to promote the interests of high class thieves. Thankfully, the
justices put a stop to this law and with their decision they helped to stop
the eugenics movement that Justice Holmes had done so much to
promote in Buck v. Bell.
Justice Field spelled out another important qualification to the
nineteenth century public purpose requirement in Barbier v.
Connolly.497 There, the Supreme Court upheld a San Francisco city
ordinance subjecting laundries in certain parts of San Francisco to
allegedly special and “burdensome” restrictions because the public
concerns could “be remedied only by the state.”498 The ordinance was
defended on the ground that it promoted the public health and safety.499
Such arguments of public health and safety are usually a trump card for
the government in the post Lochner v. New York era.500 Courts will
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.

See id. at 539–40.
Id. at 541.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 541–43.
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
Id. at 32.
Id. at 30–31.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 51, 55–56, 58, 61, 64 (1905) (examples of the
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usually uphold laws challenged on class legislation grounds at least in
situations where a law is addressing a public health and safety problem
that is of such an extraordinary magnitude that it can only be remedied
by the state.
Skinner and Barbier therefore bring out important qualifications to
the nineteenth century two-step test for unconstitutional class
legislation. Skinner shows that even if a discriminatory law has a public
purpose, it can still be subjected to strict scrutiny if it: (1) infringes in a
discriminatory way as to a fundamental right like the right to procreate,
(2) if the law in question has far-reaching consequences and is subject
to political abuse, or (3) if the means used by the law are unreasonably
damaging and disproportionate. Barbier, in contrast, shows that the
Supreme Court will usually defer to the political branches as to the
significance of the public health and safety problem that the government
claims it is addressing.
The original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class
legislation is therefore fairly easily harmonized with the modern
Supreme Court’s use of strict scrutiny when classifications are made on
such suspect grounds as race, sex, or religion. In strict scrutiny cases,
modern courts under present-day Supreme Court doctrine ask whether a
law that makes a suspect classification serves a compelling government
interest pursued under the least restrictive means.501 Under a nineteenth
century class legislation approach of the kind originally imposed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, a court would ask the slightly different
question whether the law served a public and not some private purpose,
and not just whether the law was justified by a compelling government
interest. The distinction between the nineteenth century test and the
modern test could prove critical in affirmative action cases where the
legislature seeks to help a disadvantaged group. Otherwise, the modern
strict scrutiny analysis is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ban on class legislation as long as one recognizes that religion is every
bit as much of a suspect classification as are race and sex.
B. Modern Case Law and Class Legislation
The Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class legislation includes a ban
on facial discrimination targeting a specific class. This approach is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s case law that, for instance, a racial
classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively

reasoning the Court used in rejecting legislatures’ public welfare arguments in favor of
economic substantive due process).
501. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800–01 (2006) (discussing the standard
for strict scrutiny and various cases).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

91

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 1

1000

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

invalid.502 Thus segregation and Jim Crow laws easily fall into the
category of forbidden class legislation. Anti-miscegenation laws are
also invalid because they define legal rights based on race.503 A white
person is allowed to marry another white person but a black person does
not have that same right.504 In the context of religion, the Court has also
recognized that “the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not
discriminate on its face.”505 Thus, in McDaniel v. Paty, the Supreme
Court struck down as unconstitutional a law barring ministers from
holding public office.506
The constitutional ban on class legislation includes some forms of
legal discrimination amongst religious groups. Courts have
appropriately considered these cases on equal protection grounds. For
instance, in Native American Council of Tribes v. Solem, the Eight
Circuit held that restrictions on Native American inmates’ religious
practices violated the Equal Protection Clause because similar
restrictions did not exist for other religious groups.507 And in Colorado
Christian University v. Weaver, then-Judge Michael W. McConnell’s
opinion struck down a state educational funding scheme that permitted
public money to go to religious schools but barred it from going to
“pervasively sectarian” schools.508 Although the Tenth Circuit held that
the law in question violated the Establishment Clause, it also declared
that discrimination on the basis of religion is subject to “heightened
scrutiny” and could violate the Equal Protection Clause.509 The Tenth
Circuit also said that “neutral treatment of religions” is a requirement of
the Equal Protection Clause, just as it is of the Establishment Clause.510
The ban on class legislation is also consistent with the Supreme
Court’s approach to facially neutral laws, which serve as a pretext for
improper discrimination when the laws are administered. For instance,
in 1886, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that an
ordinance prohibiting the operation of laundry businesses in wooden
buildings was unconstitutional because it was only enforced in practice
against Chinese immigrants.511 The Court dutifully noted that the
502. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
503. See Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 31, at 1419–20 (arguing that Loving v. Virginia
was consistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, which banned all class
legislation).
504. Id.
505. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
506. 435 U.S. 618, 628–29 (1978).
507. 691 F.2d 382, 384–85 (8th Cir. 1982).
508. Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1258, 1269 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
509. Id. at 1266.
510. Id. at 1257.
511. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
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Fourteenth Amendment banned class legislation and held that the
ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was enforced
improperly by drawing an “arbitrary line” between “two classes,” even
though the underlying law did not facially discriminate on the basis of
race or national origin.512 In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court
held that evidence of discriminatory intent was necessary to prove that a
facially neutral law violated the Equal Protection Clause even when the
law in question had a racially disparate impact and was not justified by
a compelling governmental interest.513 The Supreme Court later made it
clear that a plaintiff need not prove that a law is motivated “solely [by]
racially discriminatory purposes” but simply that improper
discrimination was a “motivating factor.”514 In Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the Supreme
Court laid out a variety of factors that may be evidence of
discriminatory intent.515 “Once racial discrimination is shown to have
been a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind enactment[s]
of . . . law, the burden shifts [from the plaintiff] to the law’s defenders
to demonstrate that the law would have been enacted without this
factor.”516 Those holdings are consistent with Yick Wo and the original
meaning of the Amendment’s ban on class legislation.517
In the context of racial discrimination and private sector employment
contracts, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has always barred discrimination
on the basis of religion as well as on the basis of race and sex.518 The
Supreme Court held in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. that if an employer’s
hiring criteria disparately impacts a particular racial group, the
employer bears the burden of showing that the hiring criteria has “a
manifest relationship to the employment in question” and is justified by

512. Id. at 368, 374.
513. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237, 248 (1976).
514. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977).
515. In Arlington Heights, the court provided a non-exhaustive list: (1) disparate impact on
a particular race; (2) the historical background of the law, “particularly if it reveals a series of
official actions taken for invidious purposes”; (3) the sequence of events leading up to the action
taken; (4) departures from the normal procedural sequence; (5) substantive departures,
“particularly if the factors usually considered important by the decision-maker strongly favors a
decision contrary to the one reached”; and (6) the legislative or administrative history of the
action. Id. at 266–68.
516. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985).
517. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (“The fact of this discrimination is
admitted. No reason for it is shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for it
exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which in
the eye of the law is not justified. The discrimination is, therefore, illegal, and the public
administration which enforces it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws and a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.”).
518. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000E-2 (2006).
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business necessity.519
When inspecting facially neutral laws for signs of discrimination on
the basis of religion, the Court has transplanted its analysis from its race
and sex discrimination cases. As Justice Harlan noted in the context of
the Establishment Clause, “neutrality in its application requires an equal
protection mode of analysis.”520 In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah, the Supreme Court said, “The Free Exercise Clause,
like the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination.
The Clause ‘forbids subtle departures from neutrality’ . . . [and] protects
against governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt.”521 The
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Court went on to use the Arlington
Heights factors to show that a facially neutral City of Hialeah ordinance
banning animal sacrifice was enacted for the purpose of discriminating
unconstitutionally on the basis of religion and thus abridging Free
Exercise Clause rights.522
Much of the Supreme Court’s use of the Fourteenth Amendment to
strike down various impermissible classifications in the 1970s, 1980s,
and 1990s is also quite consistent with our view that the Fourteenth
Amendment enacts a general ban on class legislation and systems of
caste. Discrimination based on national origin, gender,523
illegitimacy,524 and many kinds of physical disability,525 constitutes a
caste system because these groups are defined in part by heredity or by
immutable characteristics. The Court has also struck down some state
laws discriminating on the basis of citizenship. We think that, while
some such state laws may be preempted by federal law, state laws that
discriminate on the basis of citizenship should not for that reason be
held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-discrimination
command. As already discussed, the Privileges or Immunities Clause
519. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
520. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
521. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 540
(1993) (“Here, as in equal protection cases, we may determine the city council’s object from
both direct and circumstantial evidence.”) (citations omitted) (quoting Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971).
522. Id. at 540 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266–68 (1977)).
523. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
690–91 (1973); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555, 558 (1996).
524. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537–38
(1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175–76 (1972).
525. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (holding
that denial of zoning permit to home for mentally retarded individuals failed rational basis test
under the Equal Protection Clause). But see id. at 473–78 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in the judgment in part) (arguing that mentally retarded individuals should be
considered a suspect class due to history of discrimination and strict scrutiny analysis should
apply).
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was quite deliberately written to protect only citizens from the making
of discriminatory laws, and it implicitly permits the making of
discriminatory laws that facially discriminate against non-citizens.526
Non-citizens are protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses, which apply to all persons and not merely to all citizens.527 We
therefore think that In re Griffiths, in which the Supreme Court held that
a state could not condition admission to the bar on citizenship,528 was
inconsistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But we think that Plyler v. Doe, a case in which the Supreme Court held
that a school district could not charge children of illegal immigrants
tuition, presents a closer call because those children were persons who
were entitled to the equal protection of the state laws setting up free
public schools.529
In the 1960s and 1970s, there was something of a movement to
constitutionalize a right to receive welfare payments. Professor Frank
Michelman has been a major advocate of constitutional rights to
welfare, arguing that the equality principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment require the government to pay money to the poor.530
Professor Michelman’s argument is essentially a liberal form of
Lochner.531 Just as Lochner tried to constitutionalize laissez-faire
economic theory,532 Professor Michelman attempts to constitutionalize
the post-New Deal and Great Society welfare state, perhaps even to give
a major impetus to further efforts to achieve socialism. Professor
Michelman’s argument that the government has a constitutional
obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to pay money to a group of
people based on circumstances not caused by the government seems to
us to be wrong and is not to be found anywhere in the Constitution’s
text or history. Even the recovery by private citizens of money from the
federal government in Bivens actions requires that the federal
government have directly caused the physical damage that is the basis
of a lawsuit to a specific individual.533 And Congress had to pass
526. See supra Part I.A.
527. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
528. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973).
529. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 230 (1982).
530. Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls’
Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 966 (1973); see Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme
Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARV. L. REV. 7, 11 (1969). The Supreme Court appeared sympathetic to Michelman’s
philosophy in Goldberg v. Kelly, in which the Court held that a welfare recipient had a right to a
hearing before being deprived of welfare benefits. 397 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1970). But the Court
never went further.
531. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
532. Id. at 64.
533. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
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Section 1983 to make state officials similarly liable for money damages
when they cause an injury.534 But nowhere in the Constitution is there
any notion of government liability to pay money of the kind Professor
Michelman describes. In fact, state welfare payments as they presently
exist might have been originally considered an unconstitutional form of
class legislation, since they single out poor individuals for unique,
government-provided benefits.
We recognize that interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to include
a broad ban on all class legislation is to adopt an approach to the
Amendment’s anti-discrimination guarantee that is inconsistent with the
legendary discussion in United States v. Carolene Products Footnote
Four. In that footnote, the Supreme Court indicated that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s anti-discrimination command protects “discrete and
insular minorities,”535 an argument that was later elaborated by John
Hart Ely.536 The language emphasizing protection only for discrete and
insular minorities necessarily implies a narrow reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment under which the Amendment’s antidiscrimination command would not apply to women or other majority
victims of class legislation. But the Supreme Court has rejected Ely’s
approach in recent years537 and the Court has decided many recent
Fourteenth Amendment cases without even citing the Carolene
Products test.538
Moreover, the holding in Carolene Products is consistent with the
notion that the Fourteenth Amendment bans class legislation generally.
In Carolene Products, Congress prohibited shipments of a certain kind
of imitation milk which it found could be “injurious to the public health,
and its sale constitutes a fraud on the public.”539 The law thus singled
out sellers of imitation milk for a special burden, but it did so under a
public purpose justification—public health concerns and protecting the
public from fraud.540 Those are sufficient justifications for upholding
534. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
535. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
536. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135–36
(1980).
537. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 592–93 (2009) (striking down
discrimination against whites); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 720, 747 (2007) (applying strict scrutiny to an affirmative action program and striking
down the program); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (limiting an affirmative action
program); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (striking down an
affirmative action program).
538. See, e.g., Ricci, 557 U.S. at 593; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1995); Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977); Craig v. Borden, 429 U.S. 190, 208–09 (1976); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690–91 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971).
539. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 147.
540. Id.
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the law; the Supreme Court was right in the Carolene Products case
itself.
C. Carolene Products Footnote Four and Religion
More dramatically, United States v. Carolene Products Footnote
Four explicitly declared that the Fourteenth Amendment bans
discrimination on the basis of religion. In the second and third
paragraph of Footnote Four, the Court said that a law would be
“subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment” if it was “directed at
particular religious . . . or national . . . or racial minorities.”541 The Court
thus explicitly understood the Fourteenth Amendment’s antidiscrimination command as protecting individuals from laws that
discriminate on the basis of religion, just as it protects individuals from
laws that discriminate on the basis of national origin and race.542 And
the Supreme Court made this observation about the ban on laws that
discriminate on the basis of religion, even though the Court had just
finished saying in the first paragraph of Footnote Four that laws will be
given less deference if they burden rights guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights,543 which of course itself contains two Religion Clauses.544 If the
Court had thought that religion was only protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment as a consequence of its incorporation of the First
Amendment, the Court would not have mentioned religion as a
forbidden basis for discrimination after its initial reference to the Bill of
Rights and the Religion Clauses in the first paragraph of Footnote Four.
By listing religion in the third paragraph of Footnote Four, alongside
national origin and race, the Supreme Court showed that religion was
not merely protected by the First Amendment but was also protected by
the anti-discrimination command of the Fourteenth Amendment.545
Strikingly, the Supreme Court listed discrimination on the basis of
religion before both discrimination on the basis of national origin and
discrimination on the basis of race, perhaps recognizing that first and
foremost the anti-discrimination command of the Fourteenth
Amendment bans discrimination on the basis of religion.546 The
Supreme Court also failed to mention gender discrimination at all as
being forbidden in Footnote Four, even though women had been
guaranteed the right to vote for eighteen years before the Carolene
541. Id. at 152–53 n.4.
542. Id.
543. Id. at 152 n.4.
544. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1 (containing both the Free Exercise and the Establishment
Clause).
545. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
546. Id.
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Products case was decided.547 This too shows the unique constitutional
weight that the Court attached to the protection of religious liberty
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Footnote Four also shows that the Fourteenth Amendment banned
laws targeting all religion generally, and not just laws targeting specific
religious groups. On its face, Footnote Four does not appear to stand for
this proposition because the Supreme Court refers in Footnote Four to
“particular religious . . . minorities”548 which could be read to imply that
the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect either religion generally or
majority religions. But to support itself in Footnote Four, the Supreme
Court approvingly cited Pierce v. Society of Sisters, a case involving a
law, which burdened all religious groups generally.549 In Society of
Sisters, the State of Oregon had passed a law requiring all children
between ages eight and sixteen to attend public school.550 The law did
not provide exemptions for parents who wanted to send their children to
private religious schools and thus created a substantial burden on all
religious families and schools.551 The Supreme Court held that the law
“unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”552
The Court therefore invalidated a law burdening all religious families
and schools—whether minority or majority religions—without any
discussion about the unique burdens on one particular religion.553 And
the Carolene Products Court saw this Oregon law as the primary
example of forbidden discrimination on the basis of religion under the
Fourteenth Amendment.554 The Court cited no other cases.
Even Footnote Four’s famous language that “discrete and insular
minorities” deserve special protection555 implicitly includes most
religions, especially in the United States where there is no one majority
faith. The words “discrete and insular” suggest that a targeted group
must be distinct and narrowly defined for Footnote Four to apply.
Religion as a whole in the United States does not fit this definition, but
fervently religious groups, such as the Amish, Orthodox Jews, religious
Muslims, or particular religious Christian groups, certainly could be
included. And the words “discrete and insular” also could apply to
groups that have historically suffered prejudice or stigma. The Supreme
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.
552.
553.
554.
510).
555.

U.S. CONT. amend. XIX.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530 (1925).
Id.
See id. at 530–31.
Id. at 534–35.
Id.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 (citing only Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at
Id.
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Court has used this approach to ban gender discrimination even though
women constitute a majority of the U.S. population.556 Even mainstream
religious groups like Episcopalians, Catholics, Quakers, and Unitarians
are minorities in the United States557 and would be protected under
Footnote Four. If so, the many religious groups that have suffered
persecution in this country all deserve Fourteenth Amendment
protection. Even today, there is still much anti-religious bias and stigma
attached to those who are religious and who profess their belief in a
higher being.558
This observation leads us to discuss the majority opinion of the
Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, the case which struck down
as unconstitutional the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in
so far as it applied to the states.559 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
in City of Boerne v. Flores explicitly questioned the extent to which
discrimination on the basis of religion is still pervasive in this
country.560 The Court noted that, in contrast to the Voting Rights Act
context, Congress had produced no findings in passing RFRA of the
existence of generally applicable laws motivated by religious bigotry
that needed redressing in the forty years leading up to the passage of
RFRA.561 Because of the lack of findings of religious discrimination,
the Supreme Court questioned whether Congress had the power to
create a prophylactic measure to protect religion under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.562 The Supreme Court essentially implied that
reinstating the Sherbert-Yoder free exercise of religion balancing test563
was pointless because religious discrimination was not a real problem
anymore.
The first problem with the Court’s opinion in City of Boerne is that
discrimination on the basis of religion is unfortunately alive and well in
modern times. The Anti-Defamation League, for example, reported
1,211 documented anti-Semitic incidents in the United States alone just
556. LINDSAY M. HOWDEN AND JULIE A. MEYER, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, AGE
SEX COMPOSITION: 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS 2, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE (May 2011),
http://www.census.gov/population/age/; see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–88
(1973) (discussing the “long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination”).
557. See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, SELF-DESCRIBED RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF
ADULT POPULATION: 1990, 2001, AND 2008 (2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/
2012/tables/12s0075.pdf.
558. See Catholic League, 2011 Report on Anti-Catholicism (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www
.catholicleague.org/category/annual-report/2011-report-on-anti-catholicism/; Tupi, supra note
391, at 242–61.
559. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
560. See id. at 530–31.
561. Id.
562. Id. at 532.
563. See discussion of the Sherbert-Yoder Test infra Part IV.A.
AND
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in the year 2009.564 And the U.S. State Department reports that
discrimination on the basis of religion and religious intolerance continue
to be major worldwide concerns, including in many western democratic
countries.565 It is quite reasonable to worry that anti-religious animus in
society could seep into the legislative process and lead to the passage of
neutral, generally applicable laws that have a discriminatory impact on
religion. In fact, the Supreme Court had to strike down just such a
discriminatory law in Church of the Lukumi Babalu when the City of
Hialeah passed a facially neutral law targeting the animal sacrifice
practices of members of the Santeria religion.566 While on the Third
Circuit, then-Judge Samuel Alito wrote an opinion striking down a
police department’s policy of granting secular exemptions to its nobeard policy but refusing to grant exemptions for religious reasons.567
And in 2011, a local California ballot initiative seeking to ban
circumcision had sponsors with anti-Semitic affiliations.568 Similarly, a
city might seek to save money, not by explicitly banning religious
individuals from public schools, but by making public schools so
secular and so hostile to religion that religious parents would feel unable
to let their children attend public schools. Concern exists over laws that
discriminate on the basis of race and gender, and it is quite unclear why
it should not also exist with respect to laws that discriminate on the
basis of religion.
And second, the Supreme Court’s observation in City of Boerne that
Congress did not present findings in that case of specific, neutral,
generally applicable laws that had a discriminatory impact on religion569
should not have led to the Court’s conclusion that RFRA was pointless.
Quite possibly, few discriminatory laws were passed because judicial
protections, such as the Sherbert-Yoder free exercise balancing test, and
other laws, such as RFRA or its many state-level equivalents, had
successfully deterred legislatures from discriminating on the basis of
564. Anti-Defamation League, 2009 Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents: Overview (2009),
http://www.adl.org/main_Anti_Semitism_Domestic/2009_Audit.htm.
565. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, JulyDecember, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report: Executive Summary (2011), available
at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168441.htm. To select reports for individual
countries, go to http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/index.htm.
566. Church of the Lukumi Babalu v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 526 (1992).
567. Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359,
366–67 (3d Cir. 1999).
568. See Daily Mail Reporter, Circumcision Should Be Banned but I Don’t “Have the Time
or Energy”: California Mother Drops Bid to End the Practice, MAIL ONLINE (June 8, 2011),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2001035/California-mother-Jena-Troutman-drops-bidban-circumcision.html#ixzz1r0xqjaRF; Joshua Rhett Miller, Woman Pushing to Ban
Circumcision in California City Drops Proposal, FOX NEWS (June 7, 2011), http://www.fox
news.com/politics/2011/06/07/backer-circumcision-ban-in-california-city-withdraws-proposal/.
569. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530–31 (1997).
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religion. Who knows what kind of havoc legislatures could potentially
wreak in the absence of those deterrents? Even assuming that a lack of
findings means that there is no actual problem of religious
discrimination, why should the legislature be precluded from
preemptively guarding against potential discrimination on the basis of
religion? Just as many people proactively take care of their health, it
seems sensible to proactively prevent discrimination on the basis of
religion before it actually happens. And finally, the Supreme Court’s
evaluation of discrimination on the basis of religion fails to take into
account the plethora of Blaine Amendments in a huge majority of state
constitutions which explicitly ban government funds from going to any
religious organizations570—a degree of facial discrimination unheard of
today with regards to race. So the Court’s conclusion that RFRA cannot
be justified is simply incorrect.
The upshot of our discussion of Carolene Products is that using the
Fourteenth Amendment to ban discrimination on the basis of religion
does not contradict the modern Equal Protection Clause case law.
Footnote Four explicitly said that the Fourteenth Amendment protects
all of us from discrimination on the basis of religion, just as it protects
all of us from discrimination on the basis of national origin and race.571
And “discrete and insular minorities” certainly include religious
minorities, even assuming that discreteness and insularity are important
to anti-discrimination law—a conclusion which we tend to doubt. The
Supreme Court recognized in Carolene Products that religion gets
Fourteenth Amendment anti-discrimination protection, even though
religion also gets strict scrutiny as a result of its inclusion in the
Religion Clauses of the Bill of Rights.572 Subsequent Supreme Court
opinions have enshrined religion in the Fourteenth Amendment with
almost ritualistic statements that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause
prohibits selective enforcement ‘based upon an unjustifiable standard
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’”573 In Kiryas
Joel, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor said, “the Religion Clauses—the
Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, the Religious Test
570. See infra Part V (discussing Blaine Amendments).
571. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
572. Id.
573. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 n.8 (1979) (emphasis added) (quoting
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)); see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,
464 (1996); Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931, 938 (2010) (citing Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of
Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 596 (2008); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 (1982)) (“The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment most typically reaches state action that treats a
person poorly because of the person’s race or other suspect classification, such as sex, national
origin, religion, political affiliation, among others, or because the person has exercised a
‘fundamental right,’ or because the person is a member of a group that is the target of irrational
government discrimination.”).
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Clause, . . . and the Equal Protection Clause as applied to religion—all
speak with one voice on this point: Absent the most unusual
circumstances, one’s religion ought not affect one’s legal rights or
duties or benefits.”574
These statements show that many contemporary courts and Supreme
Court justices are not at all restrained in invoking the Fourteenth
Amendment’s anti-discrimination command to answer questions
involving religious liberty. The Supreme Court has never said that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-discrimination command does not apply
to discrimination on the basis of religion or that the First Amendment
Religion Clauses must be used to answer all constitutional questions as
to the scope of religious liberty. So, the Supreme Court or even lower
federal and state courts could simply start using the Fourteenth
Amendment’s anti-discrimination command today in cases where there
has been discrimination on the basis of religion.
IV. THE FREE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES AFTER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
We now consider the impact that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
general anti-discrimination command had or should have had on the
interpretation of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, which
are incorporated through Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process to apply against the states.575 Because both the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause were really bans on certain
specific forms of discrimination on the basis of religion, it is vital that
we ask whether and how the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
general ban on discrimination on the basis of religion affects the
Supreme Court’s present-day Free Exercise Clause and Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. To answer this question, we think it is helpful to
focus on the definition of class legislation and on the evils that the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to eradicate by
constitutionalizing a ban on class legislation. It is also vital that we
remember that the Fourteenth Amendment forbade discrimination on
the basis of religion at the same time that it forbade other forms of
discrimination as well.
We believe that the Fourteenth Amendment’s general ban on
discrimination on the basis of religion expanded the scope of Free
Exercise Clause protections but that it did not enlarge the reach of the
Establishment Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that laws
burdening religion or discriminating against religion must promote the
574. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
575. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment
Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise
Clause).
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general good of the whole people. This means that we should
sometimes provide religious exemptions from facially neutral laws that
effectively discriminate on the basis of religion because religious
individuals and secular individuals are not similarly situated. But the
Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class legislation on the basis of
religion does not open the courtroom door to citizen suits in which a
mere whiff of establishment was perceived, even though actual damages
were never incurred and no litigant has standing. Nor does it imply that
we should scrub the public square free of all religious expression and
symbols. To do that would be to actually discriminate on the basis of
religion, which is precisely what the Fourteenth Amendment forbids.
The Fourteenth Amendment was written to foster equality and liberty,
not to repress it.576 Reexamination of the Supreme Court’s Religion
Clause case law is therefore warranted.
A. Free Exercise Clause
1. Originalism and the Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause was originally meant to provide limited
protection for the free exercise of religion. First, the Clause restrains
Congress from passing certain kinds of laws,577 but it does not restrict
actions taken by private citizens.578 In this sense, the Free Exercise
Clause is quite different from the Thirteenth Amendment which guards
against private actions.579
Second, the Free Exercise Clause specifically restrains congressional
law making but not federal judicial or executive law making. And the
Free Exercise Clause says nothing about religious freedom and law
enforcement discretion. The Free Exercise Clause thus contrasts with
the Fourteenth Amendment which forbids the states from making or
enforcing laws that abridge or shorten or lessen the rights or privileges
or immunities of citizens on the basis of religion.
Third, the Free Exercise Clause only prevents Congress from making
laws “prohibiting” or targeting the free exercise of religion, but the
Clause does not on its face block laws that merely abridge or burden or
infringe on religious liberties.580 Samuel Johnson’s 1786 Dictionary and
576. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520–24 (1997) (discussing the history of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
577. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion] . . . .”).
578. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1113 (making this argument and noting that the Clause
addresses one of Madison’s primary concerns about republican government which was to
protect “citizens generally from government officials pursuing their own self-interested agendas
at the expense of their constituents”).
579. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
580. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1113 (making this argument); see also Reynolds v.
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Noah Webster’s 1828 Dictionary both defined “prohibit” as “to forbid;
to interdict by authority.”581 In 1856, prohibit appeared to have the same
meaning.582 The Free Exercise Clause thus contrasts with the Free
Speech Clause which bars Congress from even “abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”583 Laws that limit access to government welfare benefits
and to charity may “abridge” the free exercise of religion, but it is hard
to say that they “prohibit it.” The original meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause thus is hard to square with Sherbert v. Verner,584 although that
case is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-discrimination
command.
Finally, there is considerable debate over what kinds of religious
activity the Free Exercise Clause protects. In Reynolds v. United States,
the Supreme Court said that the Free Exercise Clause only protected
rights of conscience,585 which probably also included a right to take
action by worshiping in ceremonies of worship.586 The Clause does after
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162–64, 166 (1878) (evaluating the original meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause and holding that a law criminalizing polygamy did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause because the law did not prohibit religious beliefs but religious acts); cf. Lyng v. Nw.
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) (emphasizing the significance of
the word “prohibit” in the Free Exercise Clause). Professor McConnell puts together an
extensive analysis of this subject. See McConnell, Origins, supra note 344, at 1486–88.
McConnell notes that the word “infringing” was initially proposed but was replaced with
“prohibiting.” Id. at 1486. McConnell also cites a report of the Department of Justice that the
original meaning of the Clause only prevents Congress from passing laws that prohibit the free
exercise of religion. Id. Yet, somewhat curiously, McConnell ultimately concludes that the Free
Exercise Clause bars even laws abridging or infringing on religion, not just those prohibiting it.
Id. at 1488.
581. SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 719 (Harrison & Co.,
1786) [hereinafter SAMUEL JOHNSON’S 1786]. Also, Webster’s defined “prohibit” as:
1. To forbid; to interdict by authority; applicable to persons or things, but
implying authority or right. God prohibited Adam to eat of the fruit of a certain
tree. The moral law prohibits what is wrong and commands what is right. We
prohibit a person to do a thing, and we prohibit the thing to be done.
2. To hinder; to debar; to prevent; to preclude.
“Forbid” definition, NOAH WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY (1828), available at
http://www.1828-dictionary.com/d/search/word,forbid.
582. See GOODRICH, supra note 41, at 353 (defining “prohibit” as “to interdict by authority,
as the law prohibits what is wrong.—SYN. To forbid”).
583. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
584. 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (striking down the denial of unemployment compensation to
someone who was lost their job for religious reasons).
585. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
586. Cf. McConnell, Origins, supra note 344, at 1506–09 (discussing rights to conscience
and worship).
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all on its face protect the free “exercise” of religion and not merely
“freedom of conscience” or “belief.” It strains credulity not to read the
Free Exercise Clause as at least protecting a right to take action in
ceremonies of worship and to decline to serve in the military. But
Professor Michael McConnell has argued much more boldly that the
Free Exercise Clause protects not only the taking of action in
ceremonies of worship but also all other religiously motivated conduct
as well.587 McConnell’s view is based on the fact that initial drafts of
the Free Exercise Clause protected only “rights of conscience,” while
the final draft more broadly protected the “free exercise of religion.”588
Dictionary definitions at the time of the Framing defined the word
“exercise” as involving the “labour of the body” or other physical
activities, whereas the word “conscience” was restricted to apply only to
“private thoughts” or “knowledge.”589
2. Role of the Anti-discrimination Command of the Fourteenth
Amendment on Free Exercise Questions
After ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, analysis of the
incorporated Free Exercise Clause should have changed to take into
account the Amendment’s ban on all forms of discrimination on the
basis of religion. We agree with Bernadette Meyler that the courts
should have taken an equal protection approach to free exercise claims,
but we disagree with her as to the doctrinal test that should be used.590
Instead of inquiring whether a congressional action prohibited the free
587. See id. at 1488–90.
588. See id. at 1475–76.
589. McConnell reports:
The choice of the words “free exercise of religion” in lieu of “rights of
conscience” is therefore of utmost importance. As defined by dictionaries at the
time of the framing, the word “exercise” strongly connoted action. The
American edition of Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language,
published in Philadelphia in 1805, used the following terms to define
“exercise”: “Labour of the body,” “Use; actual application of any thing,”
“Task; that which one is appointed to perform,” and “Act of divine worship,
whether public or private.” Noah Webster’s American dictionary defined
“exercise” as “employment.” James Buchanan’s 1757 dictionary defined
“exercise” as “[t]o use or practice.” “Conscience” was more likely to have been
understood as opinion or belief. Johnson equated “conscience” with the terms
“knowledge,” “Real sentiment; veracity; private thoughts,” “Scruple;
difficulty,” and “reason; reasonableness.” Webster defined it as “natural
knowledge, or the faculty that decides on the right or wrong of actions.”
Buchanan defined it as the “testimony of one’s own mind.”
Id. at 1489 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (citing various dictionaries).
590. See generally Meyler, supra note 15, at 326–27 (approaching equal protection claims
as matters of discrimination, as opposed to matters of classification).
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exercise of religion, we think the Supreme Court should instead have
asked whether a state law abridging religious freedom was a forbidden
form of class legislation that discriminated on the basis of religion. As
with any other form of forbidden class legislation, the Court must
consider two questions: (1) does the law or government action
discriminate on the basis of religion, and (2) is there a public purpose
served by the law such that the law is a general law enacted for the good
of the whole people? To be clear, granting a specific religious group a
unique privilege or immunity simply because the government wants to
help that religion—perhaps in an attempt to rectify past discrimination
or out of sympathy for its current unpopularity—is not a law that should
be seen as having a legitimate public purpose. Similarly, dishing out
unique burdens simply because a particular religion does not comport
with majoritarian norms is also unacceptable. A law serves a public
purpose and is not class legislation when it is designed to benefit society
as a whole and not just a special interest group. Additionally, since the
free exercise of religion is undoubtedly a fundamental right—enshrined
in the text of the Bill of Rights and guarded in three clauses in the
Constitution and in the Bill of Rights—a court should subject any law
that abridges religious liberty to strict scrutiny.591 This is doubly the
case since most religions in the United States are arguably discrete and
insular minorities that qualify yet again for protection via strict scrutiny
under Carolene Products Footnote Four. Accordingly, a court should
evaluate laws that abridge religious liberty by asking whether the
government interest underlying the law is being pursued using the least
restrictive means and whether the law in question benefits the general
public as a whole.
The easiest application of the ban on class legislation that
discriminates on the basis of religion is to laws that are facially neutral
but that are clearly intended to discriminate against religion. For
instance, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu, the Supreme Court
unanimously struck down a city ordinance banning animal sacrifice.592
The legislative history showed that the city council passed the law in
question in response to the practice of adherents of the Santeria religion
who performed animal sacrifice in their ritual ceremonies of worship.593
This law was rightly held to be a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
It also violates the anti-discrimination command of the Fourteenth
Amendment because: (1) it directly discriminates against religion, and
(2) it lacks a public purpose because it fails to serve the general good of
the whole people. The ban on animal sacrifice should have been
subjected to strict scrutiny, which it could not possibly have survived.
591. See supra p. 87.
592. 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993).
593. Id. at 526–28.
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Constitutional analysis gets harder when courts are asked to assess a
facially neutral and generally applicable law that lacks any specific antireligious intent but which uniquely burdens religion. Whether the Free
Exercise Clause mandates religious exemptions from facially neutral
laws is a question that has triggered considerable scholarly debate.594
The Supreme Court has taken two divergent approaches. A brief
summary of the Court’s case law in this area is necessary.
Until 1990, the Supreme Court generally balanced the government
interest in adopting a facially neutral law that burdened religion against
the severity of the burden imposed on the religious individuals who
were forced to choose between complying with the law and sacrificing
their religious beliefs.595 In Sherbert v. Verner, as was mentioned above,
the Supreme Court held that the denial of unemployment benefits to
Seventh Day Adventist who would not work on Sabbath violated the
Free Exercise Clause, even though the law in question was religionneutral, facially neutral, and applied to all citizens generally.596 The
Court explained that depriving a religious individual of unemployment
benefits if he or she was fired for refusing to work on the Sabbath
placed him or her in the uncomfortable position of having to choose
between his or her religion and the government welfare benefits in
question.597 In holding that such governmental pressure violated the
Free Exercise Clause, the Sherbert Court laid down a two-step test for
evaluating Free Exercise Clause claims. First, does the government
594. Philip A. Hamburger explains that many Framers believed that exemptions were
unnecessary because civil government and religion served different roles and simply operated in
different jurisdictions. Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An
Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 936–37 (1992). Religious dissenters around
the time of the framing sought an end to establishments but did not seek exemptions. Id. at 946.
And the notion that individuals might have a right to religious exemptions from generally
applicable civil laws was so bizarre that supporters of religious establishments used the notion to
smear anti-establishment proponents. Id. at 941. In his concurrence in City of Boerne, Justice
Scalia noted that in the years following ratification of the Constitution there is no record of any
state or federal cases in which a court struck down a generally applicable law because it failed to
provide a religious exemption. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 542 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part). But, there were at least two cases in which a religious exemption was
denied. Id. at 543. But see McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 444, at 27 (arguing that the
Free Exercise Clause required religious exemptions, as long as those exemptions did not
interfere with important government interests); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 546 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court should return to its pre-Smith jurisprudence in which it
balanced the government interest against the burden on religious exercise because the Free
Exercise Clause created “an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in religious
practices and conduct without impermissible governmental interference, even when such
conduct conflicts with a neutral, generally applicable law”).
595. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 406 (1963); see also Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
596. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410.
597. Id. at 404.
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action in question substantially burden an individual’s ability to exercise
his or her religious belief? 598 And second, does the government have a
compelling state interest that overrides the individual’s religious liberty
claim?599 The Supreme Court implied that these two questions were
interrelated and that they required balancing the importance of the
government interest in question against the degree to which the free
exercise of religion was impaired.600 The answer to this question
depended in part on whether the government pursued its compelling
objective in the least restrictive way.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court used the Sherbert
balancing test to hold that Amish parents could not be compelled to
send their children to school past the eighth grade.601 The court
explained that the government’s interest in forcing Amish children to
attend ninth and tenth grades was not sufficiently compelling relative to
the substantial burden the law imposed on Amish parents’ religious
beliefs.602 Sherbert and Yoder thus seemed to herald the dawn of a new
age in which the Free Exercise Clause would be read broadly as
protecting the access of religious people to welfare benefits and to their
own ideas about the education of children.
In its 1990 decision in Employment Division, Dept. of Human
Resources v. Smith, however, the U.S. Supreme Court abruptly changed
course one hundred eighty degrees. The Court in Smith rejected the
Sherbert-Yoder balancing test and held that facially neutral criminal
laws banning the use of peyote in religious ceremonies did not need to
be accompanied by a religious exemption under the Free Exercise
Clause.603 The Court declared that facially neutral laws that prohibit
action in a religious ceremony do not violate the Free Exercise Clause,
as long as they do not target a specific religious group, even though
specific religious groups or religious people in general might face a
significant burden on their religious beliefs or practices.604
In 1993, in the wake of the Smith decision, Congress passed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which purported to
reinstate the Sherbert-Yoder balancing test.605 RFRA said that the
598. Id. at 403.
599. Id. at 406.
600. See 6 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 21.8(b) (4th ed. 2008) (discussing how the Supreme Court, in
Sherbert v. Verner, applied a two-part balancing test when it held that unemployment benefits
“could not be denied” to a woman because of her religious affiliation and religious observance).
601. 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
602. Id. at 217–18.
603. Emp’t Div., Dep’t Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884–85, 890 (1990).
604. Id. at 877–78.
605. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1993) (invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
536 (1997)).
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“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of
[their] religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability . . . .”606 If a government action does burden religious
exercise, it must satisfy strict scrutiny. Namely, the government action
must (1) further a compelling government interest, and (2) accomplish
its goal with the least restrictive means.607 RFRA applied to both the
states and the federal government.608 Congress justified RFRA on the
grounds that it was overturning Smith and enforcing the Free Exercise
Clause as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment under its
Section 5 power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.609
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court struck down RFRA
as it applied to the states.610 The Court explained that Congress could
only enforce the Free Exercise Clause if there was “congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end.”611 The Supreme Court said that Congress
could not legislatively “overturn” a Supreme Court decision like the one
in Smith and that it could not invent a new substantive right restricting
state governments while pretending to “enforce” the Fourteenth
Amendment.612 The Supreme Court did not, however, strike down
RFRA’s application to the federal government,613 and in a later case the
Court unanimously held that RFRA was valid as to the federal
government.614 Thus the Obama Administration’s recent decision to
force some organizations—whether religious or not—to provide
contraceptive coverage to their employees615 will have to survive strict
scrutiny under RFRA.
We think that Justice Scalia’s approach in Smith is open to two
criticisms. First, on the facts of Smith, a group of Native Americans was
barred from ingesting peyote in a religious ceremony of worship
because of state anti-narcotics laws.616 The constitutionality of this law
seems dubious because the Native Americans literally wanted to engage
in the exercise of religious worship, which is precisely the primary type
606. Id. § 2000bb-1(a).
607. Id. § 2000bb-1(b).
608. Id. § 2000bb-2.
609. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512, 516–17.
610. Id. at 536.
611. Id. at 520.
612. Id. at 535–36.
613. Id. at 520, 532–33, 536.
614. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424
(2006).
615. Richard Wolf & Cathy Grossman, Obama Mandate on Birth Control Coverage Stirs
Controversy, USA TODAY, Feb. 9, 2012, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/
2012-02-08/catholics-contraceptive-mandate/53014864/1.
616. Emp’t Div., Dep’t Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
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of “exercise” that the Free Exercise Clause protects. Allowing the
government to simply declare a mode of worship illegal appears to gut
the Free Exercise Clause of any meaning. And the Native American
worship did not harm any third parties as might a human sacrifice in a
Neo-Aztec ceremony of worship or the burning of a widow on her
husband’s funeral pyre as in the ancient Asian Indian practice called
suttee. Justice Scalia thus seems wrongly to say in Smith that the Free
Exercise Clause actually protects only freedom of conscience and not
the “exercise” of any religious liberties.
Second, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith seems to imply that so long
as a law is facially neutral and is motivated by no discriminatory intent
it will survive Free Exercise Clause scrutiny. This seems to us to be
plainly wrong. A law can be facially neutral but still be discriminatory if
it is written in a way that targets a suspect class or that treats unlike
things as if they are like things. The laws in the South in the 1880s that
allowed anyone to vote whose grandfathers had been eligible to vote
were facially neutral, but they were also plainly designed to
discriminate on the basis of race. Similarly, laws today that require that
all healthcare providers fund access to contraceptives and abortion
discriminate on the basis of religion even if they are written in a way
that is facially neutral. These are all facts that everyone in society just
knows, and they arise from the fact that since religious people and
secular people are different in some respects a law that treats them as if
they were exactly the same is in fact discriminatory. This phenomenon
was mentioned as long ago as by Aristotle in The Politics:
[T]he political good is justice, and justice is the common
benefit. Now everyone holds that what is just is some form
of equality . . . . For justice is something to someone, and
they say it should be something equal to those who are
equal. But equality in what and inequality in what, should
not be overlooked. For this involves a problem and political
philosophy.617
The basic point is that a law that requires that everyone take Sunday as
their legal day of rest may be facially neutral and nondiscriminatory,
and it may not even by motivated by a discriminatory intent. But such a
law does in fact discriminate on the basis of religion to the detriment of
Jews and Muslims.
We think that Justice Scalia was quite properly concerned in Smith
by his correct dislike for disparate impact analysis in Title VII race
discrimination cases where the Supreme Court held that whenever an
employment practice had a racially disparate impact the practice was
617. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 86 (C.D.C. Reeve trans. 1998).
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unlawful unless the defendant could prove it was justified by business
necessity.618 Early in his tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia
joined an important opinion in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,619
which sought to limit disparate impact analysis and which Congress
then tried to overturn by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991.620 In his
separate concurrence in Ricci v. DeStefano,621 Justice Scalia even asked
whether Title VII disparate impact analysis might itself violate
constitutional equal protection doctrine,622 which has been held since
Washington v. Davis623 to require proof of discriminatory intent as well
as disparate impact.624 Disparate impacts often emerge for totally
benign reasons, and we think it is a huge mistake in race discrimination
or religion discrimination cases to shift the burden of proof only
because of a disparate impact.
The real question in any Fourteenth Amendment discrimination case
is whether the government has denied to any class of people the same
legal rights as were held by white men under federal and state law in
1868. Members of every race, sex, and religion have the same legal
rights, today, as were enjoyed by white men in 1868. A law is
discriminatory under the Fourteenth Amendment without regard to
proof of discriminatory intent or of disparate impact if it gives a class of
people fewer legal rights than were enjoyed by white men in 1868.
Citizens of every race, sex, and religion have, in the words of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, “the same right[s]” as were enjoyed in the 1860’s
by white citizens.625 Class legislation is unconstitutional unless it is in
the form of a general law enacted for the good of the whole people, not
a subsection of society.626
We think that disparate impact analysis in cases where
discrimination on the basis of religion is alleged must take account of
the fact that it is often well known how a facially neutral law will
impact religion prior to its enactment. Because the discriminatory
impact certain laws will have on a known religion is so obvious and
inescapable, discriminatory intent can be more easily inferred in cases
involving discrimination on the basis of religion than in cases involving
discrimination on the basis of race. Justice Field discussed this issue
while riding circuit in 1879 in Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan,627 a case in which
618.
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
Id. at 659–60.
557 U.S. 557 (2009).
Id. at 594.
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Id. at 239.
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,456).
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the court struck down an ordinance that permitted prison guards to
shave the heads of prisoners, even Chinese prisoners who wore a queue
for religious reasons.628 In that case, the government was well aware
that shaving the queues of Chinese individuals would violate their
religious beliefs.629 Despite the possible benefits of the ordinance,
Justice Field was disturbed by the way in which “the ordinance acts
with special severity upon Chinese prisoners, inflicting upon them
suffering altogether disproportionate to what would be endured by other
prisoners if enforced against them.”630 For that reason, the court struck
down the ordinance as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban
on class legislation discriminating on the basis of religion.631
If Justice Field had used the test of Smith in Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan,
the prison ordinance requiring the shaving of queues should have
survived because it was a neutral, generally applicable law regarding
hair length in prison. But Justice Field recognized that the disparate
impact on Chinese religious practices was well known and severe and
for that reason the law in question did constitute impermissible class
legislation.632 Justice Field further discussed how a facially neutral law
could be considered “intended hostile legislation” merely because of the
“exceptional severity” such legislation inflicted on a particular class,
such as believers in a minority religion.633 Justice Field described, for
example, how a law requiring all prisoners to eat pork would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment because of such a law’s obvious disparate
impact on observant Jews.634 Justice Field also said that laws “enacted
with the avowed purpose of imposing special burdens and restrictions
upon Catholics” would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, even if they
were facially neutral.635
Justice Field’s point is that the existence of certain religious
practices is often well known before legislation is adopted, and for that
reason severe disparate impacts on religion, unlike severe disparate
impacts on the basis of race, can be easily predicted. We therefore think
that the Fourteenth Amendment prevents lawmakers from simply
ignoring obvious and inevitable disparate impacts that facially neutral
laws will have on religion unless those laws are needed to avoid harm to
some third party—for example, a widow being burned on the funeral
pyre of her husband. But under Smith, the Supreme Court seemed to say
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.
634.
635.

Id. at 256–57.
Id. at 253–54.
Id. at 253, 255.
Id. at 255–57.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 255–56.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 255–56.
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that lawmakers could force Chinese prisoners to shave their heads, Jews
to eat pork, and Catholics to pay for contraception and abortions, as
long as the laws in question are facially neutral and generally
applicable. We think that result is wrong and violates the Fourteenth
Amendment for the reasons Justice Field gave in 1879.
In a footnote in Carolene Products, the U.S. Supreme Court said that
the Fourteenth Amendment banned laws that disparately impact
religion.636 As discussed earlier, Footnote Four cited one case, Pierce v.
Society of Sisters,637 for the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment
banned discrimination on the basis of religion.638 In Society of Sisters,
the Oregon law at issue was not one that facially discriminated against
one religion or all religions.639 It was a facially neutral, generally
applicable law that merely had a disparate impact on religion because it
banned all private schools.640 The law in question applied to all school
children, and the Court in Society of Sisters cited no examples of antireligious animus or of discriminatory intent in the legislative history of
the Oregon law.641 Yet the Carolene Products Court still cited the
Oregon law struck down in Society of Sisters as the primary example of
a law “directed at” religion in violation of the anti-discrimination
command of the Fourteenth Amendment.642 Why would the Supreme
Court cite a disparate impact case in discussing discrimination on the
basis of religion when it cited a case of facial discrimination for race?643
The Court did not explain itself, but we can speculate that perhaps the
justices recognized that disparate impacts on religion were more
common than facial discrimination on the basis of religion? Or perhaps
the Supreme Court just took judicial cognizance of the fact that
everyone knew that Catholic parochial schools were the real targets of
the Oregon law no matter what the law said on its face. Or perhaps the
Supreme Court recognized that facial discrimination against religion
was already banned by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment as it would be incorporated against the states, whereas the
Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-discrimination command outlawed
disparate impacts on religion as well as laws that discriminated on their
face. Whatever the reason, Carolene Products Footnote Four reflects
the U.S. Supreme Court’s acknowledgment in a seminal opinion that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-discrimination command broadly bans all
636. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
637. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1952).
638. See supra Part III.C.
639. See Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 530 & n.*.
640. Id.
641. Id.
642. Carolene Prods Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
643. See id. (citing Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (involving a law that facially
discriminated based on race)).
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discrimination on the basis of religion, just as it bans all discrimination
on the basis of national origin or race.
We think that, instead of using the Smith rule, the Supreme Court
should say that the Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-discrimination
command as applied in the context of religion mandates a variation of
the Sherbert-Yoder balancing test. First, the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ban on discrimination on the basis of religion means that a law
discriminating on the basis of religion can only be upheld if it promotes
the general good of the whole people. The Sherbert-Yoder test merely
required that a law burdening religion pursue an important government
interest. Second, we also think that the Fourteenth Amendment demands
an evaluation of the degree of harm to religious citizens that is inflicted
by the law in question as well as by the need to protect a vulnerable
third party from actual physical harm. Courts should take into account
the magnitude of the harm inflicted on religion, as the Supreme Court
did in its equal protection decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma, and as
Justice Field did in Ho Ah Kow.644 And courts should assess whether
reasonable accommodations are possible, if not required, as is done in
cases arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act645 and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.646 In contrast, the Sherbert-Yoder test
simply required the government to pursue its interest using the least
restrictive means. Thus, the Sherbert-Yoder test would have wrongly
allowed a law to stand that discriminated on the basis of religion if that
law served an important government interest, even if it did not promote
the general good of the whole people. And the Sherbert-Yoder test
would also wrongly permit a law to stand that inflicts substantial,
irreparable harm on a religious group, so long as the law in question
does so using the least restrictive means.
Perhaps for these reasons the Sherbert-Yoder balancing test turned
out to provide a pretty skimpy protection for freedom of religion even in
the days between 1963 and 1990 when the test was widely used.
Professor Adam Winkler points out that under the Sherbert-Yoder
balancing test and under RFRA, seventy-two percent of all the laws that
have been challenged have been upheld, even though the courts
reviewing those laws were supposed to be applying strict scrutiny.647 In
644. See Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 253–54 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,456)
(balancing the benefits of the head shaving ordinance against the severe, negative impact on
Chinese religious practices).
645. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12117, 12201–12213 (1994).
646. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994).
647. See Winkler, supra note 501, at 860. Professor Winkler cites a similar study by James
Ryan from the 1980s showing an astounding 87% survival rate. Id. (citing James E. Ryan, Note,
Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV.
1407, 1416–17 (1992)). Winkler also explains that claims for exemptions from generally
applicable laws are rejected 74% of the time, and claims that laws intentionally target religious
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contrast, in other areas of constitutional law where strict scrutiny is
used, only thirty percent of the cases that get strict scrutiny resulted in
the courts upholding the law being challenged.648 For this reason, some
referred to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Smith as a “mercy killing”
because the Sherbert-Yoder balancing test had proved to be such an
ineffective protection for the free exercise of religion.649
The laws that were struck down as unconstitutional in both Sherbert
and Yoder may very well have been consistent with the original
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause itself. Denying welfare benefits or
access to private charity schools may very well “abridge” the Free
Exercise of Religion, but they do not “prohibit” it. The verb “prohibit”
implies a government action that is backed up with criminal sanctions.
It is completely implausible to say that a denial of welfare benefits is a
“prohibition” on the free exercise of religion. A criminal truancy statute
in the context of Yoder might well rise to the level of being a
“prohibition,” but the denial of welfare benefits in Sherbert and in
Thomas v. Review Board650 do not.
The government’s actions in Sherbert, Yoder, and Thomas all,
however, do violate the anti-discrimination command of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The laws in all three of these cases clearly discriminated
on the basis of religion. The law in Sherbert denied a Seventh Day
Adventist Sabbath observer unemployment benefits when she was fired
because, under her religion, the Sabbath was celebrated on Saturdays,
and she refused to work on that day.651 But for her religion, the plaintiff
would not have been fired and would not have needed unemployment
benefits. The law in Yoder, like the law in Society of Sisters, placed a
substantial and irreparable harm on the parents of school children—in
this case on the Amish.652 The Wisconsin legislature was probably
genuinely concerned with the level of education that school children
were receiving, but the Amish had a different approach to education
based on their own religious values, which they ought to have been free
to pursue. The Wisconsin law in Yoder was, in effect, a form of
discrimination on the basis of religion, which was barred by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The law in Thomas denied unemployment
benefits to a Jehovah’s Witness who refused to work for an employer
who made military equipment.653 Here too, the law in question operated
practices are successful 100% of the time. Id. at 860–61.
648. Id. at 796.
649. Id. at 859 (citation omitted).
650. 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (refusing to deny welfare benefits to an individual that ceased
employment as a result of his religious belief).
651. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399, 400 n.3 (1963).
652. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 & n.2 (1972).
653. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 709 & n.1.
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as a form of discrimination on the basis of religion.
The basic problem in all of these cases is that the religious
individuals who brought them were not similarly situated to secular
individuals. The Seventh Day Adventist in Sherbert celebrated the
Sabbath on Saturdays and not on Sundays. The Amish parents and child
in Yoder thought that education mandated after eighth grade was bad for
the soul. And, the Jehovah’s Witness in Thomas thought that it would
violate his religion for him to work for an employer who made military
equipment. In all three cases, religious citizens were treated as if they
were identical to secular citizens when in reality they were not alike.
Fourteenth Amendment principles are violated, not only when we treat
two similar people differently, but also when we treat two people who
are in reality different in the same way. Sherbert, Yoder, and Thomas
are thus not examples of Griggs v. Duke Power disparate impact
analysis run amok. They are instead a reminder that we may sometimes
need to treat different people differently if we want to secure them a
truly equal citizenship under the law.
For this reason, the foundational religious liberty case of all time,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters was correct because it involved an instance
of discrimination on the basis of religion. In Society of Sisters, the
facially neutral law in question applied much more harshly to religious
families who wanted, as a matter of their faith, to send their children to
private religious schools than it did to secular families. Even though
there might be a public purpose served by requiring all children to
attend public schools, the law would fail strict scrutiny equal protection
analysis because it was partially aimed at closing down private religious
schools, and it was not a general law enacted for the good of the whole
people.654 Religious education is a critical part of a religious child’s
upbringing, and forcing a child to attend a secular public school in
which the child is taught in a secular way is clearly an irreparable harm
that could be easily avoided with a religious exemption. The fact that
religious education is not a critical part of a secular child’s upbringing
does not mean that religious education can just be outlawed across the
board. Religious children and secular children simply have different
educational preferences. Treating both groups the same way when they
are in fact different violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, we think, as we implied above, that the decision in Smith
was inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. The law in Smith
penalizing ingestion of peyote in a Native American religious ceremony
should have been struck down since it directly burdened the exercise of
religion in a ceremony of worship and posed no harm to other
654. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 296 F. 928, 936–37 (D. Or. 1924), aff’d, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (discussing how the purpose of the Oregon law was to target parochial and private
schools).
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individuals. The harm to the Native Americans involved in this case
was certainly substantial and irreparable with potentially far-reaching
consequences. Although the drug laws do address a huge societal
problem—one which likely can only be addressed by government—
allowing carve-outs for a few religious rituals would not undermine the
efficacy of those laws.655 A narrow exemption for a legitimate religious
practice should have been feasible. In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme
Court appeared to partially pare back Smith, by creating a significant,
yet ambiguous exception to Smith’s general rule.656 In future cases, the
Supreme Court should invoke the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on
discrimination on the basis of religion as Justice Scalia would have done
in his dissent in Locke v. Davey.657 This would allow the Court to avoid
the Smith rule entirely without directly overruling a landmark precedent
that it has relied upon for over twenty years.
B. Establishment Clause
1. Originalism and the Establishment Clause
As an original matter, the Establishment Clause created only the
most minimal limits on government.658 Prior to the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Establishment Clause only applied to the federal
government and not to the states. At the federal level, the Clause
substantively guaranteed disestablishment.659 But beyond that, the
Clause served simply as a structural tool of federalism, permitting the
states to choose whether to have religious establishments or not and
barring the federal government from having any say over this matter.660
655. But see Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39–41 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing
that allowing an exemption to federal drug laws for medicinal users of marijuana would
undermine a national scheme to fight drug abuse).
656. Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
821, 834 (2012).
657. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
658. See Michael W. McConnell, Believers as Equal Citizens, in OBLIGATIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES
90, 100, 104 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000) [hereinafter “McConnell, Believers as Equal
Citizens”] (describing how the Establishment Clause set up a pluralist state as opposed to a
secular state).
659. See HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 106 n.40.
660. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 32–41
(1998); Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 NW. U. L.
REV. 1113, 1132–35 (1988); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause:
The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1089–99 (1995); William K.
Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of
Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1201 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Establishment
and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2105, 2109 (2003) [hereinafter “McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment”];
Paulsen, supra note 14, at 317; William C. Porth & Robert P. George, Trimming the Ivy: A
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Whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Establishment
Clause to apply against the states has been the subject of debate among
originalists, with some arguing against incorporation661 and some
arguing in favor of it.662 The evidence seems to us to more likely favor
the incorporation argument. By 1868, twenty-seven out of thirty-seven
state constitutions had some form of an establishment clause.663 This
suggests that freedom from an established state church is a right that
was deeply rooted in American history and tradition in 1868 when the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.
The Establishment Clause prohibits laws that “substantively
institute, authorize, or otherwise establish religion,” as Professor
Douglas Laycock has written.664 The Clause does not set up a wall of
separation between church and state.665 As Professor Michael Paulsen
has argued, the Establishment Clause should be interpreted using an
equal protection approach.666 In 1786, Samuel Johnson defined the word
“establishment” as mainly having financial connotations, as in a
“[s]ettlement[,] fixed rate” or an “[a]llowance[,] income[,] salary.”667
Samuel Johnson also defined “establishment” as being a
“[f]oundation[,] fundamental principle” or a “[c]onfirmation of
something.” 668 Samuel Johnson defined the verb form “to establish,” as
meaning “[t]o settle firmly[,] fix unalterably,” “[t]o make [f]irm[,] to
Bicentennial Re-Examination of the Establishment Clause, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 109, 136–39
(1987); Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954
WASH. U. L. Q. 371, 406–07. Even Laurence Tribe concedes that the primary purpose of the
Clause was “to protect state religious establishments from national displacement.” LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 1161 (2d ed. 1988). James Madison tried to
create a national establishment clause that would restrict the states as well, but the effort was
ultimately rejected. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 366, at 758–59.
661. See, e.g., Lietzau, supra note 660, at 1210 (“While many specific Bill of Rights
incorporations have been criticized, none are so thoroughly contradicted by the historically
discernible intentions of our forefathers than that of the establishment clause.”); Paulsen, supra
note 14, at 314 (“The Supreme Court’s reading of the religion clauses is completely
indefensible—historically, textually, and practically.”); see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639, 678–79 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). The basic argument is that the Establishment
Clause was designed primarily (or perhaps solely) to delineate federal power, barring Congress
from interfering with states’ establishments. See Lietzau, supra note 660, at 1199. It is therefore
incoherent to expand a principle of federalist structure to the states. See id. at 1207–08.
662. Phillip Hamburger argues that the Establishment Clause had a substantive element and
was incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment. See Philip Hamburger, Separation and
Interpretation, 18 J.L. & POL. 7, 58 n.84 (2002); HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 106 n.40.
663. See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 39, at 31–32.
664. Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 373,
376–78 (1992).
665. See HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 481–83.
666. Paulsen, supra note 14, at 315.
667. See SAMUEL JOHNSON’S 1786, supra note 581.
668. Id.
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ratify,” “[t]o fix or settle in an opinion,” “[t]o found[,] to build firmly[,]
fix immoveably.”669 Johnson’s definitions thus would seem to support
Laycock’s assertion that an establishment was a substantial undertaking.
Samuel Johnson also defines the verb “establish” as “[t]o settle in any
privilege or possession.” 670 This definition suggests that the Framers
may have included the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment to
prevent Congress from forming a national monopoly religion by
granting a special privilege to one religion but not to others. Read this
way, the Establishment Clause represents a ban on a certain form of
particularly obnoxious class legislation.
Professor McConnell argues that six categories of laws fall within
the original Eighteenth Century understanding of what constitutes an
establishment of religion. These six categories include laws that:
“(1) control . . . doctrine, governance, and personnel of the church;
(2) [make] compulsory church attendance; (3) [give a religion] financial
support; (4) prohibit[] . . . worship in dissenting churches; (5) [govern
the] use of church institutions for public functions; and
(6) restrict[] . . . political participation to members of the established
church.”671 McConnell’s bright line categories effectively ask whether a
particular law actively establishes religion.672 McConnell avoids such
669. Id.
670. Id.
671. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment, supra note 660, at 2131.
672. The modern Supreme Court’s tests for evaluating Establishment Clause cases are
generally inconsistent with the Clause’s original meaning. For instance, the Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971), established a three part test to evaluate facially
neutral laws: 1) “the statute must have a secular legislative purpose”; 2) the statute’s “principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion”; and 3) “the statute
must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”). These factors really
have nothing to do with establishing a religion as was understood at the time of the founding. In
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), the Supreme Court appeared to modify the Lemon test.
There, the Court said that in evaluating aid to religion, courts should ask whether the
government had a permissible non-sectarian purpose and whether the law had a non-religious
primary effect. See id. at 232–33. To determine whether an effect was permissible or nonpermissible, a court should evaluate three factors: (1) whether the aid supported religious
“indoctrination”; (2) whether recipients of the aid were defined by a reference to religion; and
(3) whether the aid program caused an excessive entanglement with religion. Id. at 234. Again,
these factors are almost entirely irrelevant as an original matter. Unsurprisingly, using these
factors has led to decisions that diminish religious liberty, instead of promoting it. For instance,
in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985), the Court struck down a law
requiring employers to allow their employees to take off work on the Sabbath. Id. at 710–11.
The Court explained that the law had the primary effect of advancing religion because it
increased costs for employers and co-workers to accommodate the employee’s religious
practice. Id. at 709–10. The repression of religious liberty in Thornton cannot be
underemphasized. See also Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687
(1994) (striking down a law creating a separate school district for a group of Chassidic Jews
who were unable to benefit from the secular public school system).
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nebulous concepts as whether a law “advances religion,” whether it has
a “secular legislative purpose,” whether it “endorses religion,” whether
it leads to “entanglement,” or whether it respects the “separation of
church and state.”
The Establishment Clause on its face seems only to bar actions taken
by Congress, and not actions taken by the executive or the judicial
branches of government.673 This point flows from the constitutional text
which states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.”674 But actions taken by the President alone or
by other executive branch or judicial officials do not violate the
Clause.675 The point is that making an establishment of religion is a
major undertaking that can only be accomplished with the participation
of multiple branches of government, as is required for Congress to make
a law. Accordingly, the President’s declaration of a day of prayer and
Thanksgiving, his appointment of military chaplains, or the placement
of religious symbols in the Oval Office or on the walls of the Supreme
Court building plainly do not violate the text of the Establishment
Clause.676 The text also seems to permit placing religious symbols
anywhere on government buildings or in parks, even in courtrooms, as
well as using the phrase “In God We Trust” as our national motto.677
2. Establishment Clause Questions After the Fourteenth Amendment
Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager argue that Establishment
Clause cases should be viewed from what they consider to be an
equality perspective.678 They believe that the Establishment Clause’s
673. See Hamburger, supra note 594, at 52.
674. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
675. See Hamburger, supra note 594, at 52.
676. Id.
677. The Clause’s emphasis on congressional actions also answers complaints that the
participation of clergy members and churches in politics is an establishment of religion. The
language solely restricts Congress from passing a law and in no way burdens religious
individuals or organizations from involving themselves in politics. See Hamburger, supra note
594, at 52–53. This is sensible because the purpose of the clause was to protect individual
religious freedom. See HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 101. Barring religious individuals or
organizations from politics also should violate the No Religious Test Clause. See U.S. CONST.
art. VI.
678. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 456 (1994) (stating that the equal
regard” principle “requires that government treat the deep, religiously inspired concerns of
minority religious believers with the same regard as that enjoyed by the deep concerns of
citizens generally. This principle takes stark inequalities of treatment as a sufficient ground for
constitutional solicitude, and it applies to inequalities that burden non-believers as well as to
those that target religion.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gellman & LooperFriedman, supra note 16 (arguing that religious displays violate the Equal Protection Clause
because they make non-believers feel marginalized).
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equality principle requires a hermetically strict separation of church and
state. Essentially, they think that almost any partiality that the
government might show towards religion violates an equality
principle.679 They thus conclude that religious exemptions, displays of
religious symbols,680 and most voucher programs for school children are
unconstitutional.681
A wooden, textual reading of the Fourteenth Amendment analysis
could in theory lead to a strict wall of separation between church and
state, particularly if one starts from the assumption that religion plays
and should play no role in people’s lives. If the Fourteenth Amendment
bans class legislation, one could thus argue that the government should
not be able to provide religion with special benefits not offered to the
general population. A religious display during the holiday season could
thus be construed a special privilege, allowing a particular religion to
advertise itself or convey a message. And religious exemptions in
general could be argued to be classic examples of special class laws that
carve out a unique benefit for a single class of individuals and hold the
rest of the population to a different standard. It is for this reason in City
of Boerne v. Flores682 that Justice Stevens concluded that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act was an unconstitutional establishment of
religion over irreligion.683
The proper response to Justice Stevens and Professors Sager and
Eisgruber requires that we recall that a critical feature of lawsuits
challenging partial or special laws during the Antebellum Jacksonian
period was that plaintiffs could only bring law suits when they had
679. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 678, at 452–53.
680. See id. at 457.
681. Even though Eisgruber and Sager do say that there are some circumstances in which
students could constitutionally receive vouchers to attend private religious schools, those
circumstances are very difficult to come by. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 16, at 204–17.
For instance, Eisgruber and Sager think that the voucher program in Zelman was
unconstitutional because the secular public schools were inferior to the private religious schools.
Id. at 214–15. Because urban public schools often, perhaps even always, are inferior to private
schools, vouchers for religious schools would almost always be unconstitutional under their
approach. And they think that it would be unconstitutional for a small town with a large
Christian population to provide vouchers for religious education because minority religions
would not have enough members to populate and support their own schools. Id. 207–08.
Because small towns throughout the United States often have large populations of Christians
and small populations of minority religions, Eisgruber and Sager effectively believe vouchers
are unconstitutional in many, perhaps even most small towns. With both large cities and small
towns unfit for vouchers, Eisgruber and Sager do not leave much hope for vouchers in the
United States. So their endorsement of vouchers is more theoretical than real. And because their
default educational system is public secular education without any funding of religious
education, the effect of their “equal regard” approach is discrimination against religion.
682. 521 U.S. 507.
683. Id. at 536 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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suffered actual economic damages from a law.684 Litigation challenging
special or partial class based laws was not initiated by average citizens
under a theory that those laws caused emotional distress. Instead the
plaintiffs who challenged class legislation during the Jacksonian era
were always attempting to recover a tangible economic loss that had
resulted from the law they were challenging.685 For this reason, there
really was no difference between special laws, which convey a unique
privilege, and special laws, which impose a unique burden, because
both types of laws are economically burdensome. Thus, a standing
requirement that a litigant have suffered actual and concrete legal injury
was essentially built into all the pre-1868 class legislation cases. No one
could have challenged as class legislation a law that caused them to
suffer emotional distress unless they had also suffered real and actual
economic damages.
There is no reason whatsoever to think that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ban on class legislation overrode this standing
requirement for challenges to class-based laws, and there is no historical
evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment created a cause of action for
unharmed citizens. In an Establishment Clause context, to the extent
that a law creates a unique privilege or burden and causes actual
economic damage, it constitutes class legislation, just as it would in any
other context.686 But absent actual economic damages, a law is simply
not class legislation in the sense in which that term would have been
understood in 1868. Therefore the Supreme Court’s recent move toward
tightening up the standing requirements in Establishment Clause cases
is completely consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class
legislation.687
684. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 299 n.243 (noting that “none of the antebellum cases
contain any suggestion that discriminatory intent, standing alone—that is, without
discriminatory effect—would raise constitutional concerns”).
685. See, e.g., Reed v. Wright, 2 Greene 15, 27–28 (Iowa 1849) (challenging a law singling
out half-breed Indians for special disadvantage as land owners and attempting to recover
property); Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326, 332 (1825) (challenging a law granting certain persons a
special right to appeal financial obligations between adverse parties); Budd v. State, 22 Tenn.
(3 Hum.) 483, 483, 486 (1842) (challenging a special criminal law applicable only to employees
of a certain bank); Jones’ Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 59 (1836) (challenging a law
granting a guardian of certain minors a special right to sell their property); Officer v. Young, 13
Tenn. (5 Yer.) 320 (1833) (challenging a law granting a certain person a special right to
prosecute an appeal in the name of a deceased person); Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121 (Vt. 1825)
(challenging a law granting a debtor a special right to release from debtor’s jail without paying
back his debt); Saunders, supra note 17, at 252 n.28.
686. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 (2011)
(“[P]laintiffs may demonstrate standing based on . . . direct harm . . . [or they] may demonstrate
standing on the ground that they have incurred a cost or been denied a benefit on account of
their religion.”).
687. Id. (restricting the application of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)); Hein v.
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Sager and Eisgruber’s belief that some abstract notion of equality
requires courts to strike down almost any relationship between
government and religion is wrong for multiple reasons. As we just
explained, their argument has no basis in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ban on class legislation, which contained a standing requirement and
never recognized the causes of action that Sager and Eisgruber endorse.
Religious displays, President Obama’s annual Easter prayer breakfast,
and the Supreme Court’s recent Christmas Party simply do not
constitute class legislation because no one is legally injured by any of
those government actions. Second, Sager and Eisgruber’s argument is
irreconcilable with the original meaning of the Establishment Clause
which required an actual establishment of religion, as Professors
Laycock and McConnell have explained.688 Mere whiffs of religion are
not to be mistaken for an establishment like the one that existed in
England from 1607 to 1791.689 The idea that a religious display
constitutes an establishment of religion because some peoples’
consciences are offended by it is frankly laughable. Many people’s
consciences are offended by the teaching of Darwin in public and
private schools.690 That does not mean that they have suffered a legal
injury entitling them to sue.
And third, using the Fourteenth Amendment or First Amendment as
a sword, rather than a shield, to lash out at religion is bizarre given that
those amendments were designed in part to guard and promote religious
liberty.691 It would be repressive and not freedom-enhancing for a court
to strike down religious exemptions designed to protect religious
adherents damaged by a generally applicable law. For that reason, it
would be repressive and not freedom-enhancing to refuse to grant
vouchers to religious children who want to attend private religious
schools or to refuse to provide vouchers for religious schools, even
though vouchers are provided for private secular schools. Such refusals
do not represent equality. They represent discrimination. And banning
religious displays that people want and enjoy when those displays do
not economically damage anyone is a restriction on religious freedom,
not a promotion of it. Sager and Eisgruber’s “equal regard” principle is
simply not consistent with either the original meaning of either the
Fourteenth or the First Amendment, and it violates basic principles of
Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (refusing to apply Flast); Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
688. See Laycock, supra note 664, at 376; McConnell, Establishment and
Disestablishment, supra note 660, at 2109.
689. See supra Part II.D.1.
690. See David J. Hacker, Warning! Evolution Lies Within: Preserving Academic Freedom
in the Classroom with Secular Evolution Disclaimers, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 333, 345–46
(2004).
691. See McConnell, Believers as Equal Citizens, supra note 658, at 104–05.
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liberty and equality. In reality Sager and Eisgruber are promoting a
secular state that is more in line with the traditions of France than it is in
line with those of the United States.692
3. Voucher Programs do not Violate the Establishment Clause
Government programs that provide tuition vouchers for students
attending the private school of their choice, including private religious
schools, do not violate the Establishment Clause or the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,693 the Supreme Court held
that such vouchers do not violate the Establishment Clause.694 Voucher
programs for the use of private schools do not constitute class
legislation because they are general welfare benefits available to all
residents, and they do not single out a class of people for unique
benefits or burdens.695 Because students can use their education
vouchers equally at both religious and at secular schools, voucher
programs are really no different from general welfare payments which
recipients can spend either on secular or religious goods and services.
Suits challenging voucher programs should probably even be dismissed
for lack of standing,696 as the Supreme Court held in Arizona Christian
School Tuition Organization v. Winn.697
School vouchers do not offend any of Professor McConnell’s six
categories of laws prohibited by the Establishment Clause.698 Perhaps
one could argue that vouchers provide financial support for religious
institutions. But the kinds of financial support that are barred by the
Establishment Clause are those instances where the government directly
funds religion by paying the salary of clergy or providing for the upkeep
of churches or synagogues.699 In contrast, vouchers for education give
every student and parent the right to choose whether to use government
money at a private school, be it secular or religious, instead of having to
attend a secular public school.700 It would truly be a distortion of the
Constitution to use the Establishment Clause, which guaranteed
religious liberty, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which guaranteed
individual liberty, to strike down a program that actually enhances
692. See LA CONSTITUTION 1958 CONST. art. 2 (Fr.) (“France is a Republic, indivisible,
secular, democratic and social.”).
693. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
694. Id. at 662–63.
695. Id. at 649.
696. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (denying
relief for a general citizens suit).
697. 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
698. See supra p. 119.
699. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va, 515 U.S. 819, 868 (1995)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
700. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss4/1

124

Calabresi and Salander: Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why the Constitution Re

2013]

RELIGION AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

1033

individual educational choice.
The history of the Blaine Amendment also indicates that vouchers do
not violate the Establishment Clause. In 1875, James G. Blaine, who
was at that point a Congressman from Maine, proposed an amendment
to the federal Constitution banning state governments from funding
religious schools and institutions.701 Although the Senate did not ratify
the Blaine Amendment, thirty eight states and the District of Columbia
eventually passed similar provisions over a period of time that stretched
from 1848 to 1959.702 The fact that Congress and the States felt the need
to pass the Blaine Amendment in 1875 to stop government money from
going to religious schools and institutions itself shows that members of
Congress in 1875 did not think that the Establishment Clause alone
barred government funding of religious schools and institutions. If the
Establishment Clause had already banned public funds from reaching
religious institutions, then the Blaine Amendment would have been
unnecessary. There is little historical evidence that members of
Congress objected to the Blaine Amendment on the grounds that the
Establishment Clause already did what the Blaine Amendment was
supposed to do.703 Rather, the history supports the Supreme Court’s
holding in Zelman.
One counterargument is that in 1875 many members of Congress
may not have believed that the Bill of Rights and, therefore, the
Establishment Clause applied to the states. Accordingly, they may have
simply wanted to restrict the states in the same way that the federal
government was restricted. This explanation seems sensible in the wake
of the Slaughter-House Cases, in which the Supreme Court implicitly
ruled that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.704 It is also
supported by statements made by members of Congress during the

701. See Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra note 423, at 49–50 (citing Constitutional
Guarantees of Religious Liberty, THE INDEX, Dec. 2, 1875, at 570). Blaine’s proposal provided
that:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any
State for the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund
therefor, [sic] nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the
control of any religious sect; nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted
be divided between religious sects or denominations.
Id. at 50.
702. See Duncan, supra note 3, at 513–15 & n.95; D.C. CODE § 44-715 (2012). There are
currently thirty seven Blaine Amendments because Louisiana repealed its provision in 1974.
Duncan, supra note 3, at 514 n.95.
703. See Green, supra note 423, at 38–39.
704. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 82 (1873).
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Blaine Amendment debate in 1875 and 1876.705 But it is contradicted by
the fact that Congress felt the need to add a Blaine-style provision to the
D.C. Code, banning government funds to religious organizations in the
District of Columbia and restricting U.S. Government expenditures in
general.706 That provision would have been unnecessary if the
Establishment Clause already barred public funds from reaching
religious schools and organizations. And the discussion about
incorporation was limited during the congressional debate, and there is
little evidence that more than a handful of congressional members were
concerned with the issue of incorporation.707 Rather, the focus of the
debate was on the substantive merits of the Blaine Amendment.708
V. THE BLAINE AMENDMENTS
Blaine Amendments play a significant role in the story of religion
and the Fourteenth Amendment. We think that the various Blaine
Amendments in thirty-seven states and in the District of Columbia
violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class legislation because
they facially discriminate against religion, and they are not general laws
that promote the good of the whole people. These Amendments, which
were passed at the end of the Nineteenth and the beginning of the
Twentieth Centuries, were motivated by anti-Catholic bigotry and to a
lesser extent by hatred of other minority religions. That ugly history has
been to some extent forgotten in the modern secular era, where Blaine
Amendments are currently viewed as being general anti-religion
clauses, and not as being clauses that target Catholics or another
specific group. Blaine Amendments are a reminder of how insidious a
neutral, generally applicable law that purports to only burden religion in
general can be. Blaine Amendments have also received some cover in
the modern era from the Court’s Free Exercise Clause case law because
they do not on their face target a specific religion, such as Catholicism,
and instead discriminate against all religions equally. We think that
under a Fourteenth Amendment anti-discrimination analysis, Blaine
Amendments should surely be struck down. Laws that barred
government funds from going to organizations or schools run by racial
minorities—say, historically black colleges—would surely violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. We find it impossible to see why blocking
government funds from going to religious schools and organizations
should be any different. Blaine Amendments discriminate on the basis
of religion in distributing government money, and they should thus be
subjected to strict scrutiny and struck down.
705.
706.
707.
708.

See Green, supra note 423, at 62.
See D.C. CODE § 44-715 (2012) (effective June 11, 1896).
Green, supra note 423, at 63–64.
Id.
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The passage of the various Blaine Amendments in the nineteenth
century, both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified
in 1868, does make one wonder whether the original public meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-discrimination command really did
ban discrimination on the basis of religion. This question may be of
interest to those who are original intent theorists, but it is irrelevant to
those who believe in the original public meaning of the constitutional
text. The objective original public meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment as it was adopted in 1868 banned all forms of class
legislation including class legislation targeted at religion. The fact that
some framers or other politicians subjectively believed or expected that
religion would not be included in this ban is quite simply irrelevant to
determining the objective public meaning of the constitutional text.
Thus the nineteenth century practice of discriminating on the basis of
religion, just like the nineteenth century practice of discriminating on
the basis of race, became unconstitutional on the day the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified. Practice is an imperfect guide in discerning
the original public meaning of constitutional texts.
A. The History of the Blaine Amendments
As we mentioned above, there are currently thirty-seven states with
so-called “Blaine Amendments” in their state constitutions that prohibit
government funds from reaching religious organizations such as
schools.709 The District of Columbia has a comparable provision in the
D.C. Code.710 These Blaine Amendments come in varying forms and
state courts have used them to strike down many different kinds of
government funding schemes.711 A typical provision reads:
[N]o public money or property shall ever be appropriated,
applied, donated, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or
system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or
dignitary, or sectarian institution as such.712
The bigoted and shameful history of Blaine Amendments has been welldocumented713 and is worth briefly recounting.
709. Duncan, supra note 3, at 523.
710. D.C. CODE § 44-715 (2012).
711. See Frank R. Kemerer, State Constitutions and School Vouchers, 120 EDUC. L. REP. 1
(1997) (discussing the various State Blaine Amendments and categorizing them according to
levels of restrictiveness); Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA.
L. REV. 117, 128–31 (2000) (discussing different state court decisions).
712. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 5 (1907).
713. See Green, supra note 423, at 41–42.
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Conflict over funding religion began with the advent of the public
schools in the 1830s and 1840s and continued through the nineteenth
century. Public schools during this time characteristically taught the
Bible from a Protestant perspective and imbued Protestant values in
children.714 At the same time, large numbers of Catholics, and to a
lesser extent Jews, began immigrating to the United States.715 The
public education of children in an increasingly pluralistic religious
environment led to conflicts among religious factions with deeply held
religious values. The Protestant majority set up a public school
curriculum designed to convey Protestant values, and many dissenting
Catholics and Jews understandably resisted.716 But Protestant educators
went a step farther and used public schools as a forum for denigrating
Catholics and excluding non-majoritarian religious views.717 In an
attempt to level the playing field, Catholics began requesting private
school funding in such major cities as New York, Philadelphia, Boston,
and Baltimore.718
Protestants responded to these requests for government funding of
parochial schools with a strong legislative backlash designed to prevent
Catholics from ever controlling public schools or from ever receiving
714. Id.
715. At the time of the Revolution, Catholics comprised only 1% of the population, but
grew to 3.3% by 1840, 10% by 1866, and 12.9% by 1891. Duncan, supra note 3, at 504. The
Jewish population followed a similar trend, growing from 2500 in 1800 to 15,000 in 1840 to
125,000–200,000 in 1860 and approximately 1 million in 1900. From Haven to Home: Timeline
1492–1695, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/haventohome/timeline/haventimeline_0.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2012). From 1845 to 1850 alone, one million Irish
immigrants came to this country. See Meir Katz, The State of Blaine: A Closer Look at the
Blaine Amendments and Their Modern Application, 12 J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 111
(June 2011), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20110608_Engage12.1(June2011).pdf.
716. See Steven K. Green, The Insignificance of the Blaine Amendment, 2008 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 295 (2008).
717. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 220 (noting how public schools in New York
City “required children to read the King James Bible and to use textbooks in which Catholics
were condemned as deceitful, bigoted, and intolerant”); id. at 223 n.83 (citing the report of a
special school committee that New York City public schools that “the books used in the public
schools contain passages that are calculated to prejudice the minds of children against the
Catholic faith”); see also John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the
Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 300 (2001) (discussing the controversial practice
of reading the Bible without interpretation); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School Choice,
the First Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657, 666
(1998) (observing that, while “[t]he American common school was founded on the pretense that
religion has no legitimate place in public education . . . in reality it was a particular kind of
religion that its proponents sought to isolate from public support”).
718. See DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 3–76 (1974); Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and
Educational Opportunity Under Constitutional Federalism, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 113, 145–
46 (1996).
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any public funds. In 1842, the New York State legislature passed a law
that banned government money from ever going to any schools where
“any religious sectarian doctrine or tenet shall be taught, inculcated, or
practiced.”719 In 1848, Wisconsin became the first state to amend its
State constitution to impose a similar prohibition on government money
ever going to a religious school.720 By 1875, another thirteen states had
followed Wisconsin’s lead by adopting similar Blaine Amendments to
their State constitutions.721 Although on their face these prohibitions
appeared to neutrally prohibit all government funding of religious
schools, protestant religious practice in the public schools was so
common during this time period that it was clear that these states were
not endorsing secularism in any way.722 Several State constitutions
adopted during this period expressly used the word “sectarian,” which,
in the nineteenth century, was taken to be a code word for “Catholic.”723
At the national level, politicians jumped on the anti-Catholic
bandwagon. The “Know-Nothings,” later known as the American Party,
were dedicated to “remov[ing] all foreigners, aliens, or Roman
Catholics from office” and opposed appointing Catholics to positions of
power.724 The Know-Nothings and the American Party had enormous
success in local and national elections.725
Opposition to funding private religious schools was based primarily
on a fear and hatred of Catholics and immigrants. Protestant fear of
Catholics was partly motivated by the belief that Catholic doctrines
were contrary to American principles of freedom, individuality, and
perhaps democracy. For instance, the Catholic Church’s traditionally
authoritarian structure, close connection between church and state, and
tight regulation of individual rights and conduct was perceived as
somewhat un-American.726 Opposition to funding religious schools was
719. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 717, at 301; Joseph Viteritti cites the New York law
as 1844 N.Y. LAWS ch. 320, § 12. See Viteritti, supra note 718, at 146 n.176.
720. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18 (adopted 1848) (“[N]or shall any money be drawn from the
treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries”).
721. ALA. CONST. art. XIII, § 8 (adopted 1875); ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (adopted 1870);
IND. CONST. art I, § 6 (adopted 1851); KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 6; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 8
(adopted 1859); MASS. CONST. of 1855, art. XVIII (amended 1917); MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 40
(adopted 1850); MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 2. (adopted 1857); MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 9
(adopted 1869); MO. CONST. art. XI, § 11 (adopted 1875); NEB. CONST. art. VIII, § 11 (adopted
1875); OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (added 1851); OR. CONST. art. I, § 5 (adopted 1857); PA. CONST.
art. III, § 18 (adopted 1874).
722. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 717, at 299.
723. See Green, supra note 423, at 43, 47–48.
724. See Katz, supra note 715, at 112, 118 n.15 (describing how the American Party used
oaths to test Catholics’ loyalty and put Catholics in precarious situations); Michael F. Holt, The
Politics of Impatience: The Origins of Know Nothingism, 60 J. AM. HIST. 309, 311 (1973).
725. Katz, supra note 715, at 112.
726. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 229–34 (discussing the church’s
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also motivated by a nativist skepticism of all immigrants, particularly
Irish Catholics.727 Yet this seemingly secular nativism ultimately
blended into religious prejudice.728Anti-Catholic newspapers
circulated,729 there were numerous incidents of mob violence against
Catholics, and Catholic churches were burned down.730 Public schools
were a means of assimilating Catholics, Jews, and other immigrants into
the Protestant mold.731
In the 1860s and 1870s there was also a wave of radical secularism
that was committed to “the absolute separation of church and state.”732
The goal of these secular humanists was to terminate “all public
appropriations for sectarian educational and charitable institutions” and
that “no privilege or advantage shall be conceded to Christianity or any
other special religion” at both the federal and state level.733 Secularists
also demanded that “our entire political system shall be founded and
administered on a purely secular basis.”734 For these secularists, the
Blaine Amendment was insufficient because it did not effectively wipe
out religion from the public sphere. Secularists “viewed all Christians
with the same fear and horror [that] Protestants reserved for
Catholics.”735 Most shockingly, they even believed that “government
benefits distributed on purely secular grounds could not be given to
religious organizations.”736
condemnation of separation of church and state and reaction by American Protestants); STEPHEN
MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 61
(2000) (noting that America’s “core principles of individual freedom and democratic equality”
seemed to conflict with the Catholic Church’s “authoritarian institutional structure, its longstanding association with feudal or monarchical governments, its insistence on close ties
between church and state, its endorsement of censorship, and its rejection of individual rights to
freedom of conscience and worship”); Jay S. Bybee & David W. Newton, Of Orphans and
Vouchers: Nevada’s “Little Blaine Amendment” and the Future of Religious Participation in
Public Programs, 2 NEV. L.J. 551, 555 (2002) (noting that “[t]he Vatican Decree of Papal
Infallibility of 1870 added to the anti-Catholic sentiment during this time”); Jeffries & Ryan,
supra note 717, at 302–03 (describing the church’s opposition to secular education and freedom
of conscience and noting that “Rome hampered attempts by American Catholics to abandon the
Church’s legacy by issuing reactionary pronouncements ideally suited to confirm the rankest
prejudice”).
727. See HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 202; Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and
Modern Church-State Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 121, 130 (2001) (discussing the “long
history” of American anti-Catholicism).
728. See HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 202; Berg, supra note 727, at 130.
729. Viteritti, supra note 717, at 667.
730. HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 216–17.
731. Viteritti, supra note 717, at 668.
732. HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 290 & nn.7–8, 292–93.
733. Id. at 294 n.22.
734. Id. at 294.
735. Id. at 302.
736. Id. at 305.
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In 1875, the Blaine Amendment gained fervent momentum at the
national level. President Ulysses S. Grant delivered an influential
speech in which he said that Congress should “[e]ncourage free schools,
and resolve that not one dollar, appropriated for their support, shall be
appropriated to the support of any sectarian schools.”737 Lest anyone
think that Grant was endorsing secularism, Grant added that children
should receive a “good common school education, unmixed with
sectarian, pagan, or atheistical dogmas.”738 Grant’s speech was a clear
attack on Catholics in an effort to align himself with Protestants as he
sought a third term for President.739 On December 7, 1875, speaking
before
Congress,
Grant
called
for
“a
constitutional
amendment . . . prohibiting the granting of any school funds, or school
taxes, or any part thereof . . . for the benefit or in aid, directly or
indirectly, of any religious sect or denomination.”740 James Blaine
followed Grant’s lead, and Blaine proposed his amendment to the
federal Constitution on December 14, 1875.741 Blaine’s proposal was
met with overwhelming support because it was seen “as a means of
curbing the Catholic influence on school boards.”742 The national Blaine
Amendment failed to clear the Senate, but states continued to amend
their state constitutions with their own Blaine Amendments well into
the Twentieth Century.
B. The Supreme Court and the Blaine Amendments
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the constitutionality
of the thirty-seven Blaine Amendments in various State constitutions.743
737. Green, supra note 423, at 47.
738. Id.
739. Id. at 48–49; Viteritti, supra note 717, at 670.
740. Green, supra note 423, at 52.
741. Id. at 50 (“No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State, for the
support of public schools or derived from any public fund therefor, shall ever be under the
control of any religious sect, nor shall any money so raised be divided between religious sects or
denominations.”) (citing JAMES P. BOYD, LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF HON. JAMES G. BLAINE:
THE ILLUSTRIOUS AMERICAN ORATOR, DIPLOMAT, AND STATESMAN 351–53 (1893)).
742. Id. at 53 (citing ZION’S HERALD, Dec. 16, 1875, at 4; The Blaine Amendment, Dec. 23,
1875, at 4).
743. Various articles have argued that Blaine Amendments are unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins,
Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 617–25 (2003)
(arguing that Blaine Amendments violate freedom of speech); Duncan, supra note 3 (arguing
that Blaine Amendments violate the Free Exercise Clause); Heytens, supra note 711, at 140–52
(arguing that Blaine Amendments violate equal protection); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,
Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles,
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 962 n.204, 975 (2003) (indicating that some Blaine Amendments
could violate free speech principles); Rebecca G. Rees, Note, “If We Recant, Would We
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The closest the Court came to passing on this question was in Locke v.
Davey744 where the Court considered the State of Washington’s policy
of not giving scholarship money to individuals seeking a religious
education, even though it provided scholarships to individuals seeking a
secular education. The plaintiff in Davey had his scholarship revoked
once he took up religious study at a religious school but would have
been able to maintain his scholarship if he had studied religion from a
secular perspective.745 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion held
that the states have “room for play in the joints” of the Establishment
and the Free Exercise Clauses that allows the states in some contexts to
facially discriminate against religion.746 Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained that barring funding for religious education served the state’s
“antiestablishment interests,” even though the Court in Zelman had
declared that this kind of funding was completely permissible under the
Establishment Clause.747 Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the
state did not impose “sanctions on any type of religious service or rite”
or deny “to ministers the right to participate in the political affairs of the
community” or force “students to choose between their religious beliefs
and receiving a government benefit.”748 These actions would certainly
have violated the Free Exercise Clause under existing Supreme Court
precedent. Instead, the state had “merely chosen not to fund a distinct
category of instruction.”749 This was a sufficiently rational basis for the
law, even though choosing not to fund an activity on the basis of race or
gender would obviously violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”750
In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the facts in Locke v.
Davey warranted a direct application of the ban on facial discrimination
on the basis of religion enunciated in Church of the Lukumi Babalu.751
Justice Scalia cited Brown v. Board of Education752 and Craig v.
Boren753 and compared facial discrimination in schools on the basis of
religion to facial discrimination in schools on the basis of race and
Qualify?”: Exclusion of Religious Providers from State Social Service Voucher Programs, 56
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1291, 1315–28 (1999) (explaining how Blaine amendments improperly
restrict free speech).
744. 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004). In Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828–29 (2000)
(plurality opinion), the Court noted the “shameful pedigree” of Blaine Amendments, but did not
address their constitutionality.
745. See Davey, 540 U.S. at 716–17.
746. Id. at 718.
747. Id. at 719, 722; see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002).
748. Davey, 540 U.S. at 720–21.
749. Id. at 721.
750. Id.
751. Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
752. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
753. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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gender, although he did not explicitly invoke the anti-discrimination
command of the Fourteenth Amendment that we argue for in this
article.754 Justice Scalia noted that Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith755 only permitted facially neutral
laws that disparately impacted religious practice, not facially
discriminatory laws like the ones upheld in Locke v. Davey.756 Justice
Scalia emphatically argued that the state did not have a legitimate
governmental interest in barring government funding for religious
students when government funding for similar secular studies was
allowed.757
It is not clear, however, that the holding in Locke v. Davey should
necessarily lead to upholding Blaine Amendments. Professor Douglas
Laycock has argued that the holding in Locke v. Davey was a narrow
one and that it only applies “to training of clergy, to refusals to fund that
are not based on hostility to religion, and to cases that do not involve
forums for speech.”758 Blaine Amendments are blanket bans on
government funding of any religious school or institution, not just bans
on government funding of the clergy.759 They were also clearly
motivated by a strong anti-Catholic bigotry in the nineteenth century.760
Accordingly, the Supreme Court could, consistent with Locke v. Davey,
hold Blaine Amendments unconstitutional.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has
similarly limited the application of Locke v. Davey in an important
opinion by then-Judge Michael McConnell.761 In Colorado Christian
University v. Weaver,762 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals struck
down a state educational funding scheme that allowed government
money to go to religious schools but that barred it from going to

754. Davey, 540 U.S. at 731 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
755. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
756. Davey, 540 U.S. at 731 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
757. Id. at 734.
758. See Laycock, supra note 423, at 184.
759. See supra Part V.A.
760. See generally HAMBURGER, supra note 16 (discussing the anti-Catholic sentiment
existing at the time of the Blaine Amendments). Some scholars argue that this overt bigotry
alone should be sufficient to render Blaine Amendments unconstitutional. See, e.g., Thomas C.
Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New Constitutional Questions, 72 U. CIN. L. REV.
151, 199–208 (2003). Yet the Supreme Court has been skeptical of this argument. Davey, 540
U.S. at 723 n.7; Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828–29 (2000) (plurality opinion).
761. But other circuits have said that Davey supports the notion that the Equal Protection
Clause only provides religion with simple rational basis protection, as long as the law remains
between “the joints.” See, e.g., Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282–83 (1st Cir. 2005); St.
John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 638 (7th Cir. 2007); Bowman v.
United States, 304 Fed. App’x 371, 378, 381 (6th Cir. 2008).
762. 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008).
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“pervasively sectarian” schools.763 Writing for the majority, Judge
McConnell explained that under Locke v. Davey, “the State’s latitude to
discriminate against religion is confined to certain ‘historic and
substantial state interests.’”764 Accordingly, Davey “does not extend to
the wholesale exclusion of religious institutions and their students from
otherwise neutral and generally available government support.”765 Only
“minor burdens and milder forms of disfavor are tolerable in service of
historic and substantial state interests” while “major burdens and
categorical exclusions from public benefits” are problematic.766 Judge
McConnell’s opinion also held that discrimination on the basis of
religion is subject to “heightened scrutiny” and could violate the Equal
Protection Clause.767 Thus, the Tenth Circuit applied some sort of
intermediate scrutiny for religion in place of the usual rational basis test.
C. Blaine Amendments Constitute Class Legislation
State Blaine Amendments easily violate the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ban on class legislation. Blaine Amendments facially
discriminate on the basis of religion by explicitly carving out a special
disadvantage for religious individuals as compared to secular
individuals. Blaine Amendments fit precisely into the definition of class
legislation “which is partial in its operation, intended to affect particular
individuals alone, or to deprive them of the benefit of the general
laws.”768 The plaintiff in Davey lost his scholarship once he took up
religious study at a religious school, but he would have been able to
maintain it if he had studied religion from a secular perspective.769 This
is a blatant instance of the government discriminating on the basis of
religion. Other applications of Blaine Amendments could include:
(1) allowing vouchers for students attending secular schools, but not for
students attending religious schools; (2) allowing the funding of secular
charities, but not of religious ones; or (3) denying any other government
benefits or welfare payments to religious groups while upholding them
for secular individuals. Blaine Amendments therefore constitute blatant
discrimination on the basis of religion, and they are impermissible in the
absence of a very compelling public purpose.
Blaine Amendments lack a legitimate public purpose because the
types of funding that they outlaw are generally constitutional when the
763.
764.
765.
766.
767.
768.
law).
769.

Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1255 (citing Davey, 540 U.S. at 725).
Id.
Id. at 1255–56 (quoting Davey, 540 U.S. at 720, 725) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1266 (citations omitted).
Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260, 269 (1829) (Peck, J.) (defining a partial
See Davey, 540 U.S. at 716–17.
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money goes to a secular school or institution. The Supreme Court has
held that many forms of government funding of religious organizations
do not violate the Constitution.770 These holdings are consistent with the
original meaning of the Establishment Clause which only banned actual
establishments of religion.771 So, it seems quite difficult to claim that
the Blaine Amendments serve an “antiestablishment” purpose772 when
the Supreme Court has itself said that many of these kinds of funding
programs do not actually violate the Establishment Clause. States could
certainly have provisions in their state constitutions that parallel the
federal Establishment Clause without violating the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ban on discrimination on the basis of religion. For
example, states could ban direct funding of the clergy consistently with
the anti-discrimination command of the Fourteenth Amendment. States
could even augment the protections of the federal Establishment Clause
in some contexts, as the states commonly do with other constitutional
provisions. But states cannot augment a provision of the federal
Constitution in a way that violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on
discrimination on the basis of religion. We do not allow states to
strengthen free speech protections in a way that discriminates based on
race because doing so would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Similarly, we should not allow states to strengthen federal
Establishment Clause protections in a way that discriminates on the
basis of religion.
The simple desire not to fund religion, as a matter of conscience, is
not a legitimate public purpose that can save the Blaine Amendments if
the identical activity does get funded when done by a secular school or
institution. The argument that taxpayers, as a matter of conscience,
should not be forced to indirectly support religion by having their tax
dollars go to religious organizations is not itself a public welfare
rationale.773 The conscientious objection rationale may explain the
770. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002) (holding that a
government voucher program that benefited students attending religious schools did not violate
the Establishment Clause); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1993)
(holding that public employees may be placed in religious schools); Witters v. Washington
Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986) (holding that public funds could support
a blind person at a religious school without violating the Establishment Clause); Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000) (plurality opinion) (allowing states to loan “educational
materials and equipment” purchased with federal funds directly to religious and private
schools); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845–46 (1995)
(holding that if a state university funds student magazines, it has to fund a student religious
magazine).
771. See supra Part IV.B.
772. See Davey, 540 U.S. at 722 (explaining that not funding private religious
organizations while funding parallel private secular organizations served an important
antiestablishment interest).
773. See, e.g., AMS. UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE,
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ulterior motivations of supporters of Blaine Amendments, but it does
not provide a constitutional defense for those amendments. To justify
class legislation, a law must convey a general benefit that promotes the
good of the whole people. Examples of class laws that promote the
general good of the whole people include most of our police power laws
which are designed to protect the public’s health, safety, and economic
autonomy. Simply banning a specific class of disfavored people who are
religious from receiving government money does not promote a public
purpose. Undoubtedly, there are white supremacists who—as a matter
of conscience—object to government funds being spent for the benefit
of African-Americans. But, in our constitutional system, this is not an
acceptable public purpose that could justify class legislation on the
grounds that it was meant to benefit the general good of the whole
people. Indeed, members of religious groups could argue quite plausibly
that they conscientiously object to having their tax dollars used to fund
a secular public school system. In Lawrence v. Texas,774 the Supreme
Court struck down a Texas law banning sodomy because it lacked a
“legitimate state interest,” despite the fact that the law reflected local
morals and conscience.775 The Court stated that “[f]reedom extends
beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct.”776 If the Court can conclude that laws targeting gays and
lesbians lack a public purpose, even though homosexuality is nowhere
mentioned in the Constitution, unlike religion, then the Supreme Court
should surely be able to say that laws discriminating on the basis of
religion are not general laws enacted for the good of the whole people.
Such laws must instead be subjected to strict scrutiny.
Davey’s license to discriminate on the basis of religion in the context
of educational funding could easily be transferred to many other sorts of
government programs. Educational funding is merely one type of
general welfare program designed to benefit the public. Educational
funding is thus no different in principle from Medicare, Social Security,
or even the provision of local fire protection services.777 Under the logic
of Davey, the legislature could ban Medicare recipients from going to
religious hospitals or prevent Social Security recipients from making
donations to religious institutions. Or perhaps local communities, in
keeping with the local residents’ “freedom of conscience,” could
http://www.au.org/issues/religious-school-vouchers (last visited July 23, 2013).
774. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
775. Id. at 562–63, 578–79.
776. Id. at 562.
777. In Zelman, the Court effectively described Ohio’s voucher program as a general
welfare program, referencing the “[p]rogram benefits” to “participating families.” 536 U.S. 639,
653 (2002).
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establish fire departments that protect secular schools and organizations,
but not religious ones. The fact is that Davey is no more defensible than
are any of these other forms of government discrimination on the basis
of religion. What this shows is that Davey must be wrong.
How can the Supreme Court change course? The answer is that in
Davey, the Supreme Court was exclusively focused on the free exercise
of religion question and it failed to ask whether the state law in that case
violated the equal protection doctrine by discriminating on the basis of
religion. The majority in Davey concluded that revoking Davey’s
scholarship did not constitute a prohibition of religion within the
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.778 The parties and amici in Davey
were also primarily focused on the Free Exercise Clause question. Some
of the briefs mentioned the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but they did so only in passing.779 Neither the majority, the
dissent, or any of the briefs gave any serious consideration to the
Fourteenth Amendment anti-discrimination question. So the Fourteenth
Amendment discrimination issue was not truly before the Court in
Davey, even though it should have been. The parties never recognized
that Washington State’s law was an impermissible form of class
legislation which violated the Fourteenth Amendment, and so the Court
did not truly pass on that issue. In the future, the Supreme Court could
and should take up the Fourteenth Amendment discrimination question.
D. The Counterargument of the Blaine Amendments
One possible counterargument to our thesis is that the sordid history
of state Blaine Amendments shows that the original understanding of
the Fourteenth Amendment was such that the Amendment was not
thought to protect religious freedom at all. Since nine states had Blaine
Amendments in 1868, and another twenty-four states added Blaine
Amendments to their state constitutions by the end of the nineteenth
century,780 it could be argued both that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not incorporate the religion clauses of the First Amendment and that it
did not ban discrimination on the basis of religion. This point is further
underscored by the overt anti-Catholic and, at times, anti-religious
bigotry that accompanied these Blaine amendments.
This counterargument regarding religion actually mirrors a similar
counterargument that could be made regarding discrimination on the
basis of race and gender. In the years immediately following the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, racial segregation was
widespread in the United States, especially from 1877 to 1954. During
778. Davey, 540 U.S. at 719–21.
779. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315),
2003 WL 22137308, at *44–45.
780. See supra pp. 128-29; Duncan, supra note 3, at 514 n.95, 519–20.
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the period between 1868 and 1920 and then again from 1937 to 1971,
discrimination on the basis of gender was also widespread,
notwithstanding the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment781 in
1920. The Supreme Court’s awful decisions in Plessy v. Ferguson,782
Bradwell v. State,783 and Goesaert v. Cleary784 further justified and
entrenched these discriminatory practices. The history of virulent
discrimination against African-Americans and women following the
ratification of the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments has led some
to believe that a deviation from the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment is necessary to protect against racial or sex
discrimination.785
But these arguments are mistaken.786 The original expected
applications of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, much like
their subjective intent, are simply not relevant to ascertaining the
objective public meaning of the text of the constitutional provision that
they wrote. A fitting analogy is someone who contracts to sell his house
and at the closing refuses to hand over the keys to his garage, noting
that the contract does not specify that the garage, which he did not
intend to sell, was included in the sale of the house. The seller’s
expectations and subjective intent would be simply irrelevant in
establishing the objective meaning of the contract which would instead
be defined by local laws and customs. The Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment deliberately and knowingly used broad, unqualified
language that went far beyond a simple ban on race discrimination. The
original objective public meaning of Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to ban all forms of class legislation and all systems of
caste. When the framers wanted to excise certain groups, such as aliens,
from the broad protection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, they
crafted a text that explicitly applied only to citizens. The fact that the
text mentions neither race, nor gender, nor religion, means that a
general ban on all forms of class legislation was enacted. The fact that
some or even many framers or other politicians failed to understand
781. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
782. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (articulating the so-called “separate but equal” doctrine).
783. 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (permitting states to prevent women from obtaining license to
practice law).
784. 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (permitting states to prevent women from obtaining bartending
licenses).
785. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal
Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 161, 161 (“Boldly dynamic interpretation, departing
radically from the original understanding, is required to tie to the fourteenth amendment’s equal
protection clause a command that government treat men and women as individuals equal in
rights, responsibilities, and opportunities.”).
786. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 46–51 (discussing why expected
applications are not relevant to ascertaining the original meaning of the text).
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what the Amendment had done and thought that discrimination on
account of race or religion was still permissible is irrelevant to the
objective original public meaning of the text.787 Instead, discrimination
on the basis of race and religion became unconstitutional on the very
day that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. To say otherwise is no
better than the guy who wants to hold onto his garage.
VI. THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM
We think that our argument that Blaine Amendments violate the
Fourteenth Amendment leads to a further and perhaps startling
conclusion. We think that the current American public school system
violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on all forms of class
legislation for two basic reasons. First, we think that states discriminate
on the basis of religion when they administer secular public schools that
are unpalatable to religious individuals and that are funded with
taxpayer dollars. As already discussed, discrimination on the basis of
religion is a form of class legislation that is banned by the Fourteenth
Amendment. And many religious children constitute a caste because
their religious status is inherited from their parents and is effectively
immutable until they grow up. Indeed, some religions, including
Judaism and Islam, do not even acknowledge conversions of their
members to other faiths as being valid. Second, we also think that
public school systems violate the Fourteenth Amendment because they
are state-operated monopolies. These state-run public school
monopolies are no different in principle from the types of state-granted
monopolies that the Jacksonian Democrats fought against in the
nineteenth century and that the Fourteenth Amendment banned. To
rectify these breaches of the Fourteenth Amendment, we think that
states are constitutionally obligated to give tuition vouchers to all
students that they can use, if they wish, at the private school of their
choice.
A. Discrimination on the Basis of Religion
Public schools discriminate on the basis of religion. Even though the
education laws do not explicitly ban religious individuals from
attending public schools, religious students are effectively excluded by
the character of the public school curriculum, moral teachings in public
schools, and general atmosphere at public schools.788 Public education
787. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 388 (discussing how the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment were concerned that the Amendment could have broader implications than they
expected or intended because they recognized that the objective meaning of the text, not the
subjective intent, was controlling); Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 31 (arguing that the
Fourteenth Amendment banned anti-miscegenation laws, despite the Framers’ intent).
788. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp.
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is generally advertised as being secular, neutral, and open to all
students. Yet neutrality in education is probably impossible because
conveying values to children is an inherent aspect of education.789
Secularism and popular culture are incompatible with many religious
belief systems, and public schools are simply incapable of teaching the
religious values and doctrine that religious families often need. Indeed
public education in America is neither neutral nor welcoming to all
students, as public schools regularly promote political and social
agendas at odds with religious views.790
In modern society, it is impossible to create a “neutral” educational
environment. Religious and secular educators advance polar opposite
approaches on such controversial topics as sex education,791
homosexuality,792 abortion,793 and standards of dress and decency. For
instance, California recently enacted the California Fair Education Act
which mandates that educators, textbooks, and instructional materials
positively promote “lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender Americans”
as role models.794 Needless to say, this produced a strong backlash from
religious groups opposed to these lifestyles. Balancing religion and
science has also never been simple. The debate over creationism versus

395, 396 (D.N.H. 1974); Brusca v. Missouri, 332 F. Supp. 275, 276 (E.D. Mo. 1971)
(memorandum opinion); State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750, 755, 761 (Ohio 1976).
789. See Viteritti, supra note 718, at 181–82 (discussing how there is nothing neutral about
education); Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 131, 156–82 (1995) (discussing the difficulty of finding a set of common, neutral
educational values).
790. See Note, Government Neutrality and Separation of Church and State: Tuition Tax
Credits, 92 HARV. L. REV. 696, 700–05 (1979) [hereinafter Government Neutrality] (arguing
that the public school system violates the First Amendment’s neutrality principles); Paulsen,
supra note 14, at 358 (recognizing that the current public school system is not neutral and
constitutionally problematic).
791. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 171 (1993) (describing how the New York City
public schools distributed condoms to all students without any opportunity to opt out, even
though many parents complained that doing so violated their religious beliefs); Todd Starnes,
Sex Education in NYC Schools Becomes Mandatory, FOX NEWS (Aug. 10, 2011),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/08/10/sex-education-in-nyc-schools-becomes-mandatory
(describing a controversial new program in New York City); see also EISGRUBER & SAGER,
supra note 16, at 210 (acknowledging that “secular institutions are not neutral, in the sense of
being acceptable from the standpoint of all religions”)..
792. See, e.g., Judson Berger, ACLU Sues Missouri School System for Censoring Gay
Advocacy Websites, FOX NEWS (Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/08/16/
aclu-sues-missouri-school-system-for-censoring-gay-advocacy-websites.
793. See, e.g., Marc Ramirez, Abortion referral puts spotlight on school-based health
centers, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 25, 2010), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2011445397_
abortion26m.html.
794. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51204.5 (2012).
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evolution is long-lived and impassioned.795 Which books should be
read, or not read,796 as well as how to teach history are also regularly
debated.797 And clashes between religious and secular factions
frequently end up being litigated in court.798
The facts of Peck v. Baldwinsville Central School District799 are
instructive of the religion versus secularism controversy in public
schools.800 In Peck, a kindergartener had drawn a picture of Jesus as
part of a class assignment.801 The school district censored the picture in
furtherance of its anti-establishment interests.802 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals sided with the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, holding
that schools may not censor students in this curricular context.803 But
the First and the Tenth Circuits permit this form of censorship.804 One
would not expect a neutral public school program, palatable to all, to
produce a heated circuit split.
The overall environment of public schools is also incompatible with
many religions’ beliefs. Many religions forbid pre-marital sex and foul
language and are simply repulsed by a popular culture that endorses
these behaviors. Many religious groups are also skeptical of modern
795. See, e.g., Note, Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction in Public Schools, 87
YALE L.J. 515 (1978) (describing the conflict between creationism and evolution in public
school education); EDWARD J. LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS: THE SCOPES TRIAL AND
AMERICA’S CONTINUING DEBATE OVER SCIENCE AND RELIGION (1997) (analyzing the Scopes
trial).
796. See, e.g., Douglas Kennedy, Idaho School Shut Down Over ‘Religious Texts,’ FOX
NEWS (Sept. 15, 2011), http://nation.foxnews.com/bible/2011/09/15/idaho-school-shut-downover-religious-texts (describing controversy over using Bible to teach history).
797. See, e.g., Michael Jennings, Kentucky Asks What Year Is It?: After evolution fights
comes dispute over A.D. vs. C.E., CHRISTIANITY TODAY (May 31, 2006, 12:00 AM),
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2006/mayweb-only/122-32.0.html (describing controversy
over a school board’s proposal to substitute “C.E. (Common Era) for A.D. and B.C.E. (Before
Common Era) for B.C.”).
798. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060, 1070 (6th Cir.
1987) (upholding a school board’s decision to reject parents’ requests that their children be
accommodated with readings that did not promote ideas contradicting their religious values);
Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 2001) (disputing a “New Age”
curriculum that parents claimed was religious).
799. 426 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2005).
800. See Harry G. Hutchison, Shaming Kindergarteners? Channeling Dred Scott?
Freedom of Expression Rights in Public Schools, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 365–66 (2007)
(discussing Peck).
801. Peck, 426 F.3d at 620–22.
802. Id. at 622–23.
803. Id. at 632 n.9.
804. See, e.g., Fleming v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 926–29 (10th Cir.
2002) (permitting “educators to make viewpoint-based decisions about school-sponsored
speech”); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 450, 456 (1st Cir. 1993) (allowing a public school
committee to refuse to re-appoint a biology teacher who discussed abortion based on her opinion
in class).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

141

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 1

1050

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

materialism which seems to equate happiness with physical possessions.
And they are concerned about the way women are objectified in the
media and popular culture, and how young girls and boys are
consequently impacted. For these reasons, many religious parents are
careful about which kinds of movies, television shows, or websites they
allow their children to view. And, quite predictably, many religious
parents do not want their children in a militantly secular school where
their beliefs are trivialized or are described as being bigoted.
Many religions also require that a specific religious curriculum be
taught to students of their faith. For instance, Orthodox Jewish schools
typically spend a large portion of the day teaching religious subjects that
include the study of scripture, Jewish law, and Jewish ethics.805 Many
Christian and Muslim schools have similar programs, depending on the
needs of their respective student bodies.
Today, public schools are almost all militantly secular institutions.
This is in part the fault of the Supreme Court, which has outlawed
prayer and Bible study in public schools. Under the Supreme Court’s
Establishment Clause case law, Bible readings and prayer in public
schools are unconstitutional, even if some students are absent or can be
excused from these activities.806 A school can also face litigation if it
proscribes religious exercises,807 teaches creationism,808 distributes the
Bible in school,809 or otherwise sponsors a religious message.810 Other
potential landmines include voluntary prayer, moments of silence,
student sponsored events, sporting events, and graduation
ceremonies.811
Public schools are also largely secular because most public school
administrators believe that teaching a rigidly secular dogma is best both
for public school students and for society. This is perhaps in part a
result of the increased pluralism in American society which has created
a need to find a middle ground common to everyone.812 Public schools
have been forced by the courts to adopt a “no endorsement” policy in a

805. See Brief of the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (COLPA) as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315),
2003 WL 22087608, at *6–7, 13 (describing the central role of religious education for Jewish
students); M. HERBERT DANZGER, RETURNING TO TRADITION: THE CONTEMPORARY REVIVAL OF
ORTHODOX JUDAISM 149–51, 278 (1989) (describing how Orthodox Jews combine religious and
secular studies).
806. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224–25 (1963).
807. Florey v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 619 F.2d 1311, 1313 (8th Cir. 1980).
808. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 581 (1987).
809. Goodwin v. Cross Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 394 F. Supp. 417, 419 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
810. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000).
811. See 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 762–63.
812. Hutchison, supra note 800, at 363.
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futile attempt not to alienate anyone.813 But in practice, many religious
students are in fact alienated and marginalized.
Modern secular humanism is a core, almost religious belief system
of modern liberalism. Secular humanists distrust—and sometimes even
dislike814—religion. Modern secular humanism teaches values and
opinions that are often wholly inconsistent with religious teachings.815
Though so-called modern “liberals” pretend to favor concepts such as
“neutrality,” “tolerance,” and “independent thinking,” liberal educators
in practice often have little or no tolerance for religious views that are
incompatible with the tenants of modern liberalism.816 Excluding
religious views from the classroom is in fact important to effectively
convey liberal secular humanist ideology to public school students.817
The result is that “common schools” are unable to incorporate different
viewpoints and bring true religious diversity into the classroom.818
The use of facial neutrality as a façade for the exclusion and
intolerance of those who hold a religious belief is not a new practice for
the public school system. From the moment public schools were
founded by Horace Mann in the nineteenth century, they were infused
with majoritarian intolerance of minority religions.819 Mann advertised
his “common schools” as inclusive and open to everyone without a bias
for any particular religious denomination. 820 The curriculum was
designed to be a “pan-Protestant compromise, a vague and inclusive
Protestantism.”821 In justifying the practice of reading the Bible without
813. Id. at 377–78.
814. See Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L.
REV. 807, 826, 836–42 (1999) (arguing that vouchers disturb the balance of power between
government and religion that the Establishment Clause was designed to control); Viteritti, supra
note 718, at 180–81 (describing secularist John Dewey’s strong opposition to religion). Justice
Stevens’ dissent in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 629, 686 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) noted “religious strife” in other countries and remarked, “Whenever we remove a
brick from the wall that was designed to separate religion and government, we increase the risk
of religious strife and weaken the foundation of our democracy.” Justice Souter’s dissent
similarly referenced “sectarian religion’s capacity for discord.” Id. at 715.
815. See Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the “Pall of Religious
Orthodoxy”: Value Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 28; MARK G.
YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN
AMERICA 52–55 (1983).
816. Cf. Hutchison, supra note 800, at 382.
817. See, e.g., Jerry Buell, Florida High School Teacher, Suspended For Anti-Gay
Facebook Posts, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 19, 2011, 6:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2011/08/19/jerry-buell-florida-high-_n_931941.html (updated Oct. 19, 2011); see also
Hutchison, supra note 800, at 361 n.1 (describing controversies in San Francisco).
818. See Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the
Voices of Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y. REV. 169, 178 (1996).
819. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 717, at 299–300.
820. See id. at 299.
821. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

143

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 1

1052

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

commentary, Mann said that “[o]ur system earnestly inculcates all
Christian morals; it founds its morals on the basis of religion; it
welcomes the religion of the Bible; and in receiving the Bible, it allows
it to do what it is allowed to do in no other system, to speak for
itself.”822 Yet Mann’s schools were not at all bastions of religious
inclusiveness. Instead their curricula were based solely on Protestant
teachings and were wholly intolerant of any other form of Christianity
or of any other religion.823 While reading the Bible without commentary
might seem to be neutral on its face, such a practice was in truth
designed to shut out non-Protestant teachings and was deeply offensive
to Catholics.824 Mann said that “sectarian books and sectarian
instruction, if their encroachment were not resisted, would prove the
overthrow of the schools.”825 The word “sectarian” here was code for
Catholic. Mann’s schools reflected a national trend in public education:
states operated public schools that were allegedly “nonsectarian” but
that were in fact incredibly intolerant of non-Protestant
denominations.826 Other countries have had similar historical
experiences where majoritarian groups integrate allegedly neural values
into systems of public education that turn out to be nothing more than a
façade for the oppression of religious minorities.827 If history is any
indicator, there is nothing neutral about neutrality in the context of
public education.
Public education has long been advertised as being a government
benefit that is available to the whole population, but it is in reality a
form of class legislation because it is simply unacceptable to religious
individuals unless they have no other choice. A widely recognized
phenomenon in anti-discrimination law is to understand that a racially
hostile environment or a sexist or harassing environment is a form of
race and gender discrimination. Public schools could not and should not
be able to teach racist or sexist literature, and public school teachers
822. See ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES 267 (1950) (quoting Report to the Board of Education in 1848).
823. Viteritti, supra note 717, at 666 (“The American common school was founded on the
pretense that religion has no legitimate place in public education. But in reality it was a
particular kind of religion that its proponents sought to isolate from public support. The
common-school curriculum promoted a religious orthodoxy of its own that was centered on the
teachings of mainstream Protestantism and was intolerant of those who were non-believers.”).
824. See Duncan, supra note 3, at 504.
825. See STOKES, supra note 822, at 267 (quoting Report to the Board of Education in
1848).
826. Viteritti, supra note 717, at 666–67.
827. See, e.g., STEPHEN V. MONSMA & J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER, THE CHALLENGE OF
PLURALISM: CHURCH AND STATE IN FIVE DEMOCRACIES 55–56 (2009) (describing the experience
of the Netherlands in the Eighteenth Century); Asher Maoz, Religious Education in Israel, 83 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 679, 682–83 (2006) (describing how religious groups in Israel successfully
blocked secular attempts to define a set of common universal values).
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cannot and should not be able to make racist or sexist comments in
class. The same principle applies to discrimination on the basis of
religion in schools. It is not enough for the government to avoid
discrimination in hiring teachers or admitting students. The government
must also not create a hostile learning environment for devoutly
religious students. Teaching Orthodox Jews or fundamentalist
Christians or devout Muslims that non-marital sex is acceptable creates
a forbidden form of a religiously hostile environment. Banning prayer
and Bible study in classes does the same thing. For this reason alone, it
is obvious that the modern day secular public schools are engaged in a
systemic form of discrimination on the basis of religion.
This point can be further illustrated with an analogy. Suppose a state
decided to buy clothing for its residents. But instead of buying different
clothing for men and women, the state just bought men’s clothing and
offered it to everyone on equal terms. Undoubtedly the program would
be unconstitutional because men’s clothing is fundamentally unfit for
women. Similarly, our militantly secular public schools are
fundamentally unfit for religious students. They offer a learning
environment that is hostile to religion and therefore discriminates on
account of religion.
Consider another hypothetical. Suppose that the government decided
to shut down the entire public school system and instead gave all
students tuition vouchers, which they could use to attend the private
school of their choice. Suppose further that the government stipulated
that those education vouchers could only be used at secular schools, and
not at religious ones. Such a selective funding program would clearly
constitute facial discrimination on the basis of religion.828 Our current
public school system is simply the publically operated version of that
secular voucher program. Instead of funding only secular private
schools, the government funds only secular public schools. Why should
a program that funds only secular public schools be considered any less
discriminatory than a program that funds only secular private schools?
The discriminatory impact of the secular public school system is
compounded by the enormous financial burden that the current system
places on religious families. Religious families that are poor simply may
not be able to afford private school tuition for their children.829
Consequently, they are forced to send their children to secular public
schools against their religious beliefs. Once there, students are exposed
to a learning environment that is enormously hostile to their religious
828. See supra Section V.C.
829. See Private Schooling, EDUCATION WEEK, Aug. 4, 2004, http://www.edweek.org/ew/
issues/private-schooling/ (discussing how the cost of private education prevents many families
from sending their children to private schools and how this cost disparately impacts poor
families and racial minorities).
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beliefs. Racial minorities are especially likely to be disparately
impacted by this predicament.830 And this problem is exacerbated by
mandatory education laws which obligate all children between certain
ages to attend a school. Even Wisconsin v. Yoder831 only exempted
religious school attendance beyond the eighth grade.832 Poor religious
parents who could not afford a private school for their first grader
would undoubtedly be forced to send him or her to a secular public
school with an environment that is hostile to their religion. For a
religious family, sending a child to a secular public school could easily
constitute a substantial and irreparable harm for the reasons described
above. From a religious family’s perspective, the degree of harm could
be comparable to the harm caused by discriminatory sterilization laws
in Skinner v. Oklahoma.833 Religious children may grow up to be
atheists, much to their parents’ profound dismay. Even religious
families that can afford private schools suffer substantial damage from
the public school system because private school tuition is often
expensive.
The financial burden is compounded by the gross inequity of forcing
religious families to pay for secular public schools as taxpayers in
addition to paying private school tuition.834 Public schools are paid for
by taxpayers at the local, state, and federal levels, yet private schools
are funded solely by parental fees and private donations. Religious
families are therefore forced to subsidize the education of secular
students—while religious families get nothing in return. This form of
wealth redistribution based purely on religious distinctions is
reminiscent of the religious taxes placed on members of disfavored
minority religions, such as Jews and Catholics, in Europe.835
Governments at all levels in the United States have effectively decided
that secular education is the winner, religious education is the loser, and
that religious families must therefore open their pocketbooks. If the
830. Id.
831. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
832. Id. at 225.
833. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
834. In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973), the Supreme Court recognized the burden that the current system places on families
sending their children to private schools. Id. at 783. But the Court struck down a tax benefit plan
for families sending their children to private schools because “[h]owever great our
sympathy . . . for the burdens experienced by those who must pay public school taxes at the
same time that they support other schools because of the constraints of ‘conscience and
discipline,’ [this may not] justify an eroding of the limitations of the Establishment Clause now
firmly emplanted.” Id. at 788–89 (citations omitted).
835. See, e.g., Virtual Jewish History Tour: United Kingdom, supra note 360 (describing
the rule of Henry III and the Barons Wars (1217–1290)); Ybo Buruma, Dutch Tolerance: On
Drugs, Prostitution, and Euthanasia, 35 CRIME & JUST. 73, 78 (2007) (discussing special taxes
on Catholics in the Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century).
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ACLU has conscientious objector taxpayer standing to object to
Christmas and Hanukkah displays, then surely religious parents have
conscientious objector status to sue over being taxed to pay for
militantly secular public schools with a learning environment that is
illegally hostile to religion.
To make matters worse, the government’s policy of discriminating
on the basis of religion incentivizes religious individuals to actually
become secular. This is true because government programs fund only
secular education,836 and this encourages religious individuals to attend
militantly secular public schools in violation of their core religious
beliefs. The obvious consequence is that those students will be less well
educated in their own religious traditions, less committed to their
religions, and more likely to embrace militant secularism and
materialism. Governments in the United States have not outlawed
religious schools, which might violate the Free Exercise Clause, but
they have gone around the Free Exercise Clause by creating a very
substantial financial incentive for children to abandon the religious
traditions of their families.837 And the proof is in the pudding: since the
Supreme Court began striking down religious instruction and prayer in
schools in the early 1960s,838 religious affiliation has dropped from over
ninety percent of the American public to approximately seventy-seven
percent.839 Over the same time period, the percentage of individuals
who have no religious identification has increased from around two
percent to approximately sixteen percent.840 When schools lack
religious instruction or maintain a learning environment that is hostile to
religion or even openly denigrate religion, children will simply lack the
connection and the education they need to lead a virtuous and religious
life. Therefore, despite the Supreme Court’s affirmation in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters841 that families have a constitutional right to educate

836. See Government Neutrality, supra note 790, at 703–05 (describing how government
programs provide construction aid for secular private schools, but not religious ones,
incentivized religious schools to become more secular so that they could qualify for the
funding); Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
837. In the free exercise context, the Supreme Court has recognized the coercive power of
forcing individuals to choose between government benefits and their religious beliefs. See
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 404 (1963); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717.
838. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 205 (1963).
839. Frank Newport, This Easter, Smaller Percentage of Americans Are Christian,
GALLUP, Apr. 10, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/117409/easter-smaller-percentageamericans-christian.aspx (see table).
840. Frank Newport, In U.S., Increasing Number Have No Religious Identity, GALLUP,
May 21, 2010, http://www.gallup.com/poll/128276/increasing-number-no-religious-identity.
aspx (see table).
841. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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their children according to their own religious beliefs,842 the public
school system in the United States transforms that right into a mere
fantasy for families who are unable to overcome the financial burdens
of paying for a private religious education. The end result is a
government-mandated subsidy of secularism.
The words of the Supreme Court underscore the paramount
significance of private religious education. In Society of Sisters, the
Court struck down a state law that would have forced children to attend
public school because the law “unreasonably interferes with the liberty
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children.”843 The Court said:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the State to standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The
child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.844
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court added that “the values of
parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their
children in their early and formative years have a high place in our
society.”845 And in Abbington School District v. Schempp,846 Justice
William J. Brennan wrote, “The choice between [public secular and
private or sectarian] education is one—very much like the choice of
whether or not to worship—which our Constitution leaves to the
individual parent. It is no proper function of the state or local
government to influence or restrict that election.”847 But our current
public school system with no education vouchers for religious students
violates these core principles by strongly favoring a secular education
and by economically penalizing a religious education.
Discrimination on the basis of religion in this context cannot be
defended on the ground that funding public schools is a general law that
promotes the good of the whole people and that therefore serves a
compelling government interest. As already explained, the public
schools are unacceptable to religious individuals because they are
permeated with a learning environment that is openly hostile to religion.
842.
843.
844.
845.
846.
847.

Id. At 534–35.
Id. At 511, 534–35.
Id. At 535.
406 U.S. 205, 213–14.
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
Id. At 242 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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For a law to be a general law, it must benefit almost everyone or at least
be available for almost everyone. Roads and parks can be created by the
use of powers of eminent domain because they are available for
everyone. Many occupational licensure laws and requirements that one
have a driver’s license to drive are for the same reason general laws that
benefit the whole people. But the funding of public schools with an
environment that is hostile to religion coupled with a refusal to give
religious students an education voucher is not a general law that
promotes the good of all the people nor is it justified by any compelling
governmental interest. If the government wants to fund education, then
public funds must be made available to all individuals in a way that
does not require the religiously devout to learn in an environment
permeated by hostility to religion. If a government policy had a
disparately negative impact on a racial minority or on one gender, it
would certainly be intolerable. Policies that have such an impact on
religion should not be viewed any differently. We would never tolerate
a public school that approvingly taught a racist book like Little Black
Sambo by Helen Bennerman, or a sexist magazine that contained
pornographic material denigrating women. We should be equally
intolerant of a system of public education that forces devoutly religious
children to learn in an environment that is saturated with contempt for
religion.
Even if the secular public school system served a compelling public
interest and was a general law enacted for the good of the whole people,
the discriminatory impact of the current public school system on
religion fails the Sherbert-Yoder balancing test. That test requires the
government to pursue its goal in a manner that has the least restrictive
impact on religion. What is the government’s goal? If the goal is to
educate children broadly, then the least restrictive means requires that
the government fund education for all children and not only for secular
children. Paying for only secular public schools but not for religious
ones is not the least restrictive means by which the government can
pursue its objective. And if the government’s true goal is to narrowly
provide only secular education, but not religious education, then that
goal is impermissible because it discriminates on the basis of religion.
There is simply no good reason for the government to decide that
education devoid of religion is objectively better than education
involving religion. As a policy matter, asserting that secular education is
superior to religious education is utterly baseless because religious
schools have existed for several millennia and have successfully
educated students over that whole period of time. Most of our major
private universities, including Yale and Harvard, originated as religious
schools. And secular public schools in this country have had, shall we
say, somewhat mixed results. But more critically, deciding that
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education devoid of religion is objectively better than education
involving religion is an illegitimate goal because it constitutes
discrimination on the basis of religion. The government certainly could
not maintain an education policy designed to educate whites but not
blacks or men but not women. Why should an education policy
designed to benefit only secular children and not religious children be
any different?
Some argue that private schools should not be funded by the
government because only wealthy families send their children to private
schools. This argument is problematic for several reasons. First, private
school populations often include many children from low and middle
income families.848 The words of Maimonides, the great twelfth century
Codifier of Jewish Law, exhibit the extremity to which fervently
religious people will go to pursue religious study:
Every Israelite is under an obligation to study Torah,
whether he is poor or rich, in sound health or ailing, in the
vigor of youth or very old and feeble. Even a man so poor
that he is maintained by charity or goes begging from door
to door, as also a man with a wife and children to
support . . . [as scripture says,] ‘But you shall meditate
therein day and night.’849
Needless to say, individuals with Maimonedes’ perspective will not be
dissuaded from attending private religious schools, even if doing so
comes at great financial hardship. Second, the argument is premised on
the notion that wealthy families should be entitled to fewer government
benefits than non-wealthy families. That logic is itself a classic example
of class legislation, violating Locke’s maxim that there should be “one
rule for rich and poor.”850 And third, many wealthy families send their
children to public schools without paying extra fees or tuition.851 So, the
notion that educational benefits are distributed based on wealth is
utterly without merit. The real dividing line between the public and the
private schools is religion. Those families who can tolerate secular
education—whether rich or poor—can enjoy tuition-free education.
And those families whose religious beliefs require that their children
attend religious schools or who object to a public school learning
environment that is hostile to religion must pay through the nose for
their private school education. That is discrimination on the basis of
848. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SCHOOL ENROLLMENT: CPS OCTOBER 2010-DETAILED
TABLES tbl. 3, available at www.census.gov/hhes/school/data/cps/2010/tables.html.
849. MISHNAH TORAH, Book 1 haMadda (book of knowledge), The Laws Concerning the
Study of the Torah, Ch. 1, Halacha 8 (citing Joshua 1:8).
850. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 133, at 459.
851. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 848, at tbl. 3.
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religion—plain and simple.
Just to be crystal clear about our argument, the problem with
American public schools is one of discrimination on the basis of
religion, not one of the denial of fundamental rights. The government
has no obligation to fund religious education as a substantive right, just
as it has no obligation to fund abortions, church construction, or most
other substantive constitutional rights that private individuals enjoy. If
the government would choose not to fund any education at all that
would be constitutionally permissible. But what the government cannot
do is fund education discriminatorily. If the government chooses to fund
education, as it has, it must do so even-handedly without distributing
benefits by discriminating on the basis of religion.852
B. Education Monopoly
The public school system is a monopoly, no different from the
nineteenth century government-granted monopolies which the
Fourteenth Amendment outlawed along with all other class legislation.
As already discussed, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had a
Jacksonian concern with the evils of government-granted monopolies or
government grants of special “privileges” or “immunities” conferred on
only a few crony capitalists. The Privileges or Immunities Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause were originally understood as banning
monopoly and class legislation by securing equally to all citizens all of
the privileges or immunities of both federal and of state citizenship.
Professor Calabresi has set out the originalist argument that state
government grants of monopoly violate the Fourteenth Amendment in
extensive detail in another article, and we will therefore not repeat those
arguments here.853 It suffices here to say that government grants of
monopoly are only permissible under the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment if they are contained in general laws that
benefit the whole people. Occupational licensure laws for brain
852. This reasoning does not require the government to fund abortions, even though it
funds live births, because there is a significant public purpose in favoring live births over
abortions. See Government Neutrality, supra note 790, at 701 n.34 (arguing that the need for
government neutrality in educational funding is much more compelling because education is
much more expensive than abortion). But see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 484–85 (1977)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the government must subsidize abortions if it subsidizes
live births because the funding disparity skews individual choice away from abortions, thereby
infringing on the right to privacy). Additionally, religion as a right is unquestionably protected
in the text of the Constitution itself, whereas the existence of a constitutional right to abortion is
hotly debated. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979–80 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
853. See Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa Price, Monopolies and the Constitution: A History
of Crony Capitalism 42–61 (Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 12-20, 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2130043.
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surgeons and airplane pilots undoubtedly satisfy this test, but the present
day militantly secular public school monopoly does not.
The President of the American Federation of Teachers, Albert
Shanker, once remarked about American education that, “public
education operates like a planned economy . . . . [O]ur school
system . . . more resembles the communist economy than our own
market economy.”854 Indeed it does. In 2009–2010, approximately
ninety percent of all K–12 students attended public schools.855 In the
context of the private economic sector, that statistic would by itself
easily trigger an antitrust lawsuit.856 But here we just call it a public
service that is secured by a government grant of special privilege. Years
ago, some states tried to gobble up that final ten percent by banishing
private education, but the Supreme Court slammed on the breaks in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters.857 Currently the fifty states retain their
dominant market position by simply relying on their financial power.
The states refuse to fund private education at all, or they choose to fund
only some private schools that meet certain very specific criteria. The
unsavory effects of the government conferred public school monopoly
are the same as the unsavory effects that appear with most government
grants of monopoly power. There are: (1) fewer consumer choices,
(2) higher costs to consumers, (3) lower quality services, and (4) a
discriminatory benefit that only accrues to the monopolist in this case
public school administrators and teachers.858
It is important to stress that the public school monopoly is
government-granted, just as were all monopolies prior to the adoption of
the Sherman Antitrust Law in 1890.859 When the Jacksonians railed
against the evils of monopolies, their principal objection was to
government grants of special privileges to a single citizen or class of
citizens. The government has granted itself control over the public
schools, just as it granted control of the railroads to particular private
companies which were given the power to take private land by eminent
domain.
854. See Charles Fried, Comment, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case,
116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 164 n.4 (2002) (citing Reding, Wrighting, & Erithmatic, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 2, 1989, at A14).
855. COUNCIL FOR AMERICAN PRIVATE EDUCATION, FACTS AND STUDIES, http://www.cape
net.org/facts.html (last visited July 23, 2013).
856. See JOHN MERRIFIELD, THE SCHOOL CHOICE WARS 9 (2001); Fried, supra note 854, at
164 n.4.
857. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 511, 534–35 (1925) (striking down a law
forcing parents to send their children to public schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403
(1923) (striking down a requirement that both public and private schools teach only English).
858. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT
150–88 (1980) (discussing the problems with public schools).
859. See generally Calabresi & Price, supra note 853.
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But the public school monopoly is especially pernicious because the
revenue for the public schools comes from all taxpayers. Consumers are
forced to pay for a monopoly system of public education, whether they
want to or not, so the public schools do not even have to go out and
convince consumers to purchase their services. In contrast, no
legislature has ever in any other context forced consumers to actually
purchase products from a government-granted monopoly. When English
Kings and Queens granted a monopoly on the right to produce playing
cards to a royal favorite, they never required that the public buy those
playing cards and thus pay the monopoly rent. Governments in the
United States have sometimes favored specific companies, such as
railroad companies, and they have also created unfair marketplaces
where consumer choice is limited,860 but they have never in any other
context actually forced consumers to pay for the monopolist’s services
whether they used those services or not.
The fact that the consumers of education are forced to pay for the
government’s educational services is especially problematic in light of
this country’s religious diversity. As already explained, a public school
that creates an environment that is openly hostile to religion is simply
not an option for many religious families.861 Families for whom religion
is an integral part of their lives are therefore forced to pay for militantly
secular public schools to which they would never send their own
children—not in their wildest dreams. Public funding of militantly
secular schools is equivalent to forcing a consumer to a buy a product
for himself which he abhors, telling him that the product is actually
good for him, and then refusing to give him back his money when he
demands it. Even the most overbearing government and private
monopolies cannot actually force consumers to buy a product that they
do not want. Most monopolies survive and flourish by taking advantage
of consumers who already want to purchase their product. But
generating revenue from people who actually detest the product being
offered requires a level of coerciveness that is unique to the public
school system. Forced support for militantly secular public education is
not at all similar to state laws that require that we all purchase car
insurance. Such laws are general laws that promote the good of the
whole people and that are justified by a compelling governmental
interest. Nor are the laws establishing the public school monopoly at all
similar to government funding of roads and parks which are open and
available to the entire public. They are instead comparable to President
Obama’s individual mandate which compels individuals to purchase
health insurance, even though those individuals might have wanted to
860. See id. at 6 (describing how Queen Elizabeth I dished out harsh punishments for
violating monopoly laws).
861. See supra pp. 139-51.
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stay out of the health insurance market altogether. In the education
context as with the healthcare mandate, the states force individuals to
pay tuition to public schools, even though those individuals might never
want to attend a public school.
To make matters worse, families that manage to send their children
to private schools are forced to pay two tuitions: one for public school
and one for private school. Even the most onerous monopolies would
never be able to force consumers to purchase their products even though
those consumers had already gone out and purchased a competing
product. The combination of the economic inefficiency and injustice of
this result is truly staggering.
As with any monopoly, the public school system decreases consumer
choice by eliminating competition. A monopoly’s dominant market
position allows it to muscle competitors out of the marketplace. Here,
competing services (i.e., private schools) are dramatically
disadvantaged because public education is offered free of tuition. This is
a powerful and unique feature of the public school monopoly. Few, if
any, typical monopolies have the luxury of offering their products for
free and generating income from the government based on the number
of people who sign up for their free products. Private schools obviously
cannot seriously compete with free tuition, as parents face enormous
economic pressure to send their children to public schools. For poor
families, there is simply no alternative. For wealthier families, the
economic burden is coupled with the knowledge that their tax dollars
already pay for public schools. Consequently, private school enrollment
is effectively capped, as supply and demand are artificially low for
private schools and artificially high for public schools.
And like most monopolies, the people who are coerced into
consuming the public schools’ services get stuck with a service that has
many undesirable elements. In a competitive market, consumers can
choose from different products, selecting the one that matches their
tastes and preferences. But a monopoly eliminates that choice, giving
consumers only one product that they may or may not like. There is
strong evidence that public education is quite undesirable even for
families whose children attend the public schools. A 2011 Gallup poll
showed that only thirty-four percent of Americans have “a great deal”
or “quite a lot” of confidence in their public schools.862 Only eight
percent of Americans are “completely satisfied” with K–12 education
today, and only thirty-seven percent are even “somewhat satisfied.”863
862. Lymari Morales, Near Record-Low Confidence in U.S. Public Schools, GALLUP (July
29, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/148724/Near-Record-Low-Confidence-Public-Schools
.aspx.
863. Education, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1612/education.aspx (last visited
July 23, 2013).
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These numbers show that consumers of education are not getting the
kinds of services that they want. Unsurprisingly, several polls have
shown that a strong majority of public school parents would prefer to
send their children to private schools if they could afford to do so.864
Part of the explanation for these poll numbers could be that public
schools are entirely secular, while approximately eighty percent of all
Americans identify themselves as religious.865 In 2009–2010, only eight
percent of all K–12 students attended private religious schools,866
indicating that consumers of education, eighty percent of whom are
religious, may not be receiving the kind of education that they want.
Alternatively, they could just be upset about the low quality of secular
academics or poor school administration.867 Either way, people are
unhappy with the service that they are consuming.
The experiences of other countries are instructive. When the
government does not monopolize the market for education, families
often choose to send their children to private schools in substantially
higher numbers than they do when the government operates a public
school monopoly as in the United States. For instance, in the
Netherlands, the government pays for the full cost of education for all

864. See Private Schooling, EDUCATION WEEK (Aug. 4, 2004), http://www.edweek.org/
ew/issues/private-schooling (citing a Gallup Poll that puts this percentage at 59%, as well as
another study that puts the percentage at 67%); School Choice and Ownership Society, CATO
INSTITUTE, http://www.cato.org/special/ownership_society/school-ownership2.html (last visited
Nov. 1, 2012) (citing several polls that put support for school vouchers between 49% and 62%
of Americans); Joy Pullman, Poll: 71 Percent of Moms Support School Choice, THE FRIEDMAN
FOUNDATION FOR EDUCATIONAL CHOICE (May 9, 2012), http://www.edchoice.org/Newsroom/
News/Heartlander---Poll--71-Percent-of-Moms-Support-School-Choice.aspx (finding that 69%
of adults support free access to school vouchers, and that 37% of the respondents said they
would choose to send their children to private schools if given the choice).
865. See, e.g., BARRY A. KOSMIN & ARIELA KEYSAR, TRINITY COLLEGE, AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION SURVEY 3 (2008), available at http://commons.trincoll.edu/aris/files/
2011/08/ARIS_Report_2008.pdf; THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGIOUS LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS
LANDSCAPE SURVEY 5 (2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religiouslandscape-study-full.pdf (finding that approximately 83% of Americans identified themselves as
religious).
866. COUNCIL FOR AM. PRIVATE EDUC., FACTS AND STUDIES, http://www.capenet.org
/facts.html (stating that 10% of all students attend private schools); STEPHEN P. BROUGHMAN ET
AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE
SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2009–10 PRIVATE SCHOOL UNIVERSE
SURVEY 7 tbl. 2 (2011), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011339.pdf [hereinafter “PSS
SURVEY”] (stating that 80% of private school students attend religious schools).
867. A 1998 report comparing math and science performance among students from
different countries ranked the United States eighteenth, just ahead of Lithuania and Cyprus. See
JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL
SOCIETY 4 (1999). See generally NEW SCHOOLS FOR A NEW CENTURY: THE REDESIGN OF URBAN
EDUCATION (Diane Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 1999).
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students at both public and the private schools.868 Consequently, seventy
percent of school children in the Netherlands attend private schools,
with the vast majority attending private religious schools.869 In
Australia, where the government funds approximately fifty to seventyfive percent of private school costs,870 approximately one-third of all
Australian students attend private schools.871 In Israel, where the
government funds between sixty percent and one hundred percent of
private school expenses, forty percent of Israeli students attend private
schools.872 But in the United States, where the government barely funds
private schools at all, only ten percent of students attend private
schools.873 These statistics show that when families have a meaningful
choice, they often choose to send their children to private schools.
Because public schools are insulated from competition, they, like
most monopolies, can afford to operate inefficiently and deliver suboptimal services. The basic reason is that competition forces market
players to provide the highest quality services possible at the lowest
possible cost.874 But a monopoly can afford to slack off and provide
lower quality services at a higher expense and just stick the cost back on
the consumer. This problem is especially pronounced with public school
education because consumers do not choose to pay tuition but are
instead forced to cough up taxes to the government. Theoretically,
consumers of other monopolized services could still choose whether to
buy those services or not. Unsurprisingly, the evils of monopolies are
readily apparent to anyone who looks at our public schools. They are
wasteful, bloated, bureaucratic monstrosities that fail to effectively
educate children.875
For poor children, the injurious effects of government’s monopoly
are especially pronounced. Generally speaking, public schools in poor,
868. COLIN FRASER, FRONTIER CENTRE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, THE PUBLIC SCHOOL MARKET
THE NETHERLANDS: MONEY FOLLOWS THE CHILD 1–3 (2003), available at
http://www.fcpp.org/pdf/FB16%20Dutch%20School%20Model.pdf.
869. See Helen F. Ladd et al., Parental Choice in the Netherlands: Growing Concerns
about Segregation 6 (National Conference on School Choice, 2009), available at
http://www.ncspe.org/publications_files/OP%20182.pdf.
870. AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, REVIEW OF SCHOOL FUNDING, FINAL REPORT, 15
(December 2011) (describing how both government and private schools receive funding from
the federal government, local governments, parental fees, and various other private sources).
871. JENNIFER BUCKINGHAM, CTR. FOR INDEP. STUDIES, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS ix
(2010), available at http://www.cis.org.au/images/stories/policy-monographs/pm-111.pdf.
872. ISR. RELIGIOUS ACTION CTR., EDUCATION IN ISRAEL, http://www.irac.org/Issue
Papers.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
873. COUNCIL FOR AM. PRIVATE EDUC., supra note 866 (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
874. See generally FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 858, at 9–38.
875. See generally JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S
SCHOOLS (1990) (explaining how public schools’ unresponsive bureaucratic structure impairs
the quality of education provided).
IN
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urban neighborhoods provide the lowest quality education.876 These
schools are fraught with crime, dilapidated facilities, and often sub-par
teachers and administrators.877 They consistently produce high drop-out
rates, low scores on standardized tests, and few graduates going on to
college.878 As Justice Thomas put it, “[t]he failure to provide education
to poor urban children perpetuates a vicious cycle of poverty,
dependence, criminality, and alienation that continues for the remainder
of their lives.”879 To make matters worse, poor students cannot opt out
of this system because they cannot afford to attend private schools and
are instead trapped in the jaws of the government’s educational
monopoly. Their lot in life is truly a sad manifestation of the Court’s
statement in Brown v. Board of Education: “it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education.”880 For these reasons, the vast majority of
low income parents support private school vouchers.881 Even some
liberal political theorists hesitantly support vouchers to help poor
children.882
This economic monopoly also allows the government to exert
ideological control over students. As Professor McConnell has pointed
out, government control of ideology often has a strong majoritarian bias
which in turn tends to smother minority groups and dissenting
opinions.883 In the nineteenth century, Protestants used the public
schools to attack Catholics, and now secularists and liberals use the
public schools to attack religion and conservatism.884 For this reason,
the strongest advocates of vouchers are members of religious minorities,
especially Catholics, Evangelicals, and Jews, as well as political
876. See VITERITTI, supra note 867, at 7 (describing the problems in urban public schools).
877. See Viteritti, supra note 718, at 167–70 (describing the funding problems and
“separate and unequal” status of urban schools).
878. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 681–82 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (discussing these problems).
879. See id. at 683 (Thomas, J., concurring).
880. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (cited in Zelman, 536 U.S. at 676 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
881. See T. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 164 (2001) (“The
appeal of private schools is especially strong among parents who are low in income, minority,
and live in low-performing districts: precisely the parents who are the most disadvantaged under
the current system.”); id. at 214 (Table 7-3) (showing support for vouchers is at approximately
75% for public school parents with incomes under $20,000, 75% for black public school
parents, and 71% for Hispanic public school parents); see also VITERITTI, supra note 867, at 7
(describing support for vouchers amongst the poor and racial minorities); Fried, supra note 854,
at 198 n.33 (citing various surveys and articles demonstrating widespread support for vouchers
in low income and minority neighborhoods).
882. See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Religious
Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 417 (2000).
883. See McConnell, Governments, Families, and Power, supra note 303, at 850–51.
884. Id.
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conservatives.885
The government’s monopoly of education also disturbs a critical
balance of power between the government and parents. Nearly ninety
years ago, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Supreme Court recognized
that parents, not the state, have the right “to direct the upbringing and
education of children” because “[t]he child is not the mere creature of
the State.”886 The Supreme Court has time and again reaffirmed that
parents have a right to educate their children in the way in which they
see fit.887 By monopolizing education through the creation of the public
schools, the government has created a very uneven playing field that
tilts the balance of power firmly towards government schools,
substantially decreasing the likelihood that parents will be able to
exercise their Society of Sisters rights.
So, why does the education monopoly persist? There are several
reasons why it is retained. First, fear and hatred of Catholics has existed
since the nineteenth century, and Catholic parochial schools have
historically comprised the majority of private schools.888 Anti-Catholic
bigotry was most vividly exemplified in the nineteenth century school
funding wars and in the history of the Blaine Amendments,889 and it
continued fervently into the twentieth century and persists even today.
Refusing to fund private schools is an effective way to express antiCatholic sentiment. Second, some people, especially elites, simply do
not like religion of any kind, and they do not want their tax dollars used
to support religion in general.890 They do not mind, however, using tax
dollars obtained from religious people to teach secularism, Darwin, and
the joys of extra-marital sex. This view is fueled by growing secularism
and by misconceptions about the supposed need to maintain a “wall of
separation between church and state.”891 Third, many individuals and
885. Douglas Laycock, Why the Supreme Court Changed Its Mind About Government Aid
to Religious Institutions: It’s A Lot More Than Just Republican Appointments, 2008 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 275, 283–84, 289–90 (2008) (describing historical Jewish support for government aid of
religious schools and emerging support amongst Evangelicals).
886. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
887. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972).
888. In 2009–2010, the percentage of private school students attending Catholic schools
dropped to 42.8%, down from 54.5% in 1989–1990, http://www.capenet.org/facts.html, and
95% in 1961. Laycock, supra note 885, at 282.
889. See supra Part V.A.
890. See Viteritti, supra note 718, at 180 (describing the secular philosophy of John
Dewey, Dewey’s goal of eliminating religion from schools, and Dewey’s impact on the
Twentieth century).
891. The Supreme Court first cited this famous quote from Thomas Jefferson in See
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947). Ironically, the holding in Everson actually
permitted aid to religious schools. Id. at 17–18. And public funds have long been used to
support religious hospitals, colleges, as well as religious organizations involved in community
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organizations, namely teachers unions, school boards, administrators,
and all other school personnel, benefit from a massive government-run
school system, and they do not want to lose their jobs or give up their
monopoly rents.892 The beneficiaries of a government grant of
monopoly often wield substantial political influence and are able to
sway elected officials to preserve their monopoly at all costs.893 Fourth,
some wealthier communities are concerned that local tax revenues
would be diverted away from schools in their communities.894 Some of
these individuals also fear that poor, minority students from the inner
city could start attending schools in their communities. Indeed the Ohio
voucher plan from Zelman allowed inner city children to enroll in
suburban public schools, if those schools would permit them to enroll,
but no suburban public schools allowed them to attend.895
The fact that the government is the beneficiary of the monopoly does
not alleviate the Fourteenth Amendment violation. President Jackson
vetoed the re-charter of the Second National Bank, which was partially
owned by the federal government, on the ground that it gave monopoly
banking privileges to a single federally chartered corporation. And the
public schools fit the basic model of a special monopoly because they
development, housing, and other charitable purposes. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639, 667 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing federal funding of higher education
amongst others); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 299–300 (1899) (permitting funding of
religious hospitals); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617–18 (1988) (allowing funding of
religious charities); Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81–82 (1908) (permitting the federal
government to administer a trust fund for Native Americans that used tribal money to support
religious schools); see also Natasha Mulleneaux, The Failure To Provide Adequate Higher
Education Tax Incentives for Lower-Income Individuals, 14 AKRON TAX J. 27, 30–31 (1999).
Also note that the court in Everson actually misquotes Jefferson because the court claims that
Jefferson’s wall exists only as a result of the Establishment Clause. Jefferson actually referenced
both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. See 16 JEFFERSON’S WORKS 281 (Monticello
ed.1903) (“I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which
declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between Church &
State”) (emphasis added). Jefferson thus said that both clauses were responsible for creating the
wall of separation—the Free Exercise Clause just as much as the Establishment Clause.
Jefferson was actually praising the way in which the First Amendment protected religion by
keeping government away from it.
892. See, e.g., Paul T. Hill, The Supply-Side of School Choice, at 140, 144–47, in SCHOOL
CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY, IN SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY (Stephen D.
Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999) (discussing the development of the public school
bureaucracy); MARK SCHNEIDER ET AL., CHOOSING SCHOOLS: CONSUMER CHOICE AND THE
QUALITY OF AMERICAN SCHOOLS 33 (2000) (discussing the growth and increased complexity of
the public school bureaucracy in the Twentieth century); see also CHUBB & MOE, supra note
875 (strongly criticizing teachers unions for their opposition to vouchers).
893. See Calabresi & Price, supra note 853, at 56–57 (describing this concern with the
railroads at the end of the nineteenth century).
894. See Fried, supra note 854, at 169 n.22 (discussing this form of opposition).
895. Id.
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single out a class of people for a special benefit and consequently
burden all other classes of people.896 Jackson himself decried laws that
sought “to grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, to make the
rich richer and the potent more powerful.”897 But public schools do just
that, perpetuating themselves through their statutory power over
taxpayers and exerting their ideological control over religious
dissenters.
C. The Solution: Endorse Pluralism
To rectify the way in which the public schools breach the Fourteenth
Amendment both by discriminating on the basis of religion and by
establishing a monopoly which does not promote the general good of
the whole people, the Supreme Court should order state governments to
make education vouchers available to any student who wants a private
education either secular or religious. If families choose to send their
children to private schools, whether secular or religious, the government
should fund that education, just as it funds public school educations
today. The Supreme Court would not have to change its case law
banning direct funding of religious education by the public schools, and
it could instead simply require the states to implement voucher
programs with the vouchers being redeemable at secular or religious
schools based on the parents’ choice. The Supreme Court should not
shy away from the fact that judicially mandated vouchers would cause a
significant, perhaps revolutionary, change in American public school
education. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court radically
changed American public schools forever and for the better, by tearing
down an educational system that discriminated based on race. The
Supreme Court should be similarly enthusiastic about striking down our
present-day public school system that discriminates on the basis of
religion and that functions as a government-granted monopoly.
Forcing the states to implement education voucher programs is not a
revolutionary idea. Embedded in the philosophy of government
vouchers to pay for school education is the principle of pluralism which
is a foundational democratic value that permeates our whole
constitutional system. For example, constitutional federalism recognizes
that the fifty states might have varying values, tastes, and concerns; the
electoral process recognizes that different people might vote for
different leaders; and the First Amendment acknowledges that
individuals might have different opinions and religious affiliations.
Similarly, government funding of private school education recognizes
896. See LAWRENCE FREDERICK KOHL, THE POLITICS OF INDIVIDUALISM: PARTIES AND THE
AMERICAN CHARACTER IN THE JACKSONIAN ERA 61–62 (1989) (discussing Jacksonian fears of
corporations, central banking, and monopolies).
897. POLE, supra note 203, at 145 (quoting Jackson); Yudof, supra note 19, at 1376.
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that families might have different approaches to education. Frederick
Douglass once said that, “education . . . means emancipation. It means
light and liberty. It means the uplifting of the soul of man into the
glorious light of truth, the light by which men can only be made
free.”898 How can there be only one kind of educational “light and
liberty?” The notion that the best way to achieve Douglass’ “light and
liberty” is through a government-run secular school system with an
environment hostile to religion is absolutely preposterous. There are
many ways to educate children, and many different kinds of plausible
schools. Instead of pursuing the impossible task of defining a set of
common, neutral values to thrust upon all children,899 the government
should instead embrace pluralism and recognize that different people
have different values. Favoring public secular education over private
religious education is the pinnacle of intolerance and contradicts
democratic principles.
Many other democratic countries have rejected the American “one
size fits all” model and have instead endorsed a pluralistic model that
requires the government to fund private religious education. Some of
those countries include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Germany, Iceland, Israel, the Netherlands, Scotland, Spain, Sweden,
and New Zealand,900 England, and France,901 amongst others.902 Many
of these countries are religiously diverse903 and choose to fund religion
as a means of embracing and celebrating their diversity. The American
system with its hostility to religious education stands out as a complete
898. The Blessings of Liberty and Education: An Address Delivered in Manassas, Virginia,
on 3 September 1894, in 5 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 623 (J. Blassingame & J.
McKivigan eds. 1992).
899. Sherry, supra note 789, at 156–82 (discussing the difficulty of finding common,
neutral educational values).
900. Joseph P. Viteritti, A Truly Living Constitution: Why Educational Opportunity Trumps
Strict Separation on the Voucher Question, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 89, 112 n.127 (2000).
901. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 663 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
902. See CHARLES GLENN & JAN DE GROOF, FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE: FREEDOM,
AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN EDUCATION (2002) (reviewing education in twenty-eight
countries or communities).
903. In Canada, 44% of the population is Catholic, 29% is Protestant, 11% belongs to other
religions, and 16% have no religious affiliation. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state
.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168201.htm. In the Netherlands, approximately 29% of the population
is Catholic, 19% is Protestant, 10% belongs to other religions, and 42% have no religious
affiliation. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/ 168329.htm.
And in Israel, although three-quarters of the population is Jewish, the differences in religious
observance and belief are so vast that the sub-groups might as well be members of different
religions. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/ 168266.htm.
Seventeen percent of Israeli Jews are Orthodox, 39% are “traditional,” and 44% are secular. The
other quarter of Israel’s population is composed of Muslims, Christians, and other
denominations. Australia, England, and France are similarly diverse. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/.
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anomaly.
Comparing and contrasting the American experience with the Dutch
experience highlights just how disgraceful the American system of
public school education is. In the nineteenth century, both the
Netherlands and the United States recognized that education was
fundamentally important.904 And during that time, both countries faced
enormous turmoil over how to fund education.905 In the United States,
the conflict featured Protestants against Catholics; in the Netherlands,
secular liberals faced off against Catholics and other Christians.
American Protestants and Dutch secularists each controlled their
respective public school systems and sought to teach children an
allegedly consensus set of values that would unify society. In both
countries public education turned out to be quite oppressive for
religious minorities who did not subscribe to the majoritarian ideology.
And so in both countries, religious minorities, mainly Catholics,
objected to the educational systems and fought to obtain public funds
for their private schools. But the outcomes were vastly different. Dutch
Catholics joined forces with Orthodox Reformed groups and
successfully obtained school funding from the Dutch government, while
American Catholics got steamrolled by the Protestant majority and by
today’s secular elite.
The two countries’ disparate philosophies are striking. The
Netherlands adopted the political philosophy of Abraham Kuyper, a
Calvinist, who believed that tolerance and diversity—whether secular or
religious—were crucial elements of a successful society.906 Kuyper
rejected the notion of a single set of universal values or that one value
system was necessarily better than another. Instead Kuyper favored
pluralism and tolerance. So widely accepted was Kuyper that he served
as Prime Minister of the Netherlands from 1901–1905. In 1917, the
Dutch Constitution was amended to guarantee funding equality for
public and private schools without regard to religious affiliation.907
904. In 1868, thirty-six out of thirty-eight American states had provisions in their
constitutions requiring their state governments to provide a public education. Calabresi &
Agudo, supra note 39, at 108. The Dutch Constitution of 1848 explicitly granted individuals and
organizations the right to set up private schools according to their convictions and without
governmental interference. FRASER, supra note 868, at 1–2 (describing how the Dutch
Constitution created freedom to establish schools, freedom of conviction, and freedom of
organization).
905. See supra Part V.A. (describing this history in the United States); see MONSMA &
SOPER, supra note 827, at 55–57 (describing this history in the Netherlands).
906. Id. at 57–59.
907. Id. at 57. The current Constitution reads:
(5) The standards required of schools financed either in part or in full from
public funds shall be regulated by Act of Parliament, with due regard, in the
case of private schools, to the freedom to provide education according to
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Kuyper’s pluralism was officially constitutionalized and has continued
to play a central role in Dutch society since that time. In contrast,
nineteenth century Americans endorsed religious intolerance and passed
Blaine Amendments.908 Through the mid-twentieth century, Protestant
themes and anti-Catholic bigotry pervaded American public schools.
Starting in the 1960s, the Supreme Court struck back at Protestants and
began eradicating all religion from public schools. Contemporary public
school ideology has mutated into a mishmash of secularism, liberalism,
and environmentalism.909 Religious families are left to fend for
themselves. At a time when the Dutch were endorsing pluralism,
Americans were endorsing intolerance.
The fruits of these disparate philosophies are evident in
contemporary education. Today Dutch children can attend the school of
their choice, and the Dutch government pays the full cost whether the
school is religious or secular, public or private. Consequently, seventy
percent of Dutch children attend private schools, with the vast majority
attending private religious schools.910 But in the United States, only
eight percent of children attend private religious schools, even though
approximately eighty percent of Americans identify themselves as
religious.911 In the context of education, the Dutch embraced Fourteenth
Amendment principles, but Americans did not.
A voucher system would dramatically change American schools for
the better.912 Vouchers would break up government’s education
monopoly by giving students, particularly poor students, the ability to
attend private schools.913 Students would thus enjoy all the benefits of a
religious or other belief . . .
(7) Private primary schools that satisfy the conditions laid down by Act of
Parliament shall be financed from public funds according to the same standards
as public-authority schools. The conditions under which private secondary
education and pre-university education shall receive contributions from public
funds shall be laid down by Act of Parliament.
NETH. CONST. ch. 1, art. 23.
908. See supra Part V.A.
909. See Robert H. Nelson, Rethinking Church and State: The Case of Environmental
Religion, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 121 (2011) (arguing that environmentalism is a religion).
910. See Helen F. Ladd, Edward B. Fiske, Nienke Ruijs, Parental Choice in the
Netherlands: Growing Concerns about Segregation, 6, prepared for the National Conference on
School Choice, Vanderbilt University, (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.ncspe.org/
publications_files /OP%20182.pdf.
911. See American Religious Identification Survey, Trinity College, available at
http://commons.trincoll.edu/aris/files/2011/08/ARIS_Report_2008.pdf, 5 (2008); see also Pew
Forum on Religious Life, available at http://religions.pewforum.org/reports (finding that
approximately eighty-three percent of Americans identified themselves as religious).
912. See generally FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 858.
913. See Joseph P. Viteritti, Reading Zelman: The Triumph of Pluralism, and Its Effects on
Liberty, Equality, and Choice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1105, 1172–73 (2003) (discussing how
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free market, including more ideological and religious choices and
greater quality education.914 Public schools themselves might even
benefit from the increased competition which could motivate them to
operate more efficiently and improve the quality of education
delivered.915 The result would be greater pluralism, more diversity,
enhanced religious freedom, and higher quality education.
CONCLUSION
After the Civil War, Americans amended the Constitution to
guarantee equality for all people by eradicating systems of caste and
class legislation. They did this because they had learned from their own
mistakes—slavery, government-granted monopolies, and the like. They
observed caste systems around the world from the Indian Caste system
to European feudalism, and they recognized that it was fundamentally
immoral to single out specific groups for special burdens or benefits that
did not apply to the rest of society. Although limited bans on class
legislation had been around since the founding, after the Civil War the
sentiment was that society had changed to the point where a ban on
class legislation had to be constitutionalized. From then on, legislation
would have to provide a general welfare benefit, and the laws would
have to be equally enforced. No longer could the government pick out
winners and losers. The goal was a society of equals. Religion was
certainly included in this protection. At this point in history, the United
States stood out on the world stage as the standard-bearer for societal
equality.
Unfortunately, the Fourteenth Amendment’s goal of creating a
society without systems of class, caste, or government conferred
monopolies did not come to fruition quickly. Racist legislation and
enforcement continued. Segregation persisted. Blaine Amendments
were passed. Even after the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment in
1920, gender discrimination lived on until 1971. In short, American
legislatures got away with a lot of racist and sexist legislation, and the
courts until Brown v. Board of Education failed to step in. Our history
of Jim Crow and of sexism does not prove that the original meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment permitted racism and sexism. They only
vouchers would benefit the poor).
914. Out of ten empirical studies evaluating the impact of vouchers on student
performance, nine showed that student performance improved and only one showed no impact.
See Greg Forster, A Win-Win Solution: The Empirical Evidence on School Vouchers, THE
FOUNDATION
FOR
EDUCATIONAL
CHOICE
(Mar.
2011),
available
at
http://www.edchoice.org/CMSModules/EdChoice/FileLibrary/656/A-Win-Win-Solution---TheEmpirical-Evidence-on-School-Vouchers .pdf.
915. Out of nineteen empirical studies evaluating the impact of vouchers on public schools,
eighteen showed that public schools improved and only one showed no impact. Id.
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prove that the American people and their Supreme Court justices were
not adhering faithfully to the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on racial
and gender systems of class legislation and of caste. The fact that some
people violate a law does not mean that the law permits the conduct in
question. It just means that some people are engaged in lawlessness.
Over time, American courts and legislatures have rectified many of the
lawless violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, eliminating racial and
gender discrimination, as well as other improper forms of class
legislation. But as for discrimination on the basis of religion, American
courts and legislatures still have significant work ahead.
In the context of construing the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, government currently has way too much discretion to
force religious individuals to comply with generally applicable laws.
Smith and City of Boerne represented significant steps away from the no
class legislation principles of the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the
Sherbert-Yoder balancing approach should be restored, albeit with a bit
more backbone, and the various state Blaine Amendments should be
struck down because they discriminate on the basis of religion.
In the context of education, the situation is truly embarrassing. While
the United States was once at the forefront of the equal rights movement
back in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the current state of the
American public schools has unfortunately moved the United States to
the back of the pack. Countries all over the world have endorsed
educational pluralism, the funding of religious education, and private
schools of all stripes. But the United States persistently maintains an
educational monopoly that favors secular education and secularism in
general. The funding scheme grossly discriminates against religious
families and ultimately diminishes the quality of education and
educational choices for children. Most astonishingly, many states still
have Blaine Amendments which facially discriminate against religion.
The result is that the equality goals of the Fourteenth Amendment
remain unrealized for religious families who are forced to pay for both
public and private schools. And the assurance of Pierce v. Society of
Sisters that everyone has a right to educate their children as they see fit
remains an unfulfilled promise for many families who are coerced into
sending their children to militantly secular public schools. Courts and
legislatures should return to the principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment and should endorse religious pluralism by requiring the
states to implement voucher systems for both secular and religious
public and private schools.
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APPENDIX
Ch. I Article 7 Cl. 1
All federal nationals are equal before the
law. Privileges based upon birth, sex, estate,
class, or religion are excluded.
Austria

Ch. I Art 14 cl. 6
Admission to public school is open to all
without distinction of birth, sex race, status,
class, language and religion, and in other
respects within the limits of the statutory
requirements.
Part II, Art.3
[guaranteeing fundamental rights based on]
“race, place of origin, political opinions,
colour, creed or sex”

Belize
Art. 16 cl. 3
[banning discrimination based on] “sex,
race, place of origin, political opinions, colour
or creed”
Article I, Paragraph 7
No person shall be deprived of Bosnia and
Herzegovina or Entity citizenship on any
ground such as sex, race, color, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.
Bosnia &
Herzegovina

Brazil

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss4/1

Article II, Paragraph 4
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms
provided for in this Article or in the
international agreements listed in Annex I to
this Constitution shall be secured to all
persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina without
discrimination on any ground such as sex,
race, color, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property,
birth or other status.
Title II, ch. 1, art. 5, cl. VI.
Guaranteeing equality for those who
express their “freedom of conscience and of
belief”
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Bulgaria

Canada

Chechnya

Croatia
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Article 6
(1) All persons are born free and equal in
dignity and rights.
(2) All citizens shall be equal before the law.
There shall be no privileges or restriction of
rights on the grounds of race, nationality,
ethnic self-identity, sex, origin, religion,
education, opinion, political affiliation,
personal or social status, or property status.
Section 15
(1) Every individual is equal before the and
under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination based on race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or
mental or physical disability.
Article 16 (Equality, R.F. 19)
(1) All are equal before the law and in the
courts of law.
(2) The Chechen Republic guarantees equality
of rights and liberties of individuals and
citizens regardless of sex, race, nationality,
language, origin, property or position, place of
residence, religious affiliation, convictions,
membership of public organizations, and any
other circumstance. It forbids other forms of
discrimination of citizens on the basis of
indicators of social, racial, national, language
and religious affiliation.
Ch. III , Part 1, art. 14
(1) Everyone in the Republic of Croatia
shall enjoy rights and freedoms, regardless of
race, color, gender, language, religion,
political or other belief, national or social
origin, property, birth, education, social status
or other characteristics.
(2) All shall be equal before the law.
Article 17
(1) During a state of war or an immediate
threat to the independence and unity of the
State, or in the event of severe natural
disasters, individual freedoms and rights
guaranteed by the Constitution may be
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restricted . . .
(2) The extend of such restrictions shall be
adequate to the nature of the danger, and may
not result in the inequality of persons in
respect of race, color, gender, language,
religion, national or social origin.

Cyprus

Denmark

Estonia

Finland

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss4/1

Article 41
(1) All religious communities shall be equal
before the law
Article 28
1. All persons are equal before the law, the
administration and justice and are entitled to
equal protection thereof and treatment thereby.
2. Every person shall enjoy all the rights and
liberties provided for in this Constitution
without any direct or indirect discrimination
against any person on the ground of his
community, race, religion, language, sex,
political or other convictions, national or
social descent, birth, colour, wealth, social
class, or on any ground whatsoever, unless
there is express provision to the contrary in
this Constitution.
Section 71
(1) Personal liberty shall be inviolable. No
Danish subject shall in any manner whatever
be deprived of his liberty because of his
political or religious convictions or because of
his descent.
Article 12
(1) All persons shall be equal before the law.
No one may be discriminated against on the
basis of nationality, race, color, sex, language,
origin, creed, political or other persuasions,
financial or social status, or other reasons.
(2) The propagation of national, racial,
religious or political hatred, violence or
discrimination is prohibited and punishable by
law. The propagation of hatred, violence or
discrimination between social strata is equally
prohibited and punishable by law.
Section 6
(1) Everyone is equal before the law.
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France

Germany

Hong Kong Bill
of Rights
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(2) No one shall, without an acceptable reason,
be treated differently from other persons on
the ground of sex, age, origin, language,
religion, conviction, opinion, health, disability
or other reason that concerns his or her person.
Title 0, Article 1
(1) France is an indivisible, secular,
democratic and social Republic. It ensures the
equality of all citizens before the law, without
distinction of origin, race or religion. It
respects all beliefs. It is organised on a
decentralised basis.
Article 3
All persons shall be equal before the law.
Men and women shall have equal rights. The
state shall promote the actual implementation
of equal rights for women and men and take
steps to eliminate disadvantages that now
exist. No person shall be favored or
disfavored because of sex, parentage, race,
language, homeland and origin, faith, or
religious or political opinions. No person shall
be favored because of disability.
Part I, Section 5
(1) In time of public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed,
measures may be taken derogating from the
Bill of Rights to the extent strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation, but these
measures shall be taken in accordance with
law.
(2) No measure shall be taken under
Subsection (1) that . . .
(b) involves discrimination solely on the
ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion
or social origin;
Part II Sec. 8
Article 1
(1) The rights recognized in this Bill of Rights
shall be enjoyed without distinction of any
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or
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social origin, property, birth or other status.
Article 20
(1) Every child shall have, without any
discrimination as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, national or social origin,
property or birth, the right to such measures of
protection as are required by his status as a
minor, on the part of his family, society and
the State.
Article 22
All persons are equal before the law and are
entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the
law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.

Hungary

Iceland

India

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss4/1

Article 70A
(1) The Republic of Hungary shall respect the
human rights and civil rights of all persons in
the country without discrimination on the basis
of race, color, gender, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social
origins, financial situation, birth or on any
other grounds whatsoever.
Article 64
(1) No one may lose any of his civil or
national rights on account of his religion
Article 65
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and
enjoys human rights irrespective of sex,
religion, opinion, national origin, race, colour,
property, birth or other status.
Article 15
(1) The State shall not discriminate against
any citizen on grounds only of religion, race,
caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.
(2) No citizen shall, on ground only of
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religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any
of them, be subject to any disability, liability,
restriction or condition with regard to
Article 16
(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for
all citizens in matters relating to employment
or appointment to any office under the State.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of
birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible
for, or discriminated against in respect of, any
employment or office under the State.
Article 29
(2) No citizen shall be denied admission into
any educational institution maintained by the
State or receiving aid out of State funds on
grounds only of religion, race, caste, language
or any of them.
Article 30
(2) The State shall not, in granting aid to
educational institutions, discriminate against
any educational institution on the ground that
it is under the management of a minority,
whether based on religion or language.

Ireland
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Article 325
There shall be one general electoral roll for
every territorial constituency for election to
either House of Parliament or to the House or
either House of the Legislature of a State and
no person shall be ineligible for inclusion in
any such roll or claim to be included in any
special electoral roll for any such constituency
on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or
any of them.
Ch. XII Art. 40
(iii) (6.2) Laws regulating the manner in
which the right of forming associations and
unions and the right of free assembly may be
exercised shall contain no political, religious
or class discrimination.
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Japan

Kenya
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Art. 44
(2.3) The State shall not impose any
disabilities or make any discrimination on the
ground of religious profession, belief or status.
(2.4) Legislation providing State aid for
schools shall not discriminate between schools
under the management of different religious
denominations, nor be such as to affect
prejudicially the right of any child to attend a
school receiving public money without
attending religious instruction at that school.
Part 0, Article 3
(1) All citizens have equal social status and are
equal before the law, without regard to their
sex, race, language, religion, political
opinions, and personal or social conditions.
Article 8
(1) Religious denominations are equally free
before the law.
Ch. III, Article 14
(1) All of the people are equal under the law
and there shall be no discrimination in
political, economic, or social relations because
of race, creed, sex, social status, or family
origin.
Article 27
(1) Every person is equal before the law and
has the right to equal protection and equal
benefit of the law.
(2) Equality includes the full and equal
enjoyment of all rights and fundamental
freedoms.
(3) Women and men have the right to equal
treatment, including the right to equal
opportunities in political, economic, cultural
and social spheres.
(4) The State may not discriminate directly or
indirectly against any person on any ground,
including race, sex, pregnancy, marital status,
health status, ethnic or social origin, colour,
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief,
culture, dress, language or birth.
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Nepal

Netherlands

Paraguay

Poland

Portugal
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Article 29
(1) All people shall be equal before the law,
the court, and other State institutions and
officers.
(2) A person may not have his rights restricted
in any way, or be granted any privileges, on
the basis of his or her sex, race, nationality,
language, origin, social status, religion,
convictions, or opinions.
Article 11
(1) All citizens shall be equal before the law.
No person shall be denied the equal protection
of the laws.
(2) No discrimination shall be made against
any citizen in the application of general laws
on grounds of religion (dharma), race (varya),
sex (li_ga), caste (jât), tribe (jâti) or
ideological conviction (vaicârik) or any of
these.
Ch. 1, Article 1
All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated
equally in equal circumstances.
Discrimination on the grounds of religion,
belief, political opinion, race, or sex or on any
other grounds whatsoever shall not be
permitted.
Article 88
(1) No discrimination will be permitted against
workers for reasons of race, sex, age, religion,
social status, and political or union preference.
Article 25
(1) Churches and other religious organizations
shall have equal rights.
Title I Art. 13, cl. 2
No one shall be privileged, favoured,
prejudiced, deprived of any right or exempted
from any duty on the basis of ancestry, sex,
race, language, place of origin, religion,
political or ideological beliefs, education,
economic situation, social circumstances or
sexual orientation.
Art. 59
[banning various types of discrimination
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Russia

Serbia

Singapore
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against workers based on] “Regardless of age,
sex, race, citizenship, place of origin, religion
and political and
ideological convictions”
Title I Art. 4, cl. 2
Romania is the common and indivisible
homeland of all its citizens, without any
discrimination on account of race, nationality,
ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion,
political adherence, property, or social origin.
Part I Ch. 1, art. 14
(2) Religious associations are separated
from the state, and are equal before the law.
Art. 19
(2) The state guarantees the equality of
rights and liberties regardless of sex, race,
nationality, language, origin, property or
employment status, residence, attitude to
religion, convictions, membership of public
associations or any other circumstance. Any
restrictions of the rights of citizens on social,
racial, national, linguistic or religious grounds
are forbidden.
Article 21
(1) All are equal before the Constitution and
law.
(2) Everyone has the right to equal legal
protection, without discrimination.
(3) All direct or indirect discrimination based
on any grounds, particularly on race, sex,
national origin, social origin, birth, religion,
political or other opinion, property status,
culture, language, age, mental or physical
disability are prohibited.
Article 12
(1) All persons are equal before the law and
entitled to the equal protection of the law.
(2) Except as expressly authorized by this
Constitution, there shall be no discrimination
against citizens of Singapore on the ground
only of religion, race, descent or place of birth
in any law or in the appointment to any office
or employment under apublic authority or in
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the administration of any law relating to the
acquisition, holding, or disposition of property
or the establishing or carrying on of any trade,
business, profession, vocation or employment.

Slovakia

Slovenia
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Article 16
(1) Without prejudice to the generality of
Article 12, there shall be no discrimination
against any citizens of Singapore on the
grounds only of religion, race, descent or place
of birth
(2) Every religious group has the right to
establish and maintain institutions for the
education of children and provide therein
instruction in its own religion, and there shall
be no discrimination on the ground only of
religion in any law relating to such institutions
or in the administration of any such law.
Article 12
(1) People are free and equal in dignity and
their rights. Basic rights and liberties are
inviolable, inalienable, secured by law, and
unchallengeable.
(2) Basic rights and liberties on the territory of
the Slovak Republic are guaranteed to
everyone regardless of sex, race, color of skin,
language, creed and religion, political or other
beliefs, national or social origin, affiliation to
a nation or ethnic group, property, descent, or
another status. No one must be harmed,
preferred, or discriminated against on these
grounds.
Article 7
(1) The state and religious communities shall
be separate.
(2) Religious communities shall enjoy equal
rights; they shall pursue their activities freely.
Article 14
(1) In Slovenia everyone shall be guaranteed
equal human rights and fundamental freedoms
irrespective of national origin, race, sex,
language, religion, political or other
conviction, material standing, birth, education,
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social status, disability or any other personal
circumstance.
(2) All are equal before the law.
Article 16
(1) Human rights and fundamental freedoms
provided by this Constitution may
exceptionally be temporarily suspended or
restricted during a war and state of emergency.
Human rights and fundamental freedoms may
be suspended or restricted only for the
duration of the war or state of emergency, but
only to the extent required by such
circumstances and inasmuch as the measures
adopted do not create inequality based solely
on race, national origin, sex, language,
religion, political or other conviction, material
standing, birth, education, social status or any
other personal circumstance.
Section 9
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and
has the right to equal protection and benefit of
the law.
South Africa

South Korea

Spain

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss4/1

(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate
directly or indirectly against anyone on one or
more grounds, including race, gender, sex,
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age,
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture,
language and birth.
Ch. II, Article 11
(1) All citizens are equal before the law, and
there may be no discrimination in political,
economic, social, or cultural life on account of
sex, religion, or social status.
(2) No privileged caste is recognized or ever
established in any form.
Chapter II , Section 0, Article 14
Spaniards are equal before the law, without
any discrimination for reasons of birth, race,
sex, religion, opinion, or any other personal or
social condition or circumstance.
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Switzerland

Taiwan
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Art. 12
No restriction may be imposed solely on
grounds of political, religious, cultural or other
such opinions.
Article 8
(1) All humans are equal before the law.
(2) Nobody may be discriminated against,
namely for his or her origin, race, sex, age,
language, social position, way of life,
religious, philosophical, or political
convictions, or because of a corporal or mental
disability.
Article 7
All citizens of the Republic of China,
irrespective of sex, religion, ethnic origin,
class, or party affiliation, shall be equal before
the law.
Section 5
The Thai people, irrespective of their
origins, sexes or religions, shall enjoy equal
protection under this Constitution.

Section 30
All persons are equal before the law and
shall enjoy equal protection under the law.
Thailand
Men and women shall enjoy equal rights.
Unjust discrimination against a person on the
grounds of the difference in origin, race,
language, sex, age, physical or health
condition, personal status, economic or social
standing, religious belief, education or
constitutionally political view, shall not be
permitted.
Article 10
(1) All individuals are equal without any
discrimination before the law, irrespective of
Turkey
language, race, colour, sex, political opinion,
philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any
such considerations.
United Kingdom
Section 4
(This document is
Everyone is equally entitled to all rights
not a written
and freedoms without distinction of any kind,
Constitution (cf.
such as race, color, sex, language, religion,
Section 1), but rather political or other opinion, national or social
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a compilation of
information material
originally provided
by the British
Embassy for
purposes of
publication.)

Vietnam

Zimbabwe

Additional
Provisions
Israel Declaration of
Independence (not
counted)
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origin, property, birth, or other status.
Section 8
(1) Men and women of full age, without
any limitation due to race, nationality or
religion, have the right to marry and to found a
family.
Section 20
(7) Officials working in central and local
government have a long tradition of political
neutrality. A change of minister therefore
does not involve a change of departmental
staff, whose functions remain the same
whichever political party is in office.
Public offices are open to men and women,
without distinction on grounds of sex, religion,
race or color.
Article 54
The citizen, regardless of nationality, sex,
social background, religious belief, cultural
standard, occupation, time of residence, shall,
upon reaching the age of eighteen, have the
right to vote, and, upon reaching the age of
twenty-one, have the right to stand for election
to the National Assembly and the People's
Councils in accordance with the provisions of
the law.
Article 70
(1) The citizen shall enjoy freedom of belief
and of religion; he can follow any religion or
follow none. All religions are equal before the
law.
Section 23
[banning laws that discriminate based on]
“race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions,
colour, creed, sex, gender, marital status or
physical disability”

“The State of Israel . . . will ensure
complete equality of social and political rights
to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion,
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race or sex”
Hawaii (not counted)
Ch. 1 Art. 1 Sec. 1
(e) The right of everyone to be free from
discrimination, regardless of race, creed, color,
age, nationality, religion, gender or disability.
Article III Equal Protection

Historical: Soviet
Union (not counted)
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Section 1 Protection against discrimination
No law shall be enacted prohibiting or
abridging the free exercise of these
fundamental and enumerated rights, nor shall
any individual person be deprived or denied
the equal protections of these rights on
account of race, creed, color, age, nationality,
religion, gender or disability, without due
process of law.
Article 34 [Equality]
(1) Citizens of the USSR are equal before the
law, without distinction of origin, social or
property status, race or nationality, sex,
education, language, attitude to religion, type
and nature of occupation, domicile, or other
status.
(2) The equal rights of citizens of the USSR
are guaranteed in all fields of economic,
political, social, and cultural life.
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